Pardue v. Johnson

307 So. 2d 682, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3009
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 21, 1975
DocketNo. 12507
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 307 So. 2d 682 (Pardue v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pardue v. Johnson, 307 So. 2d 682, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3009 (La. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

HALL, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees for damages arising out of an accident in which an automobile occupied by plaintiffs was struck from behind by a truck driven, owned and insured by defendants-appellants.

After carefully reviewing the record, we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of the district court as expressed in the following comprehensive written opinion:

“On October 25, 1972, Eva Pardue was driving her 1960 Ford sedan in a westerly direction on Louisiana Highway 33, traveling from Marion to Farmerville in Union Parish, Louisiana. Eunice Gillum was riding as a passenger on the front seat beside Mrs. Pardue. The weather was clear and the road surface dry. The highway in question is a two lane blacktop road. At approximately 10:20 o’clock A.M., at a point about three miles northeast of the Farmerville city limits, the Pardue vehicle was struck from the rear by a 1972 Mack truck-tractor driven by James D. Rockett and owned by Raymond Johnson. As a result of the collision, the Pardue automobile was demolished and the occupants hospitalized with serious injuries.

“This suit was filed by Eva Pardue and Eunice Gillum against James D. Rockett, Raymond Johnson and the latter’s liability insurance carrier, Employer Insurance Company of Wausau, for the damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a consequence of the described accident. After setting forth particulars assertedly constituting negligence on the part of Rockett, the plaintiffs also contend that the truck driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Defendants answered denying that Rockett was negligent and alleging that the accident was caused by Mrs. Par-due making a sudden stop in the path of the truck without giving any prior signals of her intention to stop. Contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Pardue was specially pleaded. In addition, the defendants joined Mrs. Pardue as a third party defendant, averring that if Rockett was deemed negligent, then Mrs. Pardue was also guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident and would be liable for one-half of any sum found to be owed by defendants to Mrs. Gillum. Mrs. Pardue answered the third party demand and made her liability insurance carrier, the Continental Insurance Company, an additional third party defendant. Continental Insurance Company filed an answer, admitting the existence of its policy and pleading the policy limits.

“LIABILITY

“Except for the critical question of whether Mrs. Pardue stopped suddenly just prior to the collision, the facts of this accident are largely undisputed. Rockett had been to Huttig, Arkansas, and was returning to Lillie, Louisiana, with his large Mack truck loaded with sawdust. He was familiar with the road, having sometimes made this same trip as many as four times in one day. He had been following the Pardue car for some four or five miles prior to reaching the accident site, varying the distance between the two vehicles from two to four car lengths or from 40 to 80 feet. Both vehicles were traveling at speeds of between 30 and 40 miles per hour. Because of its size and the weight of its load the truck would slow down on inclines and accelerate when going down hill. The variations in road conditions presumably accounted for the fluctuation in the distance between the two vehicles, as they traveled toward Farmerville.

“Since the highway was fairly level for about 500 feet back from the accident site in the direction from which the vehicles were coming, Rockett should have been able to have continuous observation of the Pardue car over that section of the highway. Although there was a slight dip in the road, because of the height of the [684]*684truck cab, this would not have obscured the driver's vision of a preceding automobile. As Mrs. Pardue passed an intersecting road and a place of business known as Kennedy’s Store situated on her right side of the road, the rear of her car was struck by the right front of the Mack truck. The force of the impact knocked the Pardue vehicle into a telephone pole on the right side of the road. The car then bounced back into the highway and came to rest facing back in the direction from which the occupants had been traveling.

“Photographs received in evidence showed damage to the right front of the truck (P-2) and the rear of the car (P-7). Examination of the latter picture reveals that the primary point of impact to the car appears to have been on the left rear, considering the angle at which the rear bumper was bent. Skid marks on the road surface with reference to the point of impact indicate that the truck brakes were not applied with force until the truck was a few feet from hitting the rear of the car (P-11). The collision occurred in both vehicles’ right lane of traffic.

“The general rule concerning the duty of the driver of a following vehicle is enunciated by LSA-R.S. 32:81 as follows:

‘The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.’

“It is a firmly established tenet of our law that the operator of a following vehicle is required to keep his car under control, to closely observe the forward vehicle and follow at a safe distance. If a rear-end collision occurs, the following motorist is presumed to be negligent. Palmisano v. Thibodeaux (La.App.1969) 219 So.2d 196; Calvert Fire Insurance Company v. Barlow (La.App.1968) 215 So.2d 392; Walters v. Seven Up Bottling Co. of Alexandria, Inc. (La.App.1968) 212 So.2d 443.

“The Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Burns v. Evans Cooperage Company (1945) 208 La. 406, 23 So.2d 165, elaborated upon this rule of law as follows:

‘It is the duty of the driver operating an automobile, upon approaching another automobile, from the rear while both cars are traveling in the same direction, to exercise a great deal of care. He must look out for the person ahead, realizing that that person is engaged in handling a high-powered machine requiring constant attention and that his lookout is forward and not backward. The driver of the rear car must keep a safe distance behind the front car and must have his machine under such control as to avoid injury to the car ahead or to his own car so long as the driver of the front car is driving in accordance with his rights.’

“There is an exception to this rule that the following motorist is presumed negligent where a rear-end collision occurs. The exception is operable when the lead vehicle negligently and without warning-stops or suddenly slows down, thereby creating a hazard for the following driver. Calvert Fire Insurance Company v. Barlow, supra; Porter v. Barron (La.App.1966) 185 So.2d 304. The burden of proving the exceptional circumstances is upon the following motorist who makes this allegation.

“Since it was established that the Mack truck ran into the rear end of the Pardue car, it is presumed that the truck driver was negligent. Defendants then had the burden of proving the allegation that Mrs. Pardue made a sudden stop without signaling in front of the truck. They sought to sustain this burden by showing that Mrs. Pardue made an admission to this effect immediately after the accident to Sgt. A. C. Buckley, the investigating officer, Jerry Antley, a bystander, and Jerome McKenzie, [685]*685the ambulance driver who picked up the injured parties. However, no one of these witnesses testified upon the trial that Mrs.

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Related

Nami v. Peninsular Fire Insurance
355 So. 2d 1036 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1978)
Pardue v. Johnson
310 So. 2d 853 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
307 So. 2d 682, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pardue-v-johnson-lactapp-1975.