Parchen v. Ashby

5 Mont. 68
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 5 Mont. 68 (Parchen v. Ashby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parchen v. Ashby, 5 Mont. 68 (Mo. 1883).

Opinion

Wade, 0. J.

This controversy arose over a strip of land sixteen feet wide on Eodney street, in the town of Helena, and extending westerly ninety feet in the rear of lots owned by plaintiffs, which they claim is an alley, and prosecute this action to have the same so declared, and to perpetually enjoin the defendant from obstructing the same. The defendant denies that the ground is, or that it ought to be, declared an alley, and claims to own the Same by virtue of a deed from the probate judge.

On the trial 'the court found the following facts and conclusions of law:

First. That Scott’s addition to the town of Helena was laid out, surveyed and platted in the spring of the year 1866, with sixteen-feet alleys through the center of the blocks thereof, in an easterly and westerly direction, in which was comprised the ninety-feet alley in controversy, the title to the ground of which, and as to all the ground occupied by the town, and the streets and alleys thereof, being at the time, and until the entry of the town site in 1869, in the government of the United States.

Second. That the original occupants of the lots adjoining that portion of the alley involved in this action respected and recognized said alley, as did their grantees and successors in interest, up to and at the date of the entry of said town site by the probate judge of said ■county, and that the respective parties hereto accepted and received deeds to their lots adjacent thereto, bounded by said alley, and in locating, fencing and occupying their lots, respected, marked and bounded said alley. At the western boundary of the ground in controversy, and at the eastern boundary of the Watson lot, said alley, as surveyed and platted in 1866, was obstructed by a fence shortly after the alley was laid out and surveyed, and thereafter was not opened or used as au alley west[83]*83ward from said ninety feet. There is no proof that this ninety feet was laid out as a cul-de-sac.

Third. That the ninety feet of said alley was used as an alley during the years 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871, up to the date of the obstruction thereof by defendant. The principal use to which the alley was-put was for taking in wood and hay, and for ingress and egress of the cows of the adjacent occupants. But the alley ever was a thoroughfare, so far as a street with an outlet at one end, and closed at the other, can become such. o

Fourth. That said plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have erected valuable improvements upon their lots adjacent to said ninety feet of alley, and had and held a right of property therein at . the time of the entry of said town site by said probate judge, and the same was used as an alley by all the inhabitants of said town residing in the vicinity thereof.

Fifth. That the same was an alley at the time of the acquisition of the title of the defendant and his predecessors in interest, to the lots owned by him adjacent thereto, and was so designated in his deed to said property, and was acquiesced in and recognized as such by himself and grantors up to the time of his obstruction of the same.

Sixth. That the map of the town,made by the direction of the probate judge as trustee, and presented to the county commissioners, and approved by them under the town site act, did not show that the locus in quo was an alley. No action of the county commissioners has been taken to lay out this ground as an alley, highway or cul-de-sac. No appeal or proceedings were ever taken from the survey or map made by direction of the probate judge and filed with the county clerk and recorder, and approved by the board of county commissioners. No appeal was ever taken from the decision and action of the probate judge conveying that property to defendant, [84]*84or from the survey and map, whereby the alley was ignored and the same put down as a lot for sale.

Seventh. That notice to occupants by said probate judge to prove up and enter their lots was duly given.

Eighth. That said defendant, on the 6th day of December, A. D. 1871, made application to enter the property designated in his answer, and on the-day of-, 1872, received a deed therefor from the probate judge.

And as conclusions of law the court found:

First. That at the time of the entry of said town site by the probate judge, the said plaintiffs and other adjacent lot-owners on said alley had a subsisting and valid right therein, and to the use thereof as such alley, and the probate judge entered the same in connection with said town site in trust, with the usual rights and interests in and to such alley.

Second. That being an alley at the time of such entry, and used as such, his conveyance thereof to defendant is void and inoperative.

Third. That not being authorized to convey the same, the failure to interpose an adverse claim against defendant’s application to enter was and is of no consequence.

The act of congress concerning the reservation and sale of town sites on the public lands (U.. S. E. S. sec. 2387) in substance provides that whenever any portion of the public lands have been or may be settled upon and occupied as a town site, it shall be lawful, in case such town be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and, if not incorporated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town is situated, to enter at the proper land office the land so settled and occupied in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interests; the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, to be conducted under such regulations as may be prescribed by the legislature of the state or territory in which the same may be situated.

[85]*85Section 2391 (U. S. E. S.) provides that any act of the trustees, not made in conformity to the regulations alluded to in section 2387, shall be void.

The statute of the territory in aid of this trust, and to carry the same into effect, in substance pi-ovides that the judge of the probate court shall, within three months from and after the entry of the town site, unless a survey and accurate plat thereof has been previously made, cause the same to be surveyed, and a plat thereof made, which survey and plat shall conform as near as may be to the existing rights, interests and claims of the occupants thereof, which survey and plat shall be submitted to and accepted by the board of county commissioners in the county where the town is situated; that the town site shall be surveyed into blocks, lots, streets and alleys; that the plat of such town shall be filed in the office of the county recorder, and thereafter the streets and alleys designated in such plat shall remain dedicated to the public use forever. E. S. Mont. 5th div. secs. 1207-8.

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Bluebook (online)
5 Mont. 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parchen-v-ashby-mont-1883.