25CA0320 Parental Resp Conc AMR 10-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0320 Delta County District Court No. 24DR87 Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.M.R. and R.L.A., Children,
and Concerning Stacia Marie Meyers,
Appellant,
and
Michael Andre Romero,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 2, 2025
Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant
Law Office of J.M. Distefano, Jacqueline M. Distefano, Crawford, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Stacia Mari Meyers (mother) appeals the district court’s
permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities between her
and Michael Andre Romero (father). We reverse the parenting time
order and remand for the district court to enter a new parenting
time order based on mother’s stated intention to relocate to
Alabama. In all other respects, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Three months before the permanent orders hearing, mother
notified the district court of her intent to move with the parties’
children to Alabama. She sought orders that would name her the
children’s primary residential parent and sole decision-maker.
¶3 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered that the
children remain enrolled in school in Colorado and found that their
best interests would be served if the parents exercised equal
parenting time, with mutual decision-making.
II. Discussion
¶4 Mother contends that the district court failed to follow
Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158 (Colo. 2005), and In re Marriage
of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, when it issued a parenting plan that
was not feasible for two parents living in different states, Alabama
1 and Colorado, and asks us to reverse the permanent orders. Father
concedes that the court erred by issuing a parenting plan that
didn’t account for mother living in Alabama but asks us not to
disturb the court’s best interests findings or its judgment awarding
joint decision-making.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 When, as here, a parent notifies the court before permanent
orders are entered of the parent’s plan to relocate, the district court
must resolve the allocation of parental responsibilities under
section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at
161. In this context, neither party has vested parenting time rights,
and each party may become the child’s primary residential parent
depending on the court’s best interests analysis. Id. In conducting
a best interests analysis, the court must consider the factors
identified in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) that are relevant to its
determination. In re Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. App.
2001).
¶6 The court has no statutory authority to order a parent to live
in a specific location and must make its initial determination of
parental responsibilities, including parenting time, based on the
2 location in which a parent intends to live. Morgan, ¶ 6; see also
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII) (requiring the court to consider “[t]he
physical proximity of the parties to each other as this relates to the
practical considerations of parenting time”).
¶7 A district court has broad discretion in deciding what
allocation of parenting time is in the children’s best interests, and
we may not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion.
In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. The court abuses
its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Id. However, we review de novo whether
the district court applied the proper legal standard. Id. at ¶ 10.
B. Analysis
¶8 The district court issued a year-round week-on, week-off
parenting time schedule, the terms of which required the parties to
exchange the children on “Monday afternoons after school during
the academic year and at 5:00 p.m. at all other times.” The court
also ordered that the children “will continue to attend” school in
Colorado. This order is “impractical to implement” if mother lives in
Alabama, and thus “implicitly requires mother to live in a specific
location (Colorado).” See Morgan, ¶¶ 9-10.
3 ¶9 In Morgan, a division of this court reversed a year-round
5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule that implicitly required mother to
remain in Colorado, over her stated intent to relocate to California.
Id. at ¶ 15. Relying on Spahmer, the division concluded that
mother’s wish to move to California was the premise from which the
court’s legal analysis had to begin. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing Spahmer, 113
P.3d at 164). By failing to consider mother’s intent to relocate, the
magistrate in Morgan, like the district court in Spahmer, “did not
properly take into account the parties’ physical proximity to each
other, thereby abusing its discretion and exceeding its statutory
authority.” Id. at ¶ 10.
¶ 10 Similarly here, mother never wavered in her stated intent to
move to Alabama with the children. Three months before the
permanent orders hearing, she filed a proposed parenting plan
premised on her relocation. At the hearing, mother reaffirmed that
desire in her opening statement, in her testimony, and in closing
argument. Mother testified that she wanted to move to Alabama to
be close to her sister, to have access to a trade school and medical
facilities for her oldest daughter (not of this relationship), and to
take advantage of the lower cost of living. Mother had her home
4 appraised and had been exploring career options in Alabama. And
she had obtained court permission to relocate with her other two
daughters in a separate case.
¶ 11 True, mother testified that whether she could “even go forward
with moving” depended on the outcome of the permanent orders
hearing. But mother’s admission that she would not move without
her children didn’t relieve the district court of its “obligation to
make the difficult decision to allocate parenting time” with mother
in Alabama and father in Colorado. See id. at ¶ 14.
¶ 12 Accordingly, we reverse the parenting time order. On remand,
the district court must accept the location in which each party
intends to live (father in Colorado, mother in Alabama) and allocate
parenting time accordingly. The district court “has no authority on
remand to issue an order that effectively coerces mother into
abandoning her plans to relocate” to Alabama. Id. at ¶ 15.
However, the court may exercise its discretion “to fashion an
alternative plan” that allows mother to remain in Colorado if she
decides against relocation in the event that the court names father
as the primary residential parent in Colorado. Id.
5 ¶ 13 To the extent mother argues that the district court erred when
it ordered that the parties share all major decisions, we discern no
abuse of discretion in that order. The court’s findings, which enjoy
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25CA0320 Parental Resp Conc AMR 10-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0320 Delta County District Court No. 24DR87 Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.M.R. and R.L.A., Children,
and Concerning Stacia Marie Meyers,
Appellant,
and
Michael Andre Romero,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 2, 2025
Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant
Law Office of J.M. Distefano, Jacqueline M. Distefano, Crawford, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Stacia Mari Meyers (mother) appeals the district court’s
permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities between her
and Michael Andre Romero (father). We reverse the parenting time
order and remand for the district court to enter a new parenting
time order based on mother’s stated intention to relocate to
Alabama. In all other respects, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Three months before the permanent orders hearing, mother
notified the district court of her intent to move with the parties’
children to Alabama. She sought orders that would name her the
children’s primary residential parent and sole decision-maker.
¶3 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered that the
children remain enrolled in school in Colorado and found that their
best interests would be served if the parents exercised equal
parenting time, with mutual decision-making.
II. Discussion
¶4 Mother contends that the district court failed to follow
Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158 (Colo. 2005), and In re Marriage
of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, when it issued a parenting plan that
was not feasible for two parents living in different states, Alabama
1 and Colorado, and asks us to reverse the permanent orders. Father
concedes that the court erred by issuing a parenting plan that
didn’t account for mother living in Alabama but asks us not to
disturb the court’s best interests findings or its judgment awarding
joint decision-making.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 When, as here, a parent notifies the court before permanent
orders are entered of the parent’s plan to relocate, the district court
must resolve the allocation of parental responsibilities under
section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at
161. In this context, neither party has vested parenting time rights,
and each party may become the child’s primary residential parent
depending on the court’s best interests analysis. Id. In conducting
a best interests analysis, the court must consider the factors
identified in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) that are relevant to its
determination. In re Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. App.
2001).
¶6 The court has no statutory authority to order a parent to live
in a specific location and must make its initial determination of
parental responsibilities, including parenting time, based on the
2 location in which a parent intends to live. Morgan, ¶ 6; see also
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII) (requiring the court to consider “[t]he
physical proximity of the parties to each other as this relates to the
practical considerations of parenting time”).
¶7 A district court has broad discretion in deciding what
allocation of parenting time is in the children’s best interests, and
we may not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion.
In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. The court abuses
its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Id. However, we review de novo whether
the district court applied the proper legal standard. Id. at ¶ 10.
B. Analysis
¶8 The district court issued a year-round week-on, week-off
parenting time schedule, the terms of which required the parties to
exchange the children on “Monday afternoons after school during
the academic year and at 5:00 p.m. at all other times.” The court
also ordered that the children “will continue to attend” school in
Colorado. This order is “impractical to implement” if mother lives in
Alabama, and thus “implicitly requires mother to live in a specific
location (Colorado).” See Morgan, ¶¶ 9-10.
3 ¶9 In Morgan, a division of this court reversed a year-round
5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule that implicitly required mother to
remain in Colorado, over her stated intent to relocate to California.
Id. at ¶ 15. Relying on Spahmer, the division concluded that
mother’s wish to move to California was the premise from which the
court’s legal analysis had to begin. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing Spahmer, 113
P.3d at 164). By failing to consider mother’s intent to relocate, the
magistrate in Morgan, like the district court in Spahmer, “did not
properly take into account the parties’ physical proximity to each
other, thereby abusing its discretion and exceeding its statutory
authority.” Id. at ¶ 10.
¶ 10 Similarly here, mother never wavered in her stated intent to
move to Alabama with the children. Three months before the
permanent orders hearing, she filed a proposed parenting plan
premised on her relocation. At the hearing, mother reaffirmed that
desire in her opening statement, in her testimony, and in closing
argument. Mother testified that she wanted to move to Alabama to
be close to her sister, to have access to a trade school and medical
facilities for her oldest daughter (not of this relationship), and to
take advantage of the lower cost of living. Mother had her home
4 appraised and had been exploring career options in Alabama. And
she had obtained court permission to relocate with her other two
daughters in a separate case.
¶ 11 True, mother testified that whether she could “even go forward
with moving” depended on the outcome of the permanent orders
hearing. But mother’s admission that she would not move without
her children didn’t relieve the district court of its “obligation to
make the difficult decision to allocate parenting time” with mother
in Alabama and father in Colorado. See id. at ¶ 14.
¶ 12 Accordingly, we reverse the parenting time order. On remand,
the district court must accept the location in which each party
intends to live (father in Colorado, mother in Alabama) and allocate
parenting time accordingly. The district court “has no authority on
remand to issue an order that effectively coerces mother into
abandoning her plans to relocate” to Alabama. Id. at ¶ 15.
However, the court may exercise its discretion “to fashion an
alternative plan” that allows mother to remain in Colorado if she
decides against relocation in the event that the court names father
as the primary residential parent in Colorado. Id.
5 ¶ 13 To the extent mother argues that the district court erred when
it ordered that the parties share all major decisions, we discern no
abuse of discretion in that order. The court’s findings, which enjoy
record support, reflect its consideration of the children’s best
interests after having considered any conflicting evidence. See
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326,
335 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that we will disturb the district
court’s factual findings only if they lack record support); See In re
Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Colo. App. 1998)
(noting that it’s district court’s responsibility to judge the credibility
of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence).
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The portion of the judgment concerning decision-making
responsibility is affirmed. The portion of the judgment allocating
parenting time is reversed, and the case is remanded with
directions to enter a new parenting time plan in accordance with
Spahmer and Morgan. Although we don’t disturb the court’s factual
findings, we recognize that the children’s circumstances may have
changed since the district court entered its judgment. See In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27.
6 Thus, although on remand the court may rely on the existing record
in determining the children’s best interests, it must also provide the
parties with the opportunity to present additional evidence
concerning the children’s current circumstances. Id. The existing
allocation of parental responsibilities shall remain in place pending
new orders on remand. See id.
¶ 15 Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal
remain undisturbed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.