Panara v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc.

122 F.R.D. 14, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9810, 1988 WL 96097
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 7, 1988
DocketCiv. A. No. 86-4358
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 122 F.R.D. 14 (Panara v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Panara v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 14, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9810, 1988 WL 96097 (E.D. Pa. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the motion of defendant, Mack Trucks, Inc. (hereinafter “Mack”), to deem requests for admissions to be admitted. Specifically, Mack moves that Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc. (“Hertz Penske”), Kidron Body Co. (“Kidron”), and Reading Mack Distributors, Inc. (“Reading Mack”) be deemed to have admitted # 1,18, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 671 from the First Set of Requests for Admissions. The court is further requested to compel Hertz Penske to clarify its response to request # 18 and to compel Kidron to clarify its response to requests # 18 and 23. Mack also moves that the plaintiffs, Nicholas and Patricia Panara (“the Panaras”), Hertz Penske, and Reading Mack be deemed to have admitted the Second Set of Requests for Admissions because of their failure to respond or to request an extension of time. Mack further moves that Kidron’s response to the third request contained in the Second Set of Requests for Admissions be deemed admitted because it is alleged to be evasive. Finally, Mack moves that W.E. Ryan Co., Inc. (“Ryan”), be deemed to have admitted Mack’s First and Second Set of Requests for Admissions because of failure to respond.

We shall first dispose of those matters which have been unopposed or which have been resolved by stipulation between the parties. With regard to Mack’s Second Set of Requests for Admissions, Reading Mack has no objection to having these deemed to be admitted. We shall, therefore, order that they be so admitted as to Reading Mack. The Panaras have filed no response; Hertz Penske admits that it has filed no response. Where no answer or reply has been filed to a request for admission, each of the matters included in the request for admission must be deemed to be admitted. Orkin v. Sufrin, 32 F.R.D. 388 (E.D.Pa.1963). Since neither the Panaras nor Hertz Penske have filed any response to Mack’s Second Set of Requests for Admissions, these shall be deemed admitted as to the Panaras and Hertz Penske.

With regard to Ryan and Mack’s First and Second Sets of Requests for Admissions, the parties have signed a stipulation: (1) to withdraw Mack’s motion against Ryan to deem requests for admissions admitted; (2) to deem Mack’s Second Set of Requests for Admissions admitted by Ryan for purposes of this action only; and (3) to allow Ryan not to respond to Mack’s First Set of Requests for Admissions unless and until Ryan’s motion to dismiss the third-[16]*16party complaint against it is adversely decided against Ryan. (If an adverse decision is given, thirty days are to be accorded Ryan to respond to Mack’s First Set of Requests for Admissions). In accordance with this stipulation, we shall deem Mack’s Second Set of Requests for Admissions to be admitted by Ryan for purposes of this action only. Since the Hon. Louis H. Poliak, by order dated January 12, 1988, has denied Ryan’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint against it, we shall also enter an order compelling Ryan to respond to Mack’s First Set of Requests for Admissions within thirty days of the date of the order.

With regard to those responses which are disputed by the parties, we shall first consider the relevant provisions of Fed.R. Civ.P. 36. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a) concerns requests for admission and answers thereto. It reads in pertinent part:

If objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that the party has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; the party may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why the party cannot admit or deny it.”

These are the duties of the answering party. If the party proposing the requests is not satisfied with the answers, Fed.R. Civ.P. 36(a) prescribes what that party should do and how the court should evaluate the answers: •

“The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pre-trial conference or at a designated time prior to trial____”

With these standards in mind, we shall proceed to examine the answers disputed2 by Mack for Hertz Penske, Reading Mack, and Kidron.

HERTZ PENSKE

With regard to Hertz Penske and Mack’s First Set of Requests for Admissions, we find that Hertz Penske’s answers # 1, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, [17]*1756, 57 and 58 fulfill the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a) because they comply with that part of the rule which states: “An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that the party has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny.” Answer #52 also complies with the requirements of the rule since it “specifically denies” the request. Answer #23 also comports with the rule since it qualifies the answer.

We do find deficiencies, however, in answers # 18, 20, 39, 41 and 44. In denying request # 18 and adding “[a] different model was ordered”, Hertz Penske has not “fairly met the substance of the requested admission.” The word “model” is unclear. Answer # 20 is deficient because it does not “specifically deny” the matter. Hertz Penske’s answers #39, 41 and 44 are also not “specifically denied”. (Hertz Penske is also referred to the requirements of the rule regarding qualifying an answer and specifying so much of it as is true). Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 provides that, where an answer has been found not in compliance with the requirements of the rule, the court may either order the matter admitted or order an amended answer to be served.

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Bluebook (online)
122 F.R.D. 14, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9810, 1988 WL 96097, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/panara-v-hertz-penske-truck-leasing-inc-paed-1988.