Pan American Stone Co. v. Landry

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Pan American Stone Co. v. Landry

526 So. 2d 197, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1358, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 2351

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 8, 1988

DocketNos. 87-0803, 87-1979

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 526 So. 2d 197 (Pan American Stone Co. v. Landry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pan American Stone Co. v. Landry, 526 So. 2d 197, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1358, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 2351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

HERSEY, Chief Judge.

From a finding that a promissory note merged into a settlement agreement and that appellant breached that agreement by [198]*198refusing to permit appellee “to come in and remove inventory” in satisfaction of the note, the obligor takes this appeal.

Appellee filed no cross appeal of the trial court’s finding that the promissory note merged into the settlement agreement. It is clear, however, that the promissory note remains a viable instrument, there having been no accord and satisfaction, novation or modification by substitution. The settlement agreement merely established alternative times and methods of payment.

There is no support for the finding in the final judgment that appellant breached the settlement agreement by preventing appel-lee from removing any inventory. Indeed, there is no showing of a demand for inventory by appellee. Accordingly, the finding of breach of the settlement agreement must fail. The debtor, however, ackhowl-edges the indebtedness although he disputes the way in which it is to be paid.

We are convinced by our review of the record that the money is owed and that the appellee is not limited to recovering only inventory or proceeds from the sale of inventory. Accordingly, we conclude that the final judgment in favor of appellee was the right decision, albeit for the wrong reason. As stated in Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979),

The written final judgment by the trial court could well be wrong in its reasoning, but the decision of the trial court is primarily what matters, not the reasoning used.

Even when based on erroneous reasoning, a conclusion or decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports it.

Accordingly, we affirm.

LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI