Palmer v. Carranza

• Court: District Court, D. Idaho
• Decided: November 3, 2022
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00103
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 DISTRICT OF IDAHO 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 VAL PALMER, an individual; and No. 1:22-cv-103 WBS COLEEN PALMER, an individual, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 15 PAUL A. CARRANZA, an individual; 16 ANDREW HEITZMAN, an individual; ADAM MATTHEWS, an individual; 17 MATTHEW RAPATTONI, an individual; and KYLIE WHITE, an 18 individual, 19 Defendants. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 Plaintiffs Mr. Val Palmer and Mrs. Coleen Palmer 23 brought this action against Caldwell Police Officers Paul A. 24 Carranza, Andrew Heitzman, Adam Matthews, Matthew Rapattoni1, and 25 Kylie White seeking damages against defendants for violations of 26

27 1 Throughout the record this individual’s last name is spelled “Rapattoni” and “Rappatoni.” The court will follow the 28 spelling in the original caption of this action. 1 the First and Fourth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Compl. 2 (Docket No. 1).) Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ 3 first cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, second 4 through fourth causes of action for violations of the First 5 Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and fifth and sixth causes of 6 action for violations of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 7 1983.2 (Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”) (Docket No. 8 12).) Defendants also move to dismiss defendants Matthews and 9 Rapattoni from the case. (Id.) 10 I. Summary of Allegations 11 On the morning of September 13, 2021, Mr. Palmer left 12 his home around 8:45am to go to the gym before heading to work at 13 his chiropractic clinic. (Compl. ¶ 12.) While driving west on 14 the Franklin Street bridge of I-84 (“Franklin Overpass”), his car 15 ran out of gas. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Palmer pulled over and called 16 his wife, Mrs. Palmer, to ask her to bring him a gas canister. 17 (Id. ¶ 14-15.) While Mr. Palmer was on the phone with Mrs. 18 Palmer, a neighbor drove by and left Mr. Palmer a voicemail 19 saying he saw him pulled over on the Franklin Overpass and asking 20 if he was alright. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) When Mr. Palmer got off the 21 phone with Mrs. Palmer, he returned the call to the neighbor and 22 left a voicemail explaining that he ran out of gas and Mrs. 23 Palmer was on her way over. (Id. ¶ 19.) 24 While he was waiting for Mrs. Palmer, Mr. Palmer exited 25 his car on the sidewalk of the Franklin Overpass. (Id. ¶ 20.) 26 2 Defendants do not seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ seventh 27 cause of action for excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 1 Alongside the Franklin Overpass, there is a three-foot high 2 concrete barrier which sits right below a six-foot high fence 3 overlooking I-84. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Mr. Palmer began to stretch 4 his arms and legs on the barrier as he waited. (Id.) 5 Detective Heitzman noticed Mr. Palmer standing next to 6 the barrier along the Franklin Overpass. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) He 7 drove his unmarked police vehicle over to Mr. Palmer and turned 8 on his emergency lights. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Detective Heitzman 9 ordered Mr. Palmer to sit on the curb and informed Mr. Palmer 10 that he thought he was attempting to climb the fence to commit 11 suicide. (Id. 26-27.) Mr. Palmer complied and sat on the curb. 12 (Id. ¶ 26.) Mr. Palmer explained that he had run out of gas on 13 the way to the gym, was stretching while he waited for Mrs. 14 Palmer to bring him gas, and denied that he was attempting to 15 climb the fence. (Id. ¶ 29.) Detective Heitzman called for 16 backup. (Id. ¶ 28.) 