Paquin v. City of Lighthouse Point

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Paquin v. City of Lighthouse Point

330 So. 2d 866, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15126

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 23, 1976

DocketNo. 75-2

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 330 So. 2d 866 (Paquin v. City of Lighthouse Point) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Paquin v. City of Lighthouse Point, 330 So. 2d 866, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15126 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976).

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PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the briefs, oral argument and the record on appeal we are of the opinion that the appellants were improperly'classified as “employees” of the appellee-city which classification resulted in the unauthorized termination of their employment as policemen. The law recognizes that the status of a policeman 'is that of an “officer” rather than an “employee”. Maudsley v. City of North Lauderdale, Fla.App. 4th 1974, 300 So.2d 304. Given the absence of a provision in the appellee-city’s charter controlling removal of municipal officers, appellants should have been discharged from employment pursuant to the provisions of the general law then in existence, i.e., section 165.18, F.S. See also Burklin v. Willis, Fla.App. 1st 1957, 97 So.2d 129.

The remaining points raised on appeal need not be discussed in light of our decision. Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

REVERSED.

WALDEN, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur. CROSS, J., dissents, with opinion.

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PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the briefs, oral argument and the record on appeal we are of the opinion that the appellants were improperly'classified as “employees” of the appellee-city which classification resulted in the unauthorized termination of their employment as policemen. The law recognizes that the status of a policeman 'is that of an “officer” rather than an “employee”. Maudsley v. City of North Lauderdale, Fla.App. 4th 1974, 300 So.2d 304. Given the absence of a provision in the appellee-city’s charter controlling removal of municipal officers, appellants should have been discharged from employment pursuant to the provisions of the general law then in existence, i.e., section 165.18, F.S. See also Burklin v. Willis, Fla.App. 1st 1957, 97 So.2d 129.

The remaining points raised on appeal need not be discussed in light of our decision. Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

REVERSED.

WALDEN, C. J., and MAGER, J., concur. CROSS, J., dissents, with opinion.

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330 So. 2d 866, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paquin-v-city-of-lighthouse-point-fladistctapp-1976.

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