Palmer v. VanWyck

92 Tenn. 397
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 11, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 92 Tenn. 397 (Palmer v. VanWyck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Palmer v. VanWyck, 92 Tenn. 397 (Tenn. 1893).

Opinion

A. D. Bkight, Sp. J.

The defendants in this case, the Wilkins heirs, sold to complainant, L. D. Palmer, a piece of ground in Nashville by deed containing the usual covenants of warranty. The land was described in the deed by metes and bounds, the call of the east line being the middle [398]*398of Spruce Street, and of the north line the middle of an alley. Eor the purposes of a judicial sale, this and other land adjacent had been previously divided into lots and the plan registered, and in this division the alley had been widened into a street called Lee Avenue. At the time of the sale from defendants to complainant it was not believed that, as to this land, any thing had been done by the city of Nashville t@ consummate the apparent dedication of the streets and alleys. Such proved to be the fact as to all the numerous streets and alleys except Lee Avenue, located on the north margin. As to this avenue, the city claimed that the dedication was complete, and, some months after the sale, began to improve it as a street. Complainant filed a bill and enjoined the city. The bill was dismissed by the Chancellor, and his decree affirmed by this Court. Complainant then claimed 'that all of the covenants of warranty in the deed had been breached. In the meantime, one or more of the purchase notes given for the land had matured and were unpaid. Palmer claimed that he was entitled to a credit on the first one to the amount of his damages for the breach of warranty. . It was then agreed between the parties that the matters in controversy should be settled by arbitration. It was agreed that all matters of law should be submitted to Hon. ~W. K. McAlister, his decision to be conclusive; and that if he should decide that the warranty had been breached, and that said vendors were liable [399]*399therefor, then the question of amount of damages should be settled by three disinterested citizens; that the arbitrators should view the premises, and in accordance with the principles of law settled by Judge McAlister, determine whether Palmer was. damaged, and, if so, how much, and that their decision should be final and conclusive; that if against Palmer, it should forever estop him, and if in his favor, the amount of the award should be credited on his note or notes.

Judge McAlister decided that Palmer, by his deed, obtained the fee to the land in controversy subject to the easement, and, therefore, that there had been no breach of any of the covenants except the one against incumbrances. Judge Whitworth and Lewis T. Baxter were selected as arbitrators, they to select a third arbitrator in case of disagreement, who was to act with them in reaching a conclusion. They failed to agree, and selected H. E. Jones as the third man. On October 7, 1889, an award was rendered' to the effect that there was no damage, but as it had been decided by Judge Mc-Alister that there was a breach of the warranty,, defendants should pay the cost of the arbitration, which they fixed at $75. ' Defendants paid the $75., Complainant promised generally to pay his notes, and subsequently made two separate promises that if certain liens were released he would pay the first and second notes at once, and the third as soon as he could arrange to do so. In both instances the liens were released. He then filed this bill,. [400]*400and alleges that the, decision of Baxter, Whitworth, and' Jones is null and void, and asks that the Court render a decree in his favor for $4,500 damages for breach of warranty. For the claim that the award is a nullity, four distinct grounds are laid, viz.:

1. That said ai’bitrators ignored Judge McAlister’s decision, in that they decided that Palmer sustained no damages, whereas Judge McAlister decided that he was entitled to some substantial damages.

2. That they ignored his decision, in that they considered incidental benefits to the remaining property of complainant, resulting from the street in question.

3. That the third arbitrator, Jones, failed to confer with the other two before rendering a decision.

4. That Jones did not view the premises, but examined several real estate agents in the absence of the other two arbitrators, and in the absence and without the knowledge or consent of the complainant, and based his opinion and decision on the information thus derived.

Defendants, in their answer, relied on the award; denied that Judge McAlister’s decision had been violated; denied that the rule of damages laid down by him had been violated; that it was not true, in fact, that the award was made without a conference between Jones and the other arbitrators; that they did meet and -confer, and made the award, all signing same. Defendants further relied on Palmer’s acquiescence in award; that Palmer [401]*401was, by his various acts, doings, and promises, now estopped from maintaining the bill. Defendants also deny that complainant had sustained any damages. Answer alleges that Palmer had ratified the award.

The Chancellor decreed that the award was void, and same be set aside and for naught held, and referred the case to the Master to take proof and report the value of the land with and without the easement, and the difference, if any, he should report as the damages.

The Clerk .and Master reported complainant’s damage to be $3,500. Upon exceptions by defendant, the Chancellor reduced the amount to $2,500, and allowed damages for $2,500 to be credited upon defendant’s decree on the note. He decreed in defendant’s favor on cross-bill for the note and interest — $11,237, less the damages —leaving balance $7,932, and defendants appealed, and assigned errors.

There is one further fact that should be stated. A deed was prepared and tendered Palmer to the land, which was refused by him, because reference was made in it to a subdivision of the property, which *had been registered in 1884, which subdivision had an avenue or street forty feet wide on its northern boundary, Palmer saying that he had contracted to buy upon the assurance that an alley, and not a street, bounded the property on the north, and that he had conceived a subdivision on that assurance, and would not conclude his purchase unless it was true.

[402]*402Gaut, the agent of defendants, told him the city-had no claim or right to a street across the property, but that he would write another deed, making no reference to the registered plan of 1884, which he did, and same was accepted by Palmer.

The first question presented on the record is, Shall or not the award of the arbitrators be set aside ?

The article or agreement of arbitration, between the parties stated, among other things, that “ whereas, L. D. Palmer insists that the said 'strip of ground was included in said conveyance and warranty, and that the existence of said easement constitutes a breach of his warranty, and that he is damaged thereby.” And, as we have seen, “ all matters of law in controversy between the parties shall be submitted to the arbitrament and award of the Hon. W. K. McAlister, óf Nashville, Tenn., and that his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive upon the parties hereto.” It was further agreed “ that should Judge McAlister decide that said warranties, or warranty, had been breached, and that said vendors are liable therefor, then the question of the amount of damages sustained by said Palmer shall (be submitted to the arbitrament and award of three disinterested citizens, to be chosen by said Palmer and by John M.

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Bluebook (online)
92 Tenn. 397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palmer-v-vanwyck-tenn-1893.