17 Mr. Palmer stood up from the curb to demonstrate to 18 Detective Heitzman how he was stretching his legs on the concrete 19 barrier. (Id. ¶ 30.) Detective Heitzman ordered him to sit back 20 down. (Id. ¶ 31.) Mr. Palmer complied but expressed his 21 frustration with being ordered to sit down. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Mr. 22 Palmer explained to Detective Heitzman that he had previously had 23 bad experiences with police officers. (Id. ¶ 33.) 24 Mr. Palmer then received a call on his cellphone from 25 Mrs. Palmer. (Id. ¶ 36.) When Mr. Palmer went to retrieve his 26 phone from his pocket, Detective Heitzman ordered that he keep 27 his hands out of his pockets. (Id.) Mr. Palmer then asked for, 28 and Detective Heitzman granted, permission to answer the phone. 1 (Id. ¶ 37.) Mr. Palmer yelled: “It’s a free country still, it’s 2 still a free country, right?” (Id.) In his phone conversation 3 with Mrs. Palmer, Mr. Palmer insinuated that the police were 4 there to harass him and write him a ticket in order to pay their 5 salaries. (Id. ¶ 40.) 6 While Mr. Palmer was on the phone with Mrs. Palmer, 7 Officer Carranza arrived. (Id. ¶ 41.) Detective Heitzman told 8 Officer Carranza that Mr. Palmer was being “super irate.” (Id. ¶ 9 42.) When the next officer arrived, Officer White, Detective 10 Heitzman repeated that Mr. Palmer was “irate” and said that Mr. 11 Palmer had “start[ed] to scream at [him].” (Id. ¶ 44.) 12 Mr. Palmer explained to Officer Carranza that he had 13 run out of gas and was waiting for his wife. (Id. ¶ 46.) Mr. 14 Palmer then alerted Officer Carranza that Mrs. Palmer and her 15 father had arrived at the far end of the Franklin Overpass with 16 the gas cannister. (Id. ¶ 47.) Rather than recognize that Mrs. 17 Palmer and her father had arrived, Officer Carranza asked Mr. 18 Palmer why he was attempting to climb the fence. (Id. ¶ 49.) Mr. 19 Palmer again explained that he ran out of gas while he was on the 20 way to the gym and was only stretching on the barrier. (Id.) 21 Mr. Palmer showed the officers that he was wearing gym clothes. 22 (Id.) 23 As Mr. Palmer stood up to ask if he could go get the 24 gas canister from Mrs. Palmer, Officer Carranza ordered him to 25 sit back down. (Id. ¶ 51.) Before he could sit down, Officer 26 Carranza placed himself in front of Mr. Palmer and put his hand 27 on Mr. Palmer’s chest. (Id. ¶ 52.) Mr. Palmer backed away, 28 saying, “[d]on’t touch me, please, don’t touch me,” and sat down. 1 (Id. ¶ 52.) Officer Carranza then grabbed Mr. Palmer’s left arm 2 and shoulder and ordered Mr. Palmer to put his hands behind his 3 back while Mr. Palmer was sitting on the curb. (Id. ¶ 53.) Mr. 4 Palmer refused. (Id.) Then Officer Carranza jumped on Mr. 5 Palmer’s back, jammed his knee into his back, and placed a 6 forearm on the back of Mr. Palmer’s neck. (Id. ¶ 54.) Mr. Palmer 7 placed both his hands on the ground to balance himself. (Id. ¶ 8 55.) A few seconds later, Mr. Palmer put his hands behind his 9 back and allowed Officer Carranza to handcuff him. (Id. ¶ 56.) 10 Officer Carranza fastened the handcuffs very tightly causing them 11 to cut into Mr. Palmer’s wrists. (Id. ¶ 67.) 12 Again, Mr. Palmer tried to explain that he was 13 stretching while waiting for Mrs. Palmer to arrive with gas. 14 (Id. ¶ 58.) Officer White ordered Mr. Palmer to “stop talking.” 15 (Id.) In response, Mr. Palmer stated that he still had a First 16 Amendment right. (Id.) 17 As Mr. Palmer was being handcuffed, Mrs. Palmer and her 18 father explained to the officers that Mr. Palmer was “fine” and 19 had just “r[u]n out of gas.” (Id. ¶ 59.) Detective Heitzman 20 told Mrs. Palmer that Mr. Palmer was “attempting to climb the 21 fence” and was “not complying” with the officers. (Id. ¶ 60.) 