Pamela Chyba v. Washington Mutual

Ninth Circuit

Pamela Chyba v. Washington Mutual

671 F. App'x 426

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 23, 2016

Docket14-56082

StatusUnpublished

This text of 671 F. App'x 426 (Pamela Chyba v. Washington Mutual) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pamela Chyba v. Washington Mutual, 671 F. App'x 426 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Pamela Chyba appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (motion to dismiss). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

Dismissal of Chyba’s FCRA claims was proper because Chyba failed to exhaust the claims before filing suit in district court as required by the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”). See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d); Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2014) (no jurisdiction exists over claims not properly exhausted through FIRREA’s administrative process).

We reject as without merit Chyba’s contention that the district court’s denial of her motion for in camera review violated her due process rights.

*427 Washington Mutual’s request for judicial notice, filed on March 30, 2015, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Pamela Chyba appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (motion to dismiss). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

Dismissal of Chyba’s FCRA claims was proper because Chyba failed to exhaust the claims before filing suit in district court as required by the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”). See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d); Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2014) (no jurisdiction exists over claims not properly exhausted through FIRREA’s administrative process).

We reject as without merit Chyba’s contention that the district court’s denial of her motion for in camera review violated her due process rights.

*427 Washington Mutual’s request for judicial notice, filed on March 30, 2015, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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671 F. App'x 426, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pamela-chyba-v-washington-mutual-ca9-2016.

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