PWEL SW IOR CJURT 1 GUAM 2 2t OV —6 P t2: CLERK OF COURT B
6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 ROSALIA U.G. PANGELINAN, Civil Case No. CVO3O1-20 8 Plaintiff 9 10 v. DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 11 F. RANDALL CUNLIFfE as TRUSTEE Of PLAINTIFf’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE DONGO TRUST, and DOES 1-20, 12 INCLUSIVE, 13 Defendant. 14 15 INTRODUCTION
16 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III upon submission of 17 Plaintiff Rosalia U.G. Pangelinan’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
1$ (“Motion”). Attorney Jacques G. Bronze represents Plaintiff, and Attorney Joseph C. Razzano 19 represents Defendant F. Randall Cunliffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust (“Defendant”). Having
20 duly considered the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 21 Decision and Order and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion.
22 BACKGROUND
23 Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 16, 2020, asserting causes of action of quiet title
24 and accounting against Defendant. See Compi. at 6-7. Defendant filed his Answer, asserting a 25 number of affirmative defenses along side its answer to the allegations in the complaint. See
26 Answer (June 25, 2020).
27 Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion, seeking to strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses.
2$ Plaintiff asserts that the Court should strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses as “lacking fair notice
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintift’s Motion to Strike CVO3O 1-20, Pangelinan v. F. Randall Cuntffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 1 of 5 1 or being legally insufficient.” Mot. at 5. Defendant opposed the Motion, arguing his affirmative
2 defenses provide sufficient notice of the defense to Plaintiff. Opp’n to Mot. to Strike or in the
3 Alternative Mot. for Leave to Amend Answer (“Opposition”) at 5-11 (Aug. 11, 2020). In the
4 alternative, should the Court find Defendant’s affirmative defenses insufficient, Defendant asks the
5 Court for leave to amend its answer to comply with the Court’s findings. Opp’n at 9. Plaintiff 6 replied, asserting that Defendant’s affirmative defenses are insufficient and that Defendant should
7 not be granted leave to amend his answer. Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Strike or, in the Alternative,
8 Mot. for Leave to Amend Answer (“Reply”) at 5, 11 (Aug. 28, 2020).
9 The parties submitted a stipulation for the Court to decide this matter on the briefs. See
10 Stipulation (Sep. 9, 2020). The Court then took the matter under advisement on that date.
11 DISCUSSION 12 Upon motion by any party, “the court may order striken from any pleading any insufficient
13 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Guam Rule of Civil
14 Procedure (“GRCP”) 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid expenditure of time
15 and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to
16 trial . . . .“ Whitttestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 61$ F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court finds that ten of
18 Defendant’s affirmative defenses are immaterial to the instant action and that those affirmative
19 defenses which are material are not sufficiently pled.
20 I. Ten of Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses are Immaterial to the Instant Action 21 “Matter is immaterial if it has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief
22 pleaded.” McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing
23 Wyshak v. City Nat’t Bank, 607 F.2d 824, $27 (9th Cir. 1979)). Among Defendant’s affirmative 24 defenses are the defenses of: “Plaintiff’s prior knowledge,” “Plaintiffs acquiescence,” “Defendant
25 has acted in good faith,” “Plaintiffs own negligence, assumption of risk, license. . . statute of frauds
26 . . . want or failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, [and] payment.” Answer at 3-4.
27 Plaintiffs claims involve conveyances of property jointly owned by Plaintiff and her
2$ deceased husband in violation of 19 G.C.A. § 6 106(a). The crux of Plaintiffs claims are that her
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike CVO3OY-20, Pangelinan v. F. Randall Cunliffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 2 of 5 1 deceased husband unilaterally conveyed the properties without Plaintiff. This, she alleges, voids the
2 conveyances under Section 6 106(a). The aforementioned affirmative defenses are immaterial to
3 whether Plaintiff jointly transferred the properties with her deceased husband. The statute
4 contemplates both spouses joining in any transfer or conveyance, and Plaintiff’s “prior knowledge,”
5 for example, does not render the conveyance valid under the statute. The same can be said for the 6 remaining nine affirmative defenses listed above.
7 Therefore, the Court finds that the ten affirmative defenses listed herein are immaterial to the
$ instant action and ORDERS that they be stricken pursuant to GRCP 12(f).
9 II. The Remainder of Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses are not Sufficiently Pled 10 “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it
11 gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d $24, $27 (9th Cir.
