24CA1875 Parental Resp Conc CJR 09-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1875 City and County of Denver District Court No. 19DR30638 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge Honorable Angela Boykins, Magistrate
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.J.R. and E.J.R., Children,
and Concerning Andria Lundquist,
Appellant,
and
Jeremy Raile,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 18, 2025
The Demkowicz Law Firm, LLC, Danielle L. Demkowicz, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellant
Jeremy Raile, Pro Se ¶1 Andria Lundquist (mother) appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate’s decision that mother interfered with
Jeremy Raile’s (father) parenting time and sanctioning her for that
interference. We affirm the order in part, reverse it in part, and
remand the case to the district court.
I. Background
¶2 The parties have two children, C.J.R. and E.J.R. In December
2019, the district court allocated parental responsibilities in
accordance with the parties’ agreement that mother and father
would have equal parenting time. In April 2022, mother filed a
verified motion regarding parenting time disputes in which she
alleged that the children had been missing school during father’s
parenting time. Mother later moved to restrict father’s parenting
time because of father’s ongoing alcohol use.
¶3 Following a child and family investigator’s report, the parties
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) providing that
both parents would submit to sobriety testing before and after their
respective parenting time. The court adopted the MOU as a court
order in May 2023.
1 ¶4 In June 2023, mother told father that she would not allow him
to have further parenting time with the children because he had
violated the MOU by missing a sobriety test. Mother, however, did
not file a motion to restrict father’s parenting time under section
14-10-129(4), C.R.S. 2025.
¶5 About six weeks later, father, who did not have an attorney at
the time, filed a verified motion concerning parenting time disputes
under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, and a motion for
contempt. A magistrate denied father’s motion for contempt and
referred his parenting time motion for mediation. Father filed a
second motion concerning parenting time disputes in October 2023.
¶6 The magistrate conducted a hearing on father’s parenting time
motions in May 2024 and, after hearing the parties’ evidence, found
that mother had interfered with father’s parenting time. The
magistrate concluded that, under the MOU, mother initially had
reason to restrict father’s parenting time because of his missed
sobriety test, but that the court was unable to conduct an expedited
hearing on the matter because mother had not filed a motion to
restrict, as section 14-10-129(4) requires. Noting that, as a
consequence of mother’s actions, father had no contact with the
2 children for nearly a year, the magistrate ordered a ramp-up of
father’s parenting time, immediate phone and video calls between
father and the children, and family therapy for father and the
children at mother’s expense. The magistrate also provided a
procedure for choosing the family therapist: the parties would
confer regarding a family therapist within seven days and, if they
could not agree, father would select the therapist. The magistrate
further ordered makeup parenting time for father.
¶7 Mother petitioned for review of the magistrate’s decision. The
district court denied mother’s petition and adopted the magistrate’s
order.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 When, as here, we review a district court’s order reviewing a
magistrate’s order, we must accept the magistrate’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 639 (Colo. App.
2011); see also C.R.M. 7(a)(9) (a magistrate’s findings of fact may
not be altered unless clearly erroneous). Our review of the district
court’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review; we
apply the same clearly erroneous standard to the magistrate’s
3 findings as does a district court. G.E.R., 264 P.3d at 638-39.
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless there is no
support for them in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012
COA 194, ¶ 12, 292 P.3d 1201, 1204.
¶9 We review questions of law de novo, including whether the
court applied the proper legal standard and correctly interpreted
the MOU. See In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 9, 497 P.3d
524, 528; Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 33, 402 P.3d 1030,
1035. The court’s discretion over parenting issues is broad and we
exercise every presumption in favor of its decision. In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007).
III. Interference with Parenting Time
¶ 10 Mother first argues that the district court (and before it, the
magistrate) erred when it found that she interfered with father’s
parenting time. Specifically, she asserts that the MOU allowed her
to immediately restrict father’s parenting time for a violation of the
MOU and did not require her to file a motion before doing so. We
hold that mother was required to file a motion to restrict under
section 14-10-129(4) and, thus, the district court did not err.
