Panoramic Stock Images, LTD dba Panoramic Images v. Sunset Property Management and Realty

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 10, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02654
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PANORAMIC STOCK IMAGES, LTD Case No.: 25-CV-2654 JLS (DEB) dba PANORMAIC IMAGES, 12 ORDER GRANTING JOINT Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY v. OF DEFAULT 14

SUNSET PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 15 (ECF No. 7) AND REALTY, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Panoramic Stock Images, LTD’s and 19 Defendant Sunset Property Management and Realty’s (collectively, the “Parties”) Joint 20 Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (“Joint Mot.,” ECF No. 7). On October 6, 2025, 21 Plaintiff filed the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and served Defendant with the Summons and 22 Complaint, ECF No. 4. Defendant did not respond to the Complaint, “as Defendant’s 23 owner did not become aware of the summons and complaint until a week later, and did not 24 recognize the appropriate deadline, and thus did not retain counsel or respond to the 25 Complaint prior to the deadline to respond.” Joint Mot. at 2. On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff 26 requested an Entry of Default, ECF No. 5, which the Clerk entered on November 3, 2025, 27 ECF No. 6. The Parties now jointly request that the Default be lifted, and the matter be 28 decided on its merits. Joint Mot. at 2. The Court GRANTS the Joint Motion. 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “[t]he court may set aside an entry 2 of default for good cause.” Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to vacate an 3 entry of default. Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986); 4 Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has held 5 that “[t]he ‘good cause’ standard that governs vacating an entry of default under Rule 55(c) 6 is the same standard that governs vacating a default judgment under Rule 60(b).” 7 Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Grp., Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 8 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, in assessing good cause, the district court considers three 9 factors: 10 (1) whether [the defendant] engaged in culpable conduct that led 11 to the default; (2) whether [the defendant] had a meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would 12 prejudice [the plaintiff]. As these factors are disjunctive, the 13 district court [is] free to deny the motion “if any of the three factors [is] true.” 14 15 Id. (quoting Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1008 (9th 16 Cir. 2000); see also In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 525–26 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Meadows 17 v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987)). 18 The court “should apply the factors more liberally” when assessing a motion to set 19 aside an entry of default rather than a motion to set aside default judgment. Page v. Banks, 20 No. 07-cv-2254 JM(BLM), 2008 WL 2037763, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2008) (citing 21 Haw. Carpenters’ Tr. Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986)). Ultimately, there 22 is a strong preference for deciding cases on their merits, and therefore any doubts should 23 be resolved in favor of setting aside the default. Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat 24 Computerized Techs., 840 F.2d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 Here, the Court finds that good cause exists. Defendant did not engage in any 26 culpable conduct that led to the default, and the Plaintiff agrees that the Entry of Default 27 should be lifted. Defendant was unaware of its obligations to respond and did not retain 28 counsel. Joint Mot. at 2. Defendant is now represented by counsel and able to participate 1 the matter. /d. Therefore, the Entry of Default is lifted. 2 CONCLUSION 3 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion to Set Aside 4 ||Entry of Default (ECF No. 7). The Court therefore VACATES the Clerk’s Entry of 5 Default (ECF No. 6). Defendant SHALL RESPOND to Plaintiff's Complaint within 6 || thirty (30) days of the electronic docketing of this Order.' 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: November 10, 2025 jae L. Lo memeaite- 9 on. Janis L. Sammartino 10 United States District Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 4g ||! The Parties agree that Defendant shall file and serve a responsive pleading within thirty (30) days of the Court’s Order. Joint Mot. at 3.