12 1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)). The Guam Supreme Court has held
13 that the standard in Conley is applicable to pleading requirements on Guam. See Ukau v. Fitsheng
14 Wang, 2016 Guam 18 ¶ 32. Defendant’s remaining affirmative defenses include: “fails to state a 15 claim upon which relief can be granted,” equitable defense of laches,” “waiver,” “estoppel,”
16 “Plaintiffs execution of a power of attorney pursuant to 19 G.C.A. § 6 106(b),” “fraud. . . statute of 17 limitations . . . release, and res judicata.” Answer at 3-4. These affirmative defenses only include
18 recitations of the legal defenses without providing further context or explanation.
19 Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
20 be granted fails to suggest the insufficiency within the Complaint. Defendant fails to provide the
21 statute of limitations which bars Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant fails to give any explanation as to
22 how the defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel, power of attorney execution, release, and res judicata
23 bar Plaintiffs claims. Defendant further fails to give any details regarding the defense of fraud. “In
24 all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
25 with particularity.” GRCP 9(b). The bare allegation of fraud is insufficient; there must be particular
26 facts supporting such a claim.
27 While Defendant need not plead every fact in support of its defense, Defendant is required to
28 meet the bare minimum of “fair notice of the defense” to Plaintiff. The Court finds that these
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike CVO3O1-20. Pangetinan v. F. Randall Cunttffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 3 of 5 1 defenses, while potentially material to the instant action, do not provided “fair notice of the 2 defense” to Plaintiff. The Court ORDERS that these affirmative defenses be stricken. However, the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
PWEL SW IOR CJURT 1 GUAM 2 2t OV —6 P t2: CLERK OF COURT B
6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 ROSALIA U.G. PANGELINAN, Civil Case No. CVO3O1-20 8 Plaintiff 9 10 v. DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 11 F. RANDALL CUNLIFfE as TRUSTEE Of PLAINTIFf’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE DONGO TRUST, and DOES 1-20, 12 INCLUSIVE, 13 Defendant. 14 15 INTRODUCTION
16 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III upon submission of 17 Plaintiff Rosalia U.G. Pangelinan’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
1$ (“Motion”). Attorney Jacques G. Bronze represents Plaintiff, and Attorney Joseph C. Razzano 19 represents Defendant F. Randall Cunliffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust (“Defendant”). Having
20 duly considered the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 21 Decision and Order and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion.
22 BACKGROUND
23 Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 16, 2020, asserting causes of action of quiet title
24 and accounting against Defendant. See Compi. at 6-7. Defendant filed his Answer, asserting a 25 number of affirmative defenses along side its answer to the allegations in the complaint. See
26 Answer (June 25, 2020).
27 Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion, seeking to strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses.
2$ Plaintiff asserts that the Court should strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses as “lacking fair notice
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintift’s Motion to Strike CVO3O 1-20, Pangelinan v. F. Randall Cuntffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 1 of 5 1 or being legally insufficient.” Mot. at 5. Defendant opposed the Motion, arguing his affirmative
2 defenses provide sufficient notice of the defense to Plaintiff. Opp’n to Mot. to Strike or in the
3 Alternative Mot. for Leave to Amend Answer (“Opposition”) at 5-11 (Aug. 11, 2020). In the
4 alternative, should the Court find Defendant’s affirmative defenses insufficient, Defendant asks the
5 Court for leave to amend its answer to comply with the Court’s findings. Opp’n at 9. Plaintiff 6 replied, asserting that Defendant’s affirmative defenses are insufficient and that Defendant should
7 not be granted leave to amend his answer. Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Strike or, in the Alternative,
8 Mot. for Leave to Amend Answer (“Reply”) at 5, 11 (Aug. 28, 2020).
9 The parties submitted a stipulation for the Court to decide this matter on the briefs. See
10 Stipulation (Sep. 9, 2020). The Court then took the matter under advisement on that date.
11 DISCUSSION 12 Upon motion by any party, “the court may order striken from any pleading any insufficient
13 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Guam Rule of Civil
14 Procedure (“GRCP”) 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid expenditure of time
15 and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to
16 trial . . . .“ Whitttestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 61$ F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court finds that ten of
18 Defendant’s affirmative defenses are immaterial to the instant action and that those affirmative
19 defenses which are material are not sufficiently pled.
20 I. Ten of Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses are Immaterial to the Instant Action 21 “Matter is immaterial if it has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief
22 pleaded.” McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing
23 Wyshak v. City Nat’t Bank, 607 F.2d 824, $27 (9th Cir. 1979)). Among Defendant’s affirmative 24 defenses are the defenses of: “Plaintiff’s prior knowledge,” “Plaintiffs acquiescence,” “Defendant
25 has acted in good faith,” “Plaintiffs own negligence, assumption of risk, license. . . statute of frauds
26 . . . want or failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, [and] payment.” Answer at 3-4.