4 A. The Court’s Findings
¶ 11 The MOU outlined several specific ways that father and
mother were to establish their sobriety before and after parenting
time. The MOU defined a “positive sobriety test” as one that is
“positive, missed, dilute, adulterated, or delayed.” The MOU also
contained the following provision:
The parties agree that in the event of a positive sobriety test (as defined in the testing protocol . . .), the positive test shall constitute the basis for an immediate emergency restriction of parenting time pending an evidentiary hearing by the Court as provided under [section] 14-10-129(4).
¶ 12 The magistrate found that, on more than one occasion from
the end of May to early June 2023, father did not precisely conform
to the testing protocol outlined in the MOU and, thus, had a
positive sobriety test under the MOU each time. The magistrate
further found that, in response, mother informed father that she
would not allow him to exercise any parenting time. Moreover,
mother’s counsel had advised her to call law enforcement if father
attempted to exercise parenting time. (We note that mother’s
refusal to allow father to speak with the children by telephone also
violated section 7 of the MOU.) The magistrate also found that,
5 although the MOU provided that a positive test constituted the
basis for an emergency restriction of parenting time, mother later
interfered with father’s parenting time by not filing a motion to
restrict under section 14-10-129(4).
¶ 13 Further, the magistrate found it was not up to father to
schedule his own evidentiary hearing, as mother contended. The
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA1875 Parental Resp Conc CJR 09-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1875 City and County of Denver District Court No. 19DR30638 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge Honorable Angela Boykins, Magistrate
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.J.R. and E.J.R., Children,
and Concerning Andria Lundquist,
Appellant,
and
Jeremy Raile,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 18, 2025
The Demkowicz Law Firm, LLC, Danielle L. Demkowicz, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellant
Jeremy Raile, Pro Se ¶1 Andria Lundquist (mother) appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate’s decision that mother interfered with
Jeremy Raile’s (father) parenting time and sanctioning her for that
interference. We affirm the order in part, reverse it in part, and
remand the case to the district court.
I. Background
¶2 The parties have two children, C.J.R. and E.J.R. In December
2019, the district court allocated parental responsibilities in
accordance with the parties’ agreement that mother and father
would have equal parenting time. In April 2022, mother filed a
verified motion regarding parenting time disputes in which she
alleged that the children had been missing school during father’s
parenting time. Mother later moved to restrict father’s parenting
time because of father’s ongoing alcohol use.
¶3 Following a child and family investigator’s report, the parties
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) providing that
both parents would submit to sobriety testing before and after their
respective parenting time. The court adopted the MOU as a court
order in May 2023.
1 ¶4 In June 2023, mother told father that she would not allow him
to have further parenting time with the children because he had
violated the MOU by missing a sobriety test. Mother, however, did
not file a motion to restrict father’s parenting time under section
14-10-129(4), C.R.S. 2025.
¶5 About six weeks later, father, who did not have an attorney at
the time, filed a verified motion concerning parenting time disputes
under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, and a motion for
contempt. A magistrate denied father’s motion for contempt and
referred his parenting time motion for mediation. Father filed a
second motion concerning parenting time disputes in October 2023.
¶6 The magistrate conducted a hearing on father’s parenting time
motions in May 2024 and, after hearing the parties’ evidence, found
that mother had interfered with father’s parenting time. The
magistrate concluded that, under the MOU, mother initially had
reason to restrict father’s parenting time because of his missed
sobriety test, but that the court was unable to conduct an expedited
hearing on the matter because mother had not filed a motion to
restrict, as section 14-10-129(4) requires. Noting that, as a
consequence of mother’s actions, father had no contact with the
2 children for nearly a year, the magistrate ordered a ramp-up of
father’s parenting time, immediate phone and video calls between
father and the children, and family therapy for father and the
children at mother’s expense. The magistrate also provided a
procedure for choosing the family therapist: the parties would
confer regarding a family therapist within seven days and, if they
could not agree, father would select the therapist. The magistrate
further ordered makeup parenting time for father.
