Pamela Veal-Hill v. CIR

976 F.3d 775

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 19-2121 PAMELA E. VEAL-HILL, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States Tax Court No. 1517-17 — Richard T. Morrison, Judge. ____________________

DECIDED OCTOBER 14, 2020 ____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. This court is no stranger to frivolous tax appeals. In 1986 we set $1,500 as the presumptive sanction for a frivolous tax appeal. Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 73 (7th Cir. 1986). Coleman involved groundless claims by two tax protestors; we established the $1,500 penalty as an approximation of the cost of the government attorneys’ wasted time in lieu of inviting proof of actual attorneys’ fees. Id. Ten years later inflation prompted us to raise that sanc- 2 No. 19-2121

tion to $2,000. Cohn v. Comm'r, 101 F.3d 486, 487 (7th Cir. 1996). Another decade passed, and we adjusted the sanction for a frivolous tax appeal to $4,000, this time to reflect both further inflation and additional data on the actual expenses the government incurred litigating a frivolous appeal. Szopa v. United States, 460 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2006). Since then we have left the sanction at $4,000. But as we observed in Cohn, any rule stated in a fixed dollar amount must be adjusted from time to time. 101 F.3d at 487; see also United States v. Boliaux, 915 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2019). The time has come yet again. The Consumer Price Index has increased roughly 25% since we decided Szopa, so the price of a frivolous tax appeal should rise in tow. We therefore impose a $5,000 sanction for this frivolous tax appeal to be paid in accordance with, and for the reasons stated in, the accompanying order.