27 Plaintiffs claims involve conveyances of property jointly owned by Plaintiff and her
2$ deceased husband in violation of 19 G.C.A. § 6 106(a). The crux of Plaintiffs claims are that her
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike CVO3OY-20, Pangelinan v. F. Randall Cunliffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 2 of 5 1 deceased husband unilaterally conveyed the properties without Plaintiff. This, she alleges, voids the
2 conveyances under Section 6 106(a). The aforementioned affirmative defenses are immaterial to
3 whether Plaintiff jointly transferred the properties with her deceased husband. The statute
4 contemplates both spouses joining in any transfer or conveyance, and Plaintiff’s “prior knowledge,”
5 for example, does not render the conveyance valid under the statute. The same can be said for the 6 remaining nine affirmative defenses listed above.
7 Therefore, the Court finds that the ten affirmative defenses listed herein are immaterial to the
$ instant action and ORDERS that they be stricken pursuant to GRCP 12(f).
9 II. The Remainder of Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses are not Sufficiently Pled 10 “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it
11 gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d $24, $27 (9th Cir.
12 1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)). The Guam Supreme Court has held
13 that the standard in Conley is applicable to pleading requirements on Guam. See Ukau v. Fitsheng
14 Wang, 2016 Guam 18 ¶ 32. Defendant’s remaining affirmative defenses include: “fails to state a 15 claim upon which relief can be granted,” equitable defense of laches,” “waiver,” “estoppel,”
16 “Plaintiffs execution of a power of attorney pursuant to 19 G.C.A. § 6 106(b),” “fraud. . . statute of 17 limitations . . . release, and res judicata.” Answer at 3-4. These affirmative defenses only include
18 recitations of the legal defenses without providing further context or explanation.
19 Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
20 be granted fails to suggest the insufficiency within the Complaint. Defendant fails to provide the
21 statute of limitations which bars Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant fails to give any explanation as to
22 how the defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel, power of attorney execution, release, and res judicata
23 bar Plaintiffs claims. Defendant further fails to give any details regarding the defense of fraud. “In
24 all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
25 with particularity.” GRCP 9(b). The bare allegation of fraud is insufficient; there must be particular
26 facts supporting such a claim.
27 While Defendant need not plead every fact in support of its defense, Defendant is required to
28 meet the bare minimum of “fair notice of the defense” to Plaintiff. The Court finds that these
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike CVO3O1-20. Pangetinan v. F. Randall Cunttffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 3 of 5 1 defenses, while potentially material to the instant action, do not provided “fair notice of the 2 defense” to Plaintiff. The Court ORDERS that these affirmative defenses be stricken. However, the
3 Court, as explained in Section III below, GRANTS Defendant’s request for leave to amend their
4 affirmative defenses pursuant to GRCP 15.
5 III. The Court grants Defendant’s request for leave to amend their affirmative defenses. 6 Defendant requests that “If the Court is inclined to strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses, 7 Defendant requests for leave to amend his Answer pursuant to GRCP 15(a).” Opp’n at 9. “GRCP
8 15 allows for amendment to pleadings ‘by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse
9 party’ and states that ‘leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” M Elec. Corp. v. Phil- 10 Gets (Gttam) Int’l Trading Corp., 2016 Guam 35 ¶ 41. Leave to amend should be freely granted
11 absence findings of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
12 failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
13 party by virtue of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” fomcm v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
14 (1962) (interpreting GRCP 15’s federal counterpart).
15 The Court finds that the present circumstances warrant leave to amend. There is no 16 indication that Plaintiff is seeking leave based on undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive. This is
17 Plaintiffs first request for leave to amend his Complaint. This case is in the early stages of
18 litigation as Defendant has not yet filed an answer. The amendments sought should cure the
19 deficiencies in the affirmative defenses as explained in Section II.
20 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for leave to amend their affirmative
21 defenses pursuant to GRCP 15.
22 CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs Motion. The Court 24 ORDERS that the following affirmative defenses be stricken from Defendant’s Answer:
25 Affirmative Defenses 6, 7, and 8 in whole, and Affirmative Defense 9 in part, striking the defenses
26 of negligence, assumption of risk, license, statute of frauds, want or failure of consideration, accord
27 and satisfaction, and payment. The Court FURTHER GRANTS Defendant’s request for leave to
28 amend all remaining affirmative defenses to comply with the fair notice requirements explained
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike CVO3OI-20. Pangeilnan F. Randall Cunttffe as Trttstee of the Dongo Trust .
Page 4 of 5 1 above. The Defendant shall have 20 calendar days from the date of this judgment to file an 2 amended answer pursuant to GRCP 15.
4 IT IS SO ORDERED this November 6, 2020. 5
8 HONORABLE ALBERTO C. LAMORENA, III Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Guam 9
Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike CVO3OI-20. Pangelinan v. F. Randall Cwthffe as Trustee of the Dongo Trust Page 5 of 5