¶7 Mother petitioned for review of the magistrate’s decision. The
district court denied mother’s petition and adopted the magistrate’s
order.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 When, as here, we review a district court’s order reviewing a
magistrate’s order, we must accept the magistrate’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 639 (Colo. App.
2011); see also C.R.M. 7(a)(9) (a magistrate’s findings of fact may
not be altered unless clearly erroneous). Our review of the district
court’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review; we
apply the same clearly erroneous standard to the magistrate’s
3 findings as does a district court. G.E.R., 264 P.3d at 638-39.
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless there is no
support for them in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012
COA 194, ¶ 12, 292 P.3d 1201, 1204.
¶9 We review questions of law de novo, including whether the
court applied the proper legal standard and correctly interpreted
the MOU. See In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 9, 497 P.3d
524, 528; Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 33, 402 P.3d 1030,
1035. The court’s discretion over parenting issues is broad and we
exercise every presumption in favor of its decision. In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007).
III. Interference with Parenting Time
¶ 10 Mother first argues that the district court (and before it, the
magistrate) erred when it found that she interfered with father’s
parenting time. Specifically, she asserts that the MOU allowed her
to immediately restrict father’s parenting time for a violation of the
MOU and did not require her to file a motion before doing so. We
hold that mother was required to file a motion to restrict under
section 14-10-129(4) and, thus, the district court did not err.
4 A. The Court’s Findings
¶ 11 The MOU outlined several specific ways that father and
mother were to establish their sobriety before and after parenting
time. The MOU defined a “positive sobriety test” as one that is
“positive, missed, dilute, adulterated, or delayed.” The MOU also
contained the following provision:
The parties agree that in the event of a positive sobriety test (as defined in the testing protocol . . .), the positive test shall constitute the basis for an immediate emergency restriction of parenting time pending an evidentiary hearing by the Court as provided under [section] 14-10-129(4).
¶ 12 The magistrate found that, on more than one occasion from
the end of May to early June 2023, father did not precisely conform
to the testing protocol outlined in the MOU and, thus, had a
positive sobriety test under the MOU each time. The magistrate
further found that, in response, mother informed father that she
would not allow him to exercise any parenting time. Moreover,
mother’s counsel had advised her to call law enforcement if father
attempted to exercise parenting time. (We note that mother’s
refusal to allow father to speak with the children by telephone also
violated section 7 of the MOU.) The magistrate also found that,
5 although the MOU provided that a positive test constituted the
basis for an emergency restriction of parenting time, mother later
interfered with father’s parenting time by not filing a motion to
restrict under section 14-10-129(4).
¶ 13 Further, the magistrate found it was not up to father to
schedule his own evidentiary hearing, as mother contended. The
magistrate rejected mother’s assertion that the court should have
set a hearing sua sponte, reasoning that it was not “going to be
involved in the parties’ life” and “wouldn’t have known” about
mother’s actions absent the filing of a motion. Accordingly, the
magistrate determined that mother was required to file a motion if
she wished to restrict father’s parenting time and that she
interfered with father’s parenting time when she did not do so.
B. Discussion
¶ 14 On appeal, mother asserts that the district court erred
because, other than finding that mother failed to file a motion to
restrict under section 14-10-129(4), its order, like the magistrate’s
order, lacks specific findings about how mother interfered with
father’s parenting time. But it is not clear to us, nor does mother
explain, what further facts the district court needed to find.
6 ¶ 15 The district court noted that the MOU contemplated mother’s
initial restriction and provided the basis for an emergency
restriction of parenting time pending a hearing. However, it
concluded that mother did not take the next step of moving to
restrict father’s parenting time so the court could hold the hearing.
For nearly a year, mother continued to tell father that he was not
allowed to see the children and that she would call law enforcement
if he tried to do so. It is undisputed that father did not have any
contact with the children after June 2023. Accordingly, no
additional facts were necessary to support the court’s determination
that mother interfered with father’s parenting time. See
§ 14-10-129(4) (requiring a parent who believes that his or her
children are in imminent danger due to parenting time to file a
motion to restrict that time).
