Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company

Texas Supreme Court

Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company

324 S.W.2d 200, 324 S.W.2d 300, 159 Tex. 550, 2 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308, 1959 Tex. LEXIS 573

CourtTexas Supreme Court

DecidedMay 13, 1959

DocketA-7237

StatusPublished

Cited by150 cases

This text of 324 S.W.2d 200 (Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 324 S.W.2d 200, 324 S.W.2d 300, 159 Tex. 550, 2 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308, 1959 Tex. LEXIS 573 (Tex. 1959).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed petitioners’ appeal, holding that the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of respondents and against petitioners on one phase of the case is interlocutory and not appealable. 320 S.W. 2d 915. No severance was ordered by the trial court, but petitioners say that the case involves two entirely separate, severable and independent causes of action, and that the summary judgment disposes of all issues and parties involved in one cause of action. They argue that under such circumstances the granting of the motion for summary judgment effectively severed the two causes of action by implication, and that the judgment is therefore final and appealable.

While there is authority for the argument advanced by petitioners, Richards v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 239 S.W. 2d 724 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), Riggs v. Bartlett, Texas Civ. App., 310 S.W. 2d 690 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), we do not think the finality and hence the appealability of a judgment should be made to turn upon whether the action is severable as to issues, as to parties, or as to causes of action. The confusion and uncertainty involved in the application of such a rule outweigh any advantages which might result therefrom. In our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court. Gallaher v. City Transp. Co., Texas Civ. App., 262 S.W. 2d 807 (wr. ref.); Myers v. Smitherman, Texas Civ. App., 279 S.W. 2d 173 (no writ). In the absence of an order of severance a party against whom such an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have his right of appeal when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case.

The application for writ of error is refused, No Reversible Error.

*552 Opinion delivered May 13, 1959.

Associate Justice Hamilton not sitting.

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PER CURIAM:

The Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed petitioners’ appeal, holding that the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of respondents and against petitioners on one phase of the case is interlocutory and not appealable. 320 S.W. 2d 915. No severance was ordered by the trial court, but petitioners say that the case involves two entirely separate, severable and independent causes of action, and that the summary judgment disposes of all issues and parties involved in one cause of action. They argue that under such circumstances the granting of the motion for summary judgment effectively severed the two causes of action by implication, and that the judgment is therefore final and appealable.

While there is authority for the argument advanced by petitioners, Richards v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 239 S.W. 2d 724 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), Riggs v. Bartlett, Texas Civ. App., 310 S.W. 2d 690 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), we do not think the finality and hence the appealability of a judgment should be made to turn upon whether the action is severable as to issues, as to parties, or as to causes of action. The confusion and uncertainty involved in the application of such a rule outweigh any advantages which might result therefrom. In our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court. Gallaher v. City Transp. Co., Texas Civ. App., 262 S.W. 2d 807 (wr. ref.); Myers v. Smitherman, Texas Civ. App., 279 S.W. 2d 173 (no writ). In the absence of an order of severance a party against whom such an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have his right of appeal when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case.

The application for writ of error is refused, No Reversible Error.

*552 Opinion delivered May 13, 1959.

Associate Justice Hamilton not sitting.

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324 S.W.2d 200, 324 S.W.2d 300, 159 Tex. 550, 2 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308, 1959 Tex. LEXIS 573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pan-american-petroleum-corporation-v-texas-pacific-coal-oil-company-tex-1959.

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