22 Mrs. Palmer told Detective Heitzman that the treatment of Mr. 23 Palmer was unnecessary and “[s]omebody has an ego problem.” 24 While Mrs. Palmer and Detective Heitzman were speaking, 25 Mr. Palmer was taken to Officer Carranza’s police vehicle. (Id. 26 ¶ 63.) Detective Heitzman informed Mrs. Palmer that Mr. Palmer 27 was “not under arrest right now, we are trying to figure out 28 what’s going on.” (Id. ¶ 64.) Detective Heitzman then told Mrs. 1 Palmer to go to her car and “take a deep breath.” (Id. ¶ 65.) 2 Mrs. Palmer refused and said she was “going to help her dad put 3 gas in the car.” (Id. ¶ 65.) When she walked away, Mrs. Palmer 4 told Detective Heitzman, “you guys are bored, obviously.” (Id. ¶ 5 66.) Detective Heitzman screamed at Mrs. Palmer, calling her a 6 “fucking dumb bitch.” (Id. ¶¶ 67, 68.) 7 While Mr. Palmer was sitting in the police vehicle, 8 Detective Heitzman again asked Mr. Palmer what he was doing on 9 the Franklin Overpass. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 70.) Mr. Palmer again 10 explained that he was stretching while waiting for gas. (Id.) 11 Detective Heitzman told Mr. Palmer that Mrs. Palmer had mentioned 12 that Mr. Palmer had a “mental illness” (schizophrenia). (Id. ¶ 13 71; Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 14 6 (Docket No. 18).) Mr. Palmer confirmed that he had been 15 diagnosed but reiterated that he did not intend to commit 16 suicide. (Compl. ¶ 71.) 17 The officers transported Mr. Palmer to West Valley 18 Medical Center (“West Valley”) to be placed on a mental hold. 19 (Id. ¶ 72.) The medical personnel at West Valley did not see a 20 need to place Mr. Palmer on a mental hold, explaining: “He did 21 not appear to be a harm to himself or others.” (Id. ¶ 79.) The 22 medical personnel at West Valley contacted the Canyon County 23 Prosecutor’s office to request defendants release Mr. Palmer from 24 the mental hold. (Id. ¶ 80.) The prosecutor’s office refused to 25 release Mr. Palmer until he met with a “Designated Evaluator.” 26 (Id. ¶ 81.) 27 Mr. Palmer remained at West Valley for over 50 hours 28 because of the process required to release a patient from a 1 mental hold. (Id. ¶ 84.) The West Valley physician who met with 2 the Palmers stated that Mr. Palmer should not be on a mental 3 hold. (Id. ¶ 82.) The state Designated Evaluator Mrs. Palmer 4 met with a few days later also believed Mr. Palmer should not 5 have been placed on a mental hold and that his confinement had 6 “everything to do with police and their fears.” (Id. ¶ 83.) 7 Mr. Palmer was cited, but not charged, for disorderly 8 conduct under Caldwell Code § 08-01-27 and obstructing an officer 9 under Idaho Code § 18-705. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 77.) 10 II. Discussion 11 A. Mr. Palmer’s Fourth Amendment Claims (Claims 5 and 6) 12 The above allegations are sufficient to support Mr. 13 Palmer’s false arrest claims under the Fourth Amendment. Under 14 the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest is constitutional if 15 the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a crime 16 has been, or is being, committed. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 17 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Mr. Palmer alleges that there was no 18 probable cause to justify his arrest for violation of either 19 Caldwell Code § 18-01-273 or Idaho Code § 18-705.4 Accepting the 20 3 Under Caldwell Code § 18-01-27, a person is guilty of 21 misdemeanor disorderly conduct where they: 22 [e]ngage[] in fighting or threatening, or in violent 23 behavior [or] [u]se language, an utterance, or gesture, or engage[] in a display or act that is obscene, physically 24 threatening or menacing, or done in a manner that is likely to inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace. 25 Caldwell Code § 18-01-27(B)-(C).