¶ 16 To the extent mother asserts that father’s filing of a verified
motion regarding parenting time disputes under section
14-10-129.5 remedied her failure to file a motion to restrict under
section 14-10-129(4), we disagree. Motions to restrict parenting
time filed under section 14-10-129(4) are decided in an expedited
manner; they “shall be heard and ruled upon by the court not later
7 than fourteen days” after filing. However, a court has more time —
thirty-five days — to take action on a section 14-10-129.5 motion
and is not required to set a hearing on the motion. Rather, it may
deny such a motion, refer the matter for mediation, or hold a
hearing. Indeed, the magistrate referred father’s section
14-10-129.5 motion for mediation and, when that proved
unsuccessful, set a hearing on it. The magistrate did not hear and
rule on father’s motion under section 14-10-129.5 for nearly a year.
¶ 17 Because of the expedited nature of motions to restrict
parenting time under section 14-10-129(4), and the MOU’s explicit
mention of that statute, we cannot agree that father’s separate
motion under 14-10-129.5 absolved mother of the requirement to
file a section 14-10-129(4) motion after she restricted father’s
parenting time following his positive sobriety test.
¶ 18 We are also unpersuaded by mother’s assertion that she could
not ask for an evidentiary hearing on father’s behalf because her
counsel does not represent father. Neither the MOU nor the statute
contemplates that a party’s counsel will file a motion on another
party’s behalf. Under mother’s interpretation, a parent could never
file a motion to restrict under section 14-10-129(4) because it would
8 be “on the other parent’s behalf.” We decline to interpret the
statute or the MOU in this way. See In re Marriage of Roosa, 89
P.3d 524, 528 (Colo. App. 2004) (“We presume that the legislature
intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and
we will not read a statute to provide an unreasonable or absurd
result.”).
¶ 19 Nor are we persuaded by mother’s assertion that the court,
and not the moving parties, must set an evidentiary hearing on
restricting parenting time. Mother’s interference with father’s
parenting time did not stem from her failure to “set” an evidentiary
hearing under section 14-10-129(4), but, rather, from her failure to
file anything with the court after mother restricted father’s
parenting time. As the district court aptly noted, without a motion
first being filed, the court would not know if a restriction was
occurring or “get involved” in the parties’ lives and set a hearing on
the restriction.
IV. Sanctions
A. Applicable Law
¶ 20 Section 14-10-129.5 governs disputes over parenting time. If,
after a hearing, the district court finds that a parent has not
9 complied with a parenting time order or schedule, the court shall
enter an order sanctioning the noncompliant parent.
§ 14-10-129.5(2). Such sanctions may include, as relevant here, an
order requiring that makeup parenting time be provided to the
aggrieved parent, or any other order promoting the children’s best
interests. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d); In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning W.F-L., 2018 COA 164, ¶ 12, 433 P.3d 168, 170. And
the court may make “[a]ny other order that may promote the best
interests of the . . . children involved.” § 14-10-129.5(2)(h).
B. Makeup Parenting Time
¶ 21 Mother argues that the magistrate (and, later, the district
court) erred by ordering makeup parenting time for father.
Although we hold that the magistrate did not err by ordering
makeup parenting time in general, the order is unclear regarding
the number of days of makeup parenting time. For this reason, we
reverse the makeup parenting time order and remand the case for
clarification of this point.
¶ 22 Mother first asserts that father waived any request for makeup
parenting time because he did not ask for it in his section
14-10-129.5 parenting time disputes motion. Although true, father
10 was acting pro se at the time and filed a contemporaneous
contempt motion in which he sought makeup parenting time.
Moreover, father requested makeup parenting time in his trial
management certificate. And mother does not claim she was
unaware that father was seeking makeup parenting time, or that
she was surprised or unable to present evidence on this issue at the
hearing. Thus, we cannot agree that father waived any request for
makeup parenting time or that his failure to request it in his motion
prejudiced mother.
¶ 23 To the extent that mother asserts that the magistrate did not
have the general authority to order makeup parenting time, we
disagree. See § 14-10-129.5(2)(b), (d), (f), (h). However, we agree
that the magistrate’s order regarding the amount of makeup
parenting time is unclear, and the magistrate must clarify this
amount on remand.
