Palmer v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Palmer v. State

548 So. 2d 277, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2054, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4878, 1989 WL 101066

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 1, 1989

DocketNo. 88-2262

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 548 So. 2d 277 (Palmer v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Palmer v. State, 548 So. 2d 277, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2054, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4878, 1989 WL 101066 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinion

ERVIN, Judge.

Appellant appeals his conviction for violation of Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1987), burglary of a dwelling, and Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1987), grand theft, both allegedly committed on January 1, 1988. Appellant raises five points on appeal, one of which merits discussion and requires reversal.

On the morning of trial, appellant made a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding appellant’s incarceration on the day of the offense. Specifically, appellant requested that the state not be allowed to introduce records of the Jacksonville Work Release Center, which showed that appellant had signed out of the center on furlough on the day of the incident and indicated that his destination was Live Oak, where the incident occurred. The court denied the motion, and the records were introduced into evidence, along with the testimony of the custodian of the records.

Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1987), provides: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” In this case, any probative value of appellant’s furlough records was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of presenting to the jury the fact that appellant was a convicted prisoner on furlough. Furthermore, appellant’s presence in Live Oak on the day of the crime could have been established by other nonprejudicial means.

Although the state argues that it was not appellant’s status as an inmate that was significant, but rather his confinement to a certain place (prison), which necessitated the involvement of other people (his wife and her friend) in the concealment of the weapon (buried near the prison) after he stole it while on furlough; nevertheless, its prejudicial effect was too great. Furthermore, because the prejudicial evidence was introduced during the state’s case-in-chief, it was not cumulative. We cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of this testimony contributed to defendant’s conviction. [278]*278State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

Therefore, defendant’s conviction is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for a new trial.

ZEHMER, J., concurs. WENTWORTH, J., dissents without written opinion.

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ERVIN, Judge.

Appellant appeals his conviction for violation of Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1987), burglary of a dwelling, and Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1987), grand theft, both allegedly committed on January 1, 1988. Appellant raises five points on appeal, one of which merits discussion and requires reversal.

On the morning of trial, appellant made a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding appellant’s incarceration on the day of the offense. Specifically, appellant requested that the state not be allowed to introduce records of the Jacksonville Work Release Center, which showed that appellant had signed out of the center on furlough on the day of the incident and indicated that his destination was Live Oak, where the incident occurred. The court denied the motion, and the records were introduced into evidence, along with the testimony of the custodian of the records.

Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1987), provides: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” In this case, any probative value of appellant’s furlough records was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of presenting to the jury the fact that appellant was a convicted prisoner on furlough. Furthermore, appellant’s presence in Live Oak on the day of the crime could have been established by other nonprejudicial means.

Although the state argues that it was not appellant’s status as an inmate that was significant, but rather his confinement to a certain place (prison), which necessitated the involvement of other people (his wife and her friend) in the concealment of the weapon (buried near the prison) after he stole it while on furlough; nevertheless, its prejudicial effect was too great. Furthermore, because the prejudicial evidence was introduced during the state’s case-in-chief, it was not cumulative. We cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of this testimony contributed to defendant’s conviction. [278]*278State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

Therefore, defendant’s conviction is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for a new trial.

ZEHMER, J., concurs. WENTWORTH, J., dissents without written opinion.

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Bluebook (online)

548 So. 2d 277, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2054, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4878, 1989 WL 101066, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palmer-v-state-fladistctapp-1989.

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