Paola Del Fabbro v. Luca Bonetto

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 2, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D26-0150

Lower Tribunal No. 23-3406-FC-04

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Paola Del Fabbro,

Appellant,

vs.

Luca Bonetto,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica Diaz, Judge.

Fell Law Group, PLLC, and Brian D. Fell (Plantation), for appellant.

Luca Bonetto, in proper person.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

Appellant Paola Del Fabbro (Former Wife) and appellee Luca Bonetto (Former Husband) dispute the meaning and impact of a phrase in their

Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA).1 Specifically, Former Wife appeals the trial court’s January 21, 2026 order (the “Challenged Order”) that denied her May 22, 2024 motion to enforce section 12.8(h) of the MSA (the “Motion”). The parties’ minor child is a dual national of Italy and Great Britain, present in the United States on a student visa. Former Wife wishes to file an immigration application for the child to become a permanent resident here. Former Husband has withheld his consent.

Former Wife’s Motion argued Former Husband violated the terms of the MSA’s section 12.8(h) and sought to compel Former Husband to consent to the child’s immigration application. At a December 8, 2025 hearing on the Motion, without taking any evidence, the trial court ruled, as a legal matter, that section 12.8(h) contains no enforceable obligation on the part of either party. In other words, the trial court viewed this provision as merely requiring the parties to cooperate in deciding whether to apply for their child’s

1 The disputed language of section 12.8 of the MSA reads as follows:

[T]he parents agree that they shall have Shared Parental Responsibility of the minor child and that all major decisions shall be made on a mutual decision-making basis, with each parent conferring and cooperating with the other and taking into consideration the best interest of the minor child. The parties acknowledge that major decisions include but are not limited to matters relating to . . . (h) immigration application, although parties agree to cooperate in this process and neither parent shall unreasonably withhold consent[.]

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permanent residency in the United States. In the Challenged Order, the trial court appears to equate section 12.8(h)’s phrase “immigration application” with the renewal of the child’s student visa,2 suggesting a different meaning for the phrase “immigration application” from the one the trial court pronounced at the hearing. Yet both interpretations appear to be contained in the Challenged Order.

On our de novo review3 of the record, we are compelled to reverse the Challenged Order denying Former Wife’s Motion and, as set forth below, remand for further consideration of the Motion.

First, section 12.8(h) is ambiguous. As evidenced by the parties’

contrary legal arguments – evidenced not only by their briefing but by the transcript from the December 8, 2025 hearing – the phrase “immigration application” as used in section 12.8(h) is susceptible to more than one meaning. “An agreement is ambiguous if it ‘is susceptible to two different interpretations, each one of which is reasonably inferred from the terms’ of the agreement.” McClune v. McClune, 79 So. 3d 194, 197 (Fla. 5th DCA

2 Section 12.18 of the MSA imposes procedures and obligations on the parties to renew the child’s student visa. 3 An appellate court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of a marital settlement agreement de novo. Knoll v. Knoll, 937 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

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2012) (quoting Miller v. Kase, 789 So. 2d 1095, 1097-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Because the parties’ intent in crafting section 12.8 is not apparent, leading to contractual ambiguity, the consideration of parol and extrinsic evidence in an evidentiary hearing becomes necessary. Riera v. Riera, 86 So. 3d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Second, assuming section 12.8(h)’s “immigration application”

contemplates something different from renewal of the child’s student visa, the trial court will need to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Former Husband’s withholding of his consent to the immigration application was reasonable. The plain language of section 12.8(h) imposes not only an obligation to cooperate with the other spouse on the child’s immigration application, but also an express obligation on each parent to refrain from unreasonably withholding consent to such immigration application. Hence, on remand, the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Former Husband’s withholding of his consent to the immigration application is reasonable.

We therefore remand this case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the Motion that are not inconsistent with this opinion. We express no opinion on the merits of the parties’ respective arguments.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.