¶ 24 The magistrate’s written order contained the following
provision:
Father shall have makeup Parenting Time from June 12, 2023 – May 20, 2024, or 34 days. Parenting Time was 50-50, so father’s make up time shall be 172 days. Father’s make up Parenting Time shall be taken at no more than
11 3 days each week, shall not include a holiday unless missed between June 12, 2023 – May 20, 2024, and shall not begin until Parenting Time returns to week on/week off.
¶ 25 From the face of the order, it is unclear whether the magistrate
ordered 34 or 172 days of makeup parenting time. The district
court did not clarify this provision when it adopted the magistrate’s
order. If the magistrate meant to order 172 days of makeup
parenting time, then it is unclear how father could achieve that
time because the magistrate also ordered that makeup parenting
time could not begin until the ramp-up to 50-50 parenting time was
complete — four months, according to the court’s schedule.
Moreover, the magistrate ordered that father could not take more
than three makeup days each week. Accordingly, it is unclear how
father could make up 172 days, given that makeup parenting time
must occur within a year from the order. See § 14-10-129.5(d)(II).
¶ 26 Mother also asserts that father is not entitled to make up
parenting time because he stopped providing sobriety tests between
June 6, 2023, and April 26, 2024. Although we disagree that this
fact prevented the magistrate from ordering any makeup parenting
time, on remand, the court must determine if father is eligible for
12 makeup parenting time for this period or if he missed parenting
time voluntarily by not continuing the testing protocol and,
therefore, is not entitled to makeup parenting time for this period.
C. Family Therapy
¶ 27 To the extent mother generally contends that the magistrate
(and later, the district court) lacked authority to order family
therapy for father and the children and to order her to pay for it, we
disagree. See § 14-10-129(2)(b.3), (b.7) (allowing the court to order
a noncomplying parent to bear the expense of parental education or
family therapy as a sanction for interference with parenting time);
§ 14-10-129.5(2)(h) (providing that the court may enter any other
order promoting the best interests of the children); see also In re
Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 317 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding
that it was in the best interests of the children for one party to
participate in anger management counseling).
¶ 28 Mother also argues that father waived family therapy as a
sanction because, in his motion, he did not ask the court to modify
decision-making or the parties’ financial provisions regarding the
children’s expenses. However, father requested family therapy in
his trial management certificate, and again, mother does not assert
13 that she was surprised by father’s request for family therapy or was
unable to address it at the hearing.
¶ 29 Nor do we perceive that the magistrate or the district court
generally modified the parties’ agreements regarding
decision-making or financial provisions. Rather, the magistrate
found that parenting time with father was in the children’s best
interests, but that father and the children needed time to get to
know each other again. It therefore ordered family therapy between
father and the children and ordered mother to pay for the family
therapy. It also set forth a procedure for selecting the family
therapist that required the parties to confer on a therapist, but, if
the parties could not agree, provided that father would choose the
therapist. We do not perceive, and mother does not explain, how
this order related to family therapy altered the court’s prior orders
related to decision-making and financial provisions.
¶ 30 Mother also asserts that the court needed to consider section
14-10-131, C.R.S. 2025, when modifying decision-making
responsibility, as section 14-10-129.5(2)(f) requires. But for the
reasons discussed above, we do not agree that the discrete family
therapy order generally modified decision-making responsibilities.
14 ¶ 31 Lastly, mother contends that the magistrate (and later, the
district court) erred by not following section 13-22-313(1), C.R.S.
2025, which prohibits a court from ordering “any ancillary form of
alternative dispute resolution” when one party claims to be the
victim of physical or psychological abuse. But mother did not
present this argument to the district court in her petition for review
of the magistrate’s decision, and we will not consider it for the first
time on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403
(Colo. App. 2006) (holding that a party appealing a magistrate’s
decision must raise the particular issue in the district court,
thereby allowing the district court to correct any error, before
raising the issue on appeal).
V. Disposition
¶ 32 We reverse the portion of the district court’s order addressing
the amount of makeup parenting time and remand to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion;
otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.