UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PAMELA SUE DESIR, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00482-JRS-MKK ) LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, ) ) Appellee. )
Order Dismissing Appeal
Appellant Pamela Sue Desir, proceeding pro se, appeals from several orders issued by the bankruptcy court in her now-dismissed Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. See Cause Nos. 1:25-cv-481-JRS-MG; 1:25-cv-764-JRS-CSW; 1:25-cv-765-JRS-MG, 1:25- cv-828-JRS-TAB. Here, Desir appeals from the bankruptcy court's orders granting Appellee LoanDepot.com, LLC's ("LoanDepot") motion for relief from the automatic stay and denying Desir's motion for reconsideration of the same. (Notice Appeal, ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, Desir's appeal is dismissed as moot and Desir's Motion for Summary Disposition, (ECF No. 18), is denied as moot. I. Background Desir, proceeding pro se before the bankruptcy court, filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in September 2024. (See Docket 1, ECF No. 9.) LoanDepot identified a secured claim of $179,553.89 relating to a mortgage on one of Desir's real properties. (Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 11.) Desir objected to LoanDepot's claim. (See Docket 8, 13, ECF No. 9.) LoanDepot sought relief from the automatic stay of collection actions against Desir to foreclose on the real property because Desir failed to pay LoanDepot any required mortgage payment since filing her bankruptcy petition. (Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 10–12.) Desir objected to LoanDepot's
motion for several reasons. (Obj., ECF No. 9-1 at 45–49.) For example, Desir argued that lifting the stay was improper because the bankruptcy court had not yet resolved her objection to LoanDepot's claim; she would be prejudiced; and lifting the stay would violate her constitutional due process rights. (Id. at 45–47.) The bankruptcy court held a hearing on January 28, 2025, to address, among other issues, LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Notice Hr'g, ECF No.
9-1 at 50; Jan. 28 Tr., ECF No. 10.) The bankruptcy court explained that Desir was required to make mortgage payments to LoanDepot and ordered her to do so by February 10, 2025. (Jan. 28 Tr. 7:25–8:3, ECF No. 10.) The bankruptcy court warned Desir that if she failed to do so, the court would likely grant LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Id. 8:21–24.) The bankruptcy court set a hearing for February 11, 2025, to determine whether Desir paid LoanDepot as required. (Id.) Also on January 28, 2025, the bankruptcy trustee ("Trustee") moved to dismiss
Desir's bankruptcy case because Desir failed to make required monthly payments to the Trustee. (See Docket 1, 10, ECF No. 9.) On February 11, 2025, the bankruptcy court held another hearing to determine whether Desir paid LoanDepot as ordered. (See Feb. 11 Tr., ECF No. 11.) She had not. (Id. 2:9–13.) Desir explained that she did not pay LoanDepot because she contests the validity of its claim. (See id. 2:18–22.) The bankruptcy court stated that it would not determine the validity of LoanDepot's claim and advised Desir to litigate validity in the state court foreclosure proceedings. (Id. 2:23–3:2.) Since Desir had not paid LoanDepot as ordered, the bankruptcy court lifted the stay and allowed
LoanDepot to foreclose on the real property. (Id. 3:8–11.) The bankruptcy court issued its ruling by separate order. (Order Granting LoanDepot's Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 66–67.) Desir timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the bankruptcy court's order granting LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay and an "Emergency Stay of Enforcement" pending the bankruptcy court's reconsideration. (Mot. Recons.,
ECF No. 9-1 at 69–74.) Desir argued that the bankruptcy court's failure to address her objection to LoanDepot's claim resulted in procedural due process violations, legal and procedural error, and substantial prejudice to Desir. (Id. 69–70.) The bankruptcy court denied Desir's Motion for Reconsideration and "Emergency Stay of Enforcement" on February 26, 2025. (Order Denying Mot. Recons., ECF No. 9-1 at 77–80.) The bankruptcy court clarified that "stay relief is a distinct issue from whether [LoanDepot] holds a valid claim," and Desir may raise her validity concerns
in state court. (Order Denying Mot. Recons., ECF No. 9-1 at 78–79.) Here, Desir timely appeals from this order and from the underlying order granting LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Notice Appeal, ECF No. 1); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1). Looking back to the Trustee's pending Motion to Dismiss from January 28, 2025, Desir failed to object or otherwise respond to the Trustee's motion. (See Docket, ECF No. 9.) Accordingly, the bankruptcy court dismissed Desir's bankruptcy case on March 5, 2025. (Id. at 15.) Desir filed a Motion for Relief from Order of Dismissal, which the bankruptcy court denied. (See id. at 1, 16 (stating that Desir's bankruptcy
case was "[d]ismissed for [f]ailure to [m]ake [p]lan [p]ayments")). Desir appealed from the bankruptcy court's order denying her motion for relief from the dismissal of her bankruptcy case. See Notice Appeal, Desir v. U.S. Bank et al., 1:25-cv-828-JRS- TAB (S.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2025). This Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. Order Affirming Bankruptcy Court's Order, Desir v. U.S. Bank et al., 1:25-cv-828- JRS-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2026) (ECF No. 23).
