PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC v. TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & Another.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedJuly 10, 2025
Docket24-P-0375
StatusUnpublished

This text of PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC v. TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & Another. (PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC v. TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & Another.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC v. TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & Another., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-375

PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC

vs.

TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Tristan Medical Enterprises, P.C. (defendant), and its

principal, Ryan Welter (collectively, defendants), contest

damages awarded to the plaintiff for breach of a commercial

lease by the defendant. We affirm.

Background. "We accept the judge's findings of fact unless

they are clearly erroneous." NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451 Mass.

417, 419 (2008), citing Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620

(1992).

On May 15, 2017, the plaintiff leased to the defendant two

suites in the plaintiff's commercial property in Raynham. The

lease was for a five-year term and required payment of monthly

1 Ryan Welter. base rent along with additional rental fees. It included a

liquidated damages provision that provided that, in the event of

a default,

"Tenant shall pay to Landlord the Fixed Rent, Additional Rent and other sums required to be paid by Tenant to and including the date of such expiration, termination or repossession; and, thereafter, Tenant shall, until the end of what would have been the expiration of the then existing Term in the absence of such expiration, termination or repossession, and whether or not the Premises or any part thereof shall have been relet, be liable to Landlord for, and shall pay to Landlord, as liquidated and agreed current damages, the Fixed Rent, Additional Rent and other sums which would be payable under this Lease by Tenant in the absence of such expiration, termination or repossession, less the net proceeds, if any, of any reletting effected for the account of Tenant pursuant to" another section of the lease.

The defendant made timely rent payments for approximately a

year, but then missed payments. In time, the plaintiff brought

a summary process action to recover possession and unpaid rents.

By agreement for judgment, execution for possession and rent was

issued but held in escrow by the plaintiff; it was to be

released and served upon the occasion of any future default for

nonpayment. In early August 2019, the defendant defaulted and

(by agreement) vacated the premises by the end of the month,

remitting a payment for use and occupancy through August 2019.

The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of the

lease, breach of a personal guaranty of the lease, and trustee

2 process,2 and a judge of the Superior Court awarded summary

judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of liability. After a

hearing on damages, a second judge of the Superior Court

(damages judge) awarded the plaintiff damages of $386,273.70,

plus prejudgment statutory interest and attorney's fees. The

defendants moved for relief from the judgment awarding damages

to the plaintiff. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828

(1974). Denying that motion, the damages judge found that the

defendant's principal was a sophisticated party.

Discussion. The defendants maintain that (1) the

liquidated damages provision in the parties' lease agreement was

a prohibited penalty, and the damages judge's reasoning in

awarding damages was therefore flawed, (2) the plaintiff failed

to introduce sufficient evidence of the applicable lease terms,

and (3) the damages judge erred in determining, posthearing,

that the individual defendant was a "sophisticated party." We

begin with a review of the third point because it affects review

of the first.3

2 The claim for trustee process was dismissed by stipulation.

3 We are not persuaded by the defendants' second argument that the existence of unspecified "subsequent lease documents" rendered this lease ambiguous. The lease was dated May 15, 2017, and amended on May 31, 2017. The case was litigated based on this lease, which the parties agreed they had signed. The parties' joint pretrial memorandum referred to it as the "Lease Agreement." In the stipulation of facts for the damages

3 a. Sophisticated party. Whether the defendant was a

sophisticated party is a question of fact, see Cummings Props.,

LLC v. Hines, 492 Mass. 867, 873-874 (2023) (Hines), which we

review for clear error, see H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington

St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 13 (2022). Here, we perceive none. The

damages judge properly grounded his ruling in the documentary

and testimonial evidence. He noted that the principal was the

previous owner of the building in which the defendant leased its

space and had sold the building to the plaintiff. The damages

judge also relied on the principal's familiarity with commercial

leases, common area maintenance charges, and other charges

common to commercial leases, noting that the principal was

represented by counsel during the lease negotiations.

b. Prohibited penalty. "Whether a liquidated damages

provision in a contract is an unenforceable penalty is a

question of law," NPS, LLC, 451 Mass. at 419, which we review de

novo, see James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy, 478 Mass.

664, 667 (2018). "A contractual liquidated damages provision is

entitled to a presumption of validity, especially where . . . it

was negotiated between two sophisticated parties." Hines, 492

Mass. at 873, quoting Nantasket Beachfront Condominiums, LLC v.

Hull Redev. Auth., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 469 (2015). "It is

hearing, the parties described the lease terms by reference to this lease. No later lease appears in the record.

4 well settled that a contract provision that clearly and

reasonably establishes liquidated damages should be enforced, so

long as it is not so disproportionate to anticipated damages as

to constitute a penalty" (quotation and citation omitted). NPS,

LLC, supra at 420.

"The burden of showing that a liquidated damages provision

is unenforceable rests with the party challenging enforcement of

the provision (here, the defendant)." NPS, LLC, 451 Mass. at

420. "If, at the time the contract was made, actual damages

were difficult to ascertain and the sum agreed on by the parties

as liquidated damages represents a reasonable forecast of

damages expected to occur in the event of a breach, it will

usually be enforced." Cummings Props., LLC v. National

Communications Corp., 449 Mass. 490, 494 (2007) (National

Communications Corp.). "In assessing reasonableness, we look to

the circumstances at the time of contract formation; we do not

take a 'second look' at the actual damages after the contract

has been breached." NPS, LLC, supra. See Hines, 492 Mass. at

873 (reaffirming "single look" approach for assessing

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Related

Kendall v. Selvaggio
602 N.E.2d 206 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1992)
Nantasket Beachfront Condominiums, LLC v. Hull Redevelopment Authority
32 N.E.3d 318 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2015)
Cummings Properties, LLC v. National Communications Corp.
869 N.E.2d 617 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2007)
NPS, LLC v. Minihane
886 N.E.2d 670 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2008)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)

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PARAMOUNT MOB, LLC v. TRISTAN MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, P.C., & Another., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paramount-mob-llc-v-tristan-medical-enterprises-pc-another-massappct-2025.