Paola Jarquin v. Reliant Immediate Care Medical Group, Inc.

Opinion

O JS-6

44 55 66 77 United States District Court 88 Central District of California 99 1100

1111 PAOLA JARQUIN, individually and on Case No. 2:20-CV-06334-ODW (JEMx) behalf of a class of other similarly 1122 situated individuals, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING FEES 1133 Plaintiff, AND COSTS [10]; AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS [13] 1144 v.

MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al., 1166

Defendants. 1177 1199 On May 4, 2020, Plaintiff Paola Jarquin (“Jarquin”) filed this action in the Los 2200 Angeles County Superior Court against Defendant Reliant Immediate Care Medical 2211 Group, Inc. (“Reliant”). (Notice of Removal, Attach. 2 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2.) 2222 Jarquin alleges that Reliant violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 2233 (“FACTA”), which requires merchants to print only limited credit and debit card 2244 information onto customer receipts. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Specifically, Jarquin alleges that 2255 she paid Reliant for medical services, and Reliant provided her with a receipt 2266 disclosing more than the last five digits of her credit or debit card information, in 2277 violation of FACTA. (Compl. ¶¶ 43–45.) 2288 On July 16, 2020, Reliant removed the case to this Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Now, Jarquin moves to remand the case to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, arguing that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because she lacks Article III standing. (Mot. Remand (“Motion” or “Mot.”) 1–2, ECF No. 10.) Jarquin also seeks attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Id. at 12–14.) The Motion is fully briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 14; Reply, ECF No. 15.) For the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and consequently REMANDS1 this action to state court.2 Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court only if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removal statute is strictly construed against removal, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court first addresses the issue of remand before turning to Jarquin’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs. 1 On August 7, 2020, while this Motion was pending, Reliant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. (See Mot. Dismiss 1–2, ECF No. 13.) Reliant’s Motion is also fully briefed. (See Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16; Reply Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 21.) In light of the Court’s determination that this case must be remanded, Reliant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot. 2 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. A. Motion to Remand Jarquin contends that this case must be remanded to state court because Reliant cannot show she has Article III standing, as she does not allege an injury in fact. (Mot. 5–8.) Reliant opposes the Motion, arguing that Jarquin’s allegations do establish she has suffered an injury in fact. (Opp’n 5–6.) Reliant insists Jarquin has alleged a concrete injury because she alleges: (1) that she suffered a “heightened risk of identity theft”; (2) that Reliant invaded Jarquin’s privacy through disclosure of her “private financial information to the world, including to persons who might find the receipts in the trash . . . including identity thieves . . . as well as [Reliant’s] employees who handled the receipts”; and (3) that Jarquin was “forced . . . to take action to prevent further disclosure of the private financial information displayed on the receipt.” (Opp’n 8–9 (quoting Compl. ¶¶ 45, 55, 74).) Notwithstanding these allegations, however, the Court finds that Jarquin fails to allege she has “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). First, Jarquin’s allegation that she faced a heightened risk of identity theft merely sets forth a “potential for exposure to actual injury,” which “do[es] not entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement” and “is too speculative for Article III purposes.” See Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs. Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 777, 783 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Anton v. Prospera Hotels, Inc., No. CV 19-534-CBM (SHKx), 2019 WL 4266528, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2019) (finding allegations of elevated risk of identity theft “speculative, hypothetical, and conjectural” and insufficient to establish an injury in fact). Second, Jarquin’s allegations that Reliant disclosed her private financial information to the world, including identity thieves and the Reliant employee who handled her receipt, fail to establish a concrete injury. See Stelmachers v. Verifone Sys., Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04912-EJD, 2017 WL 3968871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017) (finding allegations that the defendant “exposed Plaintiff’s credit card number to ‘[the defendant’s] staff and possibly others’” insufficient to demonstrate “a material risk to the concrete interest that Congress sought to protect through FACTA”). Reliant argues these allegations demonstrate an injury that is “certainly impending,” which is sufficient to confer standing. (See Opp’n Mot. 12 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (explaining that a “certainly impending injury” may establish Article III standing)).) But any harm that could befall Jarquin (e.g., an identity thief finding her receipt in the trash and using it for a nefarious purpose) would not materialize absent a chain of possibilities which presently remain speculative. See Stelmachers, 2017 WL 3968871, at *3 (clarifying that a “speculative chain of possibilities do[es] not establish a certainly impending injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Third and finally, Jarquin’s allegations that Reliant’s violation of FACTA required her to take action to prevent further disclosure of her credit or debit card information are not sufficient to establish standing. See, e.g., Anton, 2019 WL 4266528, at *2 (finding no standing where plaintiffs were allegedly “forced . . . to take the time and effort to save receipts in a secure place to ensure that their credit card information would not be stolen”); Stelmachers, 2017 WL 3968871, at *4–5 (finding no standing where plaintiff was allegedly “burdened . . . with the duty to consistently check his credit card statements, so as to make certain that identity thieves did not take advantage of the FACTA violation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, Reliant has failed to meet its burden to establish that Jarquin has alleged Article III standing. Accordingly, this action must be remanded to state court. See Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Jarquin seeks an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Mot. 12–14.) “An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).. However, generally, a district court may award attorneys’ fees under § 1447 only when a defendant “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). “Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Jd. “[R]emoval is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). Upon consideration of Reliant’s contentions and applicable law, the Court finds that Reliant’s attempt at removal was not objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court DENIES Jarquin’s request for fees and costs. For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Jarquin’s Motion to Remand and DENIES her request for attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 10.) The Court REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Spring Street Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Department 017, Hon. Maren Nelson, Case No. 20STCV17264. Reliant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot. (ECF No. 13.) The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. January 4, 2021 ~~ . SB Eel |

OTIS D. GHT, II UNITED STATES, DISTRICT JUDGE