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the bankruptcy court, including those from which Desir appeals here. See In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659–60 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a bankruptcy court's order lifting an automatic stay as to a creditor's interest was an appealable order). The Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction over decisions of a bankruptcy court, remains limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to adjudicating only
"actual controvers[ies]." Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (citation modified) ("We have repeatedly held that an actual controversy must exist . . . through all stages of the litigation."). Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that is now moot. See id. Therefore, "if, by virtue of an intervening event," the Court cannot grant Desir "any effectual relief," the Court must dismiss her appeal as moot. In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)). Generally, the Court reviews the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. In re Berman, 629 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011). However, "[t]he bankruptcy court's grant of relief from [an] automatic stay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Colon v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003). III. Analysis Desir's appeal must be dismissed as moot. See In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601
F.3d at 716–17.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PAMELA SUE DESIR, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00482-JRS-MKK ) LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, ) ) Appellee. )
Order Dismissing Appeal
Appellant Pamela Sue Desir, proceeding pro se, appeals from several orders issued by the bankruptcy court in her now-dismissed Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. See Cause Nos. 1:25-cv-481-JRS-MG; 1:25-cv-764-JRS-CSW; 1:25-cv-765-JRS-MG, 1:25- cv-828-JRS-TAB. Here, Desir appeals from the bankruptcy court's orders granting Appellee LoanDepot.com, LLC's ("LoanDepot") motion for relief from the automatic stay and denying Desir's motion for reconsideration of the same. (Notice Appeal, ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, Desir's appeal is dismissed as moot and Desir's Motion for Summary Disposition, (ECF No. 18), is denied as moot. I. Background Desir, proceeding pro se before the bankruptcy court, filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in September 2024. (See Docket 1, ECF No. 9.) LoanDepot identified a secured claim of $179,553.89 relating to a mortgage on one of Desir's real properties. (Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 11.) Desir objected to LoanDepot's claim. (See Docket 8, 13, ECF No. 9.) LoanDepot sought relief from the automatic stay of collection actions against Desir to foreclose on the real property because Desir failed to pay LoanDepot any required mortgage payment since filing her bankruptcy petition. (Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 10–12.) Desir objected to LoanDepot's
motion for several reasons. (Obj., ECF No. 9-1 at 45–49.) For example, Desir argued that lifting the stay was improper because the bankruptcy court had not yet resolved her objection to LoanDepot's claim; she would be prejudiced; and lifting the stay would violate her constitutional due process rights. (Id. at 45–47.) The bankruptcy court held a hearing on January 28, 2025, to address, among other issues, LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Notice Hr'g, ECF No.
9-1 at 50; Jan. 28 Tr., ECF No. 10.) The bankruptcy court explained that Desir was required to make mortgage payments to LoanDepot and ordered her to do so by February 10, 2025. (Jan. 28 Tr. 7:25–8:3, ECF No. 10.) The bankruptcy court warned Desir that if she failed to do so, the court would likely grant LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Id. 8:21–24.) The bankruptcy court set a hearing for February 11, 2025, to determine whether Desir paid LoanDepot as required. (Id.) Also on January 28, 2025, the bankruptcy trustee ("Trustee") moved to dismiss
Desir's bankruptcy case because Desir failed to make required monthly payments to the Trustee. (See Docket 1, 10, ECF No. 9.) On February 11, 2025, the bankruptcy court held another hearing to determine whether Desir paid LoanDepot as ordered. (See Feb. 11 Tr., ECF No. 11.) She had not. (Id. 2:9–13.) Desir explained that she did not pay LoanDepot because she contests the validity of its claim. (See id. 2:18–22.) The bankruptcy court stated that it would not determine the validity of LoanDepot's claim and advised Desir to litigate validity in the state court foreclosure proceedings. (Id. 2:23–3:2.) Since Desir had not paid LoanDepot as ordered, the bankruptcy court lifted the stay and allowed
LoanDepot to foreclose on the real property. (Id. 3:8–11.) The bankruptcy court issued its ruling by separate order. (Order Granting LoanDepot's Mot. Relief Stay, ECF No. 9-1 at 66–67.) Desir timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the bankruptcy court's order granting LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay and an "Emergency Stay of Enforcement" pending the bankruptcy court's reconsideration. (Mot. Recons.,
