Pardalis Technology Licensing, L.L.C. v. International Business Machines Corporation

District Court, E.D. Texas·Decided September 12, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-00452·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

§ PARDALIS TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, § LLC, § Plaintiff, § v. § Case No. 2:22-cv-00452-JRG-RSP § INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS § MACHINES CORPORATION, § Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is IBM’s Motion to Strike Portions of Mr. Novak’s Expert Report (Dkt. No. 131.) For the reasons provided below, the Motion is DENIED. I. APPLICABLE LAW An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission

at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010). Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law) (“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary

system.’ . . . Thus, while exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross- examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). II. ANALYSIS A. HYPERLEDGER FABRIC INFRINGEMENT THEORIES IBM contends that Pardalis has introduced a number of new infringement theories in Mr. Novak’s expert report that were not included in Pardalis’s infringement contentions. IBM contends this failure is particularly inexcusable since the source code at issue, the Hyperledger Fabric source code, is publicly available and Pardalis never attempted to amend its contentions. First, IBM contends Mr. Novak introduces new theories as to “unique identifier.” Pardalis’s contentions identified “transaction hash or transaction ID” as examples of how the accused products meet the “unique identifier” limitation, but Mr. Novak’s report further identifies “keys” to satisfy the limitation.

Second, IBM makes a similar argument as to “offer data” and “permissions … in the offer data.” Mr. Novak identifies “smart contracts,” but the contentions never identify “smart contracts” for this limitation, although they did for others. Third, IBM contends that Pardalis did not disclose a theory of how the accused products “enable members identified in the offer data to access and change data corresponding to data that is contained in the immutable informational object to an extent and for a duration as defined by permissions set by the authorized authoring member in the offer data.” IBM specifically identifies “to an extent and for a duration…” as not being disclosed. Mr. Novak’s report now identifies a smart contract’s “maturity date,” “redeem time,” and “expiration dates/data.” Fourth, IBM contends Pardalis alleged “authenticating” “within the ordered transaction”

“by applying a chaincode-specific validation policy and using a consensus mechanism” in the contentions. Whereas Mr. Novak points to “transaction proposal endorsement methods” prior to the ordering process. Fifth, the contentions point to “permissioned user” as the claimed “identified accessing member.” However, IBM contends Mr. Novak identifies “peers designated within the smart contract” as “identified accessing members.” Sixth, IBM argues that Pardalis identified a “peer node” as the “authoring server” but Mr. Novak identifies “a Certificate Authority and a Membership Service Provider.”

Seventh, IBM argues that Pardalis failed to identify how the accused products performed the “mapping” limitations. Pardalis stated in the contentions that “each Accused Product includes a server node that comprises an authoring server that is configured to map the association of the transaction IDs… of each transaction with the block’s … hash value.” Now, Mr. Novak opines that “a block header … configured to associate the set hash of the block with the transaction IDs of each committed transaction within that block” meets the “mapping” limitation. Finally, the contentions identified “current state database” for the “memory” limitation. Now, Mr. Novak identifies the “distributed ledger” as meeting the “memory” limitation. IBM argues that Pardalis’ contentions identify both of these features but contends they are separate. IBM argues that each of the identified changes should be stricken under the Court’s good

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Related

Mathis v. Exxon Corporation
302 F.3d 448 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. Valencia
600 F.3d 389 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
526 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1999)