Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Andrews

323 S.W.2d 287, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2339
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 10, 1959
DocketNo. 7090
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 323 S.W.2d 287 (Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Andrews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Andrews, 323 S.W.2d 287, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellee Mrs. Elizabeth Cotton Andrews, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Sharon Elizabeth Simmons, a Minor, sued defendants-appellants, Pan American Life Insurance Company and Continental [288]*288Assurance Company under the double indemnity provisions of two life insurance policies issued upon the life of Harrington Griffin Simmons, deceased, being the same person as Harrington G. Simmons. The cases were filed separately but by agreement were consolidated and tried together.

Mr. Simmons was an accountant and rented an upstairs office in the city of Crockett, and on December 4, 1953, a fire occurred in the building occupied by Simmons. It was alleged that as a result of the fife Simmons suffered a psychic trauma as the result of fright and exertion that caused cerebral arterial thrombosis which resulted in his death on January 7, 1954. The principal sum of the insurance in each policy was paid by the companies without waiver on the part of any of the parties as to the double indemnity provisions. The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants have appealed.

The provision of the Pan American Life Ins. Co., policy involved in this suit reads as follows:

“Upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured occurred in consequence of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, of which (except in the case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy) there is a visible contusion or wound on the body, and that such death occurred within sixty days after such injury was sustained, and as a direct result thereof, independently of any other cause, * * * the Company will, upon surrender of the policy, in lieu of all other benefits under this policy, pay to the beneficiary or beneficiaries under this policy, subject to the change of beneficiary clause, double the face amount of this policy.”

The provision in the Continental Assurance Company policy involved in this suit reads as follows:

“Upon receipt at its home office in Chicago, Illinois, of due proof that the death of the insured has resulted from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means and that said death occurred while said policy and this supplementary contract are in full force and within ninety (90) days from the accident causing such injuries, it will pay to the beneficiary designated in said policy a sum equal to the face amount of the policy, in addition to the amount otherwise payable under the said policy.
“This supplementary contract does not cover death resulting from:
“(a) Bodily injuries of which there is no visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, except in case of drowning or internal injuries revealed by an autopsy; * * * ”

Appellants bring forward one point of error which reads as follows:

“The court erred in rendering judgment for Appellees because there is no evidence that Harrington G. Simmons died in consequence of bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means or of internal injuries revealed by autopsy or as a direct result thereof, independently of any other cause.”

The only question for this Court to decide is: Does the record in this case reveal sufficient evidence of probative force to support the implied finding on the trial court that Harrington G. Simmons died as the result of accidental internal injuries revealed by an autopsy? No findings of fact were filed by the trial court and none were requested. If there is any evidence of probative force to support the implied finding of the trial court, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. City of Abilene v. Meek, Tex.Civ.App., 311 S.W.2d 654, n. w. h.; Rule 299, Vernon’s Ann.Texas Rules of [289]*289Civil Procedure, and authorities cited thereunder.

Appellants do not contend that the fire was not an accident. Much has been written about “accident” and “accidental means” in such cases, and a late and thorough discussion of their meanings will be found in the case of Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So.2d 171, 172. This case also discusses the ingenious theories that have been advanced on the courts for many generations. A study of this opinion and the authorities therein cited is enlightening. In the Schon-berg case the deceased died from “ ‘anaphy-lactic shock’ produced by a very rare blood transfusion reaction,” which was revealed by an autopsy.

It is undisputed that fright and exertion produce mental reactions such as psychic trauma, traumatic neurosis, and traumatic aneurasthenia that produce internal injuries. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California v. Tetinick, 185 Okl. 37, 89 P.2d 774; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944, 47 L.R.A. 325; Shepherd’s S. W. Reporter citations reveals that the Hayter case has been cited more than 50 times; many times in other jurisdictions. A late case cited being Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W.2d 631, n. w. h.

During the fire, several witnesses testified that they noticed Simmons was nervous and excited during the fire and after the fire they noticed a slight limp in his walk; they saw him carry heavy baskets of papers from the office across to an adjoining building and lifting them over a fire wall; they heard him almost immediately complain of backache and headache; and after the fire, he displayed a nervous condition that had never been noticed prior to the fire. He commenced complaining of numbness in his right side on the day of the fire. His condition gradually became worse until he had to be hospitalized. Brain surgery was done at Methodist Hospital in Houston, and he died January 7, 1954. After his death an autopsy was performed from which it was revealed that Mr. Simmons had suffered a cerebral arterio thrombosis probably caused by psychic trauma, the definition of which is as follows: “Trauma, a wound or injury; psychic trauma, an emotional shock ■ that makes a lasting impression on the mind, especially the subconscious mind.” The definition is taken from the 13th edition of Gorman’s Medical Dictionary.

There is a conflict of medical testimony as to the cause of the death. Two death certificates were filed. The first one, signed on the date of death, showed the cause of death to be brain tumor. After the autopsy, a corrected death certificate was filed showing the cause of death to be: “(a) cerebral thrombosis, bilateral posterior cerebral arteries;” due to “(b) exertion because of fire in office before December 4, 1953.” This later death certificate showed: “18b. Major finding of operation: high infra-cranial pressure; necrotic brain;” and further, “20f. How did injury occur? Trying to save records from burning building.” This amended death certificate was offered in evidence by appellants without any limitation whatever and therefore they are bound by its contents. Attached to this amended death certificate was an affidavit which reads as follows:

“The State of Texas
“County of Harris
“Before me on this day appeared Dr. James A.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pan American Life Insurance Company v. Andrews
340 S.W.2d 787 (Texas Supreme Court, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
323 S.W.2d 287, 1959 Tex. App. LEXIS 2339, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pan-american-life-insurance-co-v-andrews-texapp-1959.