ECF No. 9-1 at 69–74.) Desir argued that the bankruptcy court's failure to address her objection to LoanDepot's claim resulted in procedural due process violations, legal and procedural error, and substantial prejudice to Desir. (Id. 69–70.) The bankruptcy court denied Desir's Motion for Reconsideration and "Emergency Stay of Enforcement" on February 26, 2025. (Order Denying Mot. Recons., ECF No. 9-1 at 77–80.) The bankruptcy court clarified that "stay relief is a distinct issue from whether [LoanDepot] holds a valid claim," and Desir may raise her validity concerns
in state court. (Order Denying Mot. Recons., ECF No. 9-1 at 78–79.) Here, Desir timely appeals from this order and from the underlying order granting LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay. (Notice Appeal, ECF No. 1); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1). Looking back to the Trustee's pending Motion to Dismiss from January 28, 2025, Desir failed to object or otherwise respond to the Trustee's motion. (See Docket, ECF No. 9.) Accordingly, the bankruptcy court dismissed Desir's bankruptcy case on March 5, 2025. (Id. at 15.) Desir filed a Motion for Relief from Order of Dismissal, which the bankruptcy court denied. (See id. at 1, 16 (stating that Desir's bankruptcy
case was "[d]ismissed for [f]ailure to [m]ake [p]lan [p]ayments")). Desir appealed from the bankruptcy court's order denying her motion for relief from the dismissal of her bankruptcy case. See Notice Appeal, Desir v. U.S. Bank et al., 1:25-cv-828-JRS- TAB (S.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2025). This Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. Order Affirming Bankruptcy Court's Order, Desir v. U.S. Bank et al., 1:25-cv-828- JRS-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2026) (ECF No. 23).
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the bankruptcy court, including those from which Desir appeals here. See In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659–60 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a bankruptcy court's order lifting an automatic stay as to a creditor's interest was an appealable order). The Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction over decisions of a bankruptcy court, remains limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to adjudicating only
"actual controvers[ies]." Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (citation modified) ("We have repeatedly held that an actual controversy must exist . . . through all stages of the litigation."). Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that is now moot. See id. Therefore, "if, by virtue of an intervening event," the Court cannot grant Desir "any effectual relief," the Court must dismiss her appeal as moot. In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)). Generally, the Court reviews the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. In re Berman, 629 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011). However, "[t]he bankruptcy court's grant of relief from [an] automatic stay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Colon v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003). III. Analysis Desir's appeal must be dismissed as moot. See In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601
F.3d at 716–17. Desir contests the bankruptcy court's orders granting LoanDepot's motion for relief from the automatic stay and denying reconsideration of the same. In other words, Desir disputes whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the automatic stay. However, a valid automatic stay requires a pending bankruptcy case, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B), and Desir's bankruptcy case was dismissed since she filed this appeal. (See Docket 1, ECF No. 9.) Though Desir appealed from the bankruptcy court's order denying her relief from the dismissal, this Court recently affirmed that
order. See Order Affirming Bankruptcy Court's Order, Desir v. U.S. Bank et al., 1:25- cv-828-JRS-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2026) (ECF No. 23). Consequently, despite Desir's arguments to the contrary, there is no longer any case or controversy presented by this appeal because Desir's bankruptcy case has been dismissed. See In re Stat. Tabulating Corp., 60 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal of bankruptcy case moots controversy over lifting the automatic stay because dismissal disposes of the basis for the stay); In re Sykes, 554 F. App'x 527, 528 (7th Cir. 2014) ("An unchallenged dismissal of a bankruptcy case moots a dispute about a stay because the stay, to be valid, requires a pending bankruptcy case."). In other words, there is no possible relief this Court could fashion for Desir on appeal—the bankruptcy court's orders lifting the automatic stay and denying Desir's motions for reconsideration are inoperable, as the automatic stay and the case no longer exist. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (providing that the automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case). IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed as moot and Desir's Motion for Summary Disposition, (ECF No. 18), is denied as moot. SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/16/2026 JAMES R. SWEENEY II, CHIEF JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana Distribution: PAMELA SUE DESIR 3563 Insignia Court Indianapolis, IN 46214 Joshua Isaac Goldman Padgett Law Group josh.goldman@padgettlawgroup.com