26 4 Idaho Code § 18-705 makes it a crime to: “willfully 27 resist[], delay[] or obstruct[] any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office . . 28 . .” Idaho Code § 18-705. 1 allegations of the complaint as true, they are sufficient to 2 support a finding of lack of probable cause.5 3 Mr. Palmer also asserts that the officers lacked 4 probable cause to place him on a mental hold. Idaho Code § 66- 5 326 provides:

6 . . . a person may be taken into custody by a peace officer and placed in a facility . . . [if there is] 7 reason to believe that person is gravely disabled due 8 to mental illness or the person’s continued liberty poses an imminent danger to that person or others, as 9 evidenced by a threat of substantial physical harm. 10 Accepting Mr. Palmer’s allegation that explained 11 that he ran out of gas on the way to the gym and was merely 12 stretching on the fence while he waited for his wife and 13 that this was corroborated by Mrs. Palmer arriving with a 14 gas cannister and the fact that Mr. Palmer was dressed in 15 his gym clothes, the complaint sufficiently sets forth facts 16 from which could be inferred a lack of probable cause to 17

18 5 The cases that have considered what actions are sufficient to violate Idaho Code § 18-705 suggest a person must do more than 19 initially refuse an officer’s command. Compare Moreno v. ID, No. 4:15-cv-00342 BLW, 2017 WL 1217113, at *9 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 20 2017) (finding no violation of Idaho Code § 18-705 for “momentarily” refusing to comply with officers’ commands to get 21 on the ground), with Baker v. Clearwater Cnty, No. 2:20-cv-00376 22 CWD, 2022 WL 19411, at *9-10 (D. Idaho Jan. 3, 2022) (finding sufficient evidence for violation of Idaho Code § 18-705 for 23 refusing to open a gate, drop a crowbar, and speak to officers who were responding to a dispatch call for false imprisonment); 24 U.S. v. Tuschoff, No. 1:19-cr-00233 1 DCN, 2021 WL 932012, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 10, 2021) (repeatedly refusing to exit vehicle so 25 officer could deploy drug sniffing dog); Soderberg v. City of McCall, No. 1:16-cv-00045 EJL, 2018 WL 264917, at *6-7 (D. Idaho 26 Jan. 2, 2018) (preventing uniformed officer from entering hotel 27 room to investigate the smell of marijuana and officer made clear that failure to comply would result in arrest). 28 1 believe that Mr. Palmer was gravely disabled or posed an 2 imminent danger to himself or others. 3 The motion to dismiss the fifth and sixth claims 4 of the complaint will accordingly be denied. 5 B. Mr. Palmer’s First Amendment Claims (Claims 2 and 3) 6 The allegations of the complaint are also sufficient to 7 state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Mr. Palmer’s 8 rights protected by the First Amendment. “The freedom of 9 individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without 10 thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by 11 which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” City of 12 Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987). “The First 13 Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and 14 challenge directed at police . . . . ‘unless shown likely to 15 produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil 16 that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or 17 unrest.’” Id. at 461 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 18 1, 4 (1949)). Taking the allegations as true, Mr. Palmer did 19 engage in protected speech by telling the officers he had 20 previously had bad experiences with the police, exclaiming “it’s 21 a free country still, it’s still a free country, right?”, and 22 insinuating that the police were there to harass him and to 23 ticket him to pay their salaries. (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37, 40.) 24 The close temporal proximity between Mr. Palmer’s 25 statements and his detention are sufficient at this stage in the 26 pleadings to allege that were a substantial motivating factor in 27 defendants’ conduct. See Ariz. Students’ Ass’n, 824 F.3d at 871 28 (“[A] plaintiff may establish motive using direct or 1 circumstantial evidence” and may “rely on evidence of temporal 2 proximity between the protected activity and alleged retaliatory 3 conduct to demonstrate that the defendant’s purported reasons for 4 its conduct are pretextual or false.”). The complaint also 5 sufficiently alleges that his detention and arrest were without 6 probable cause. See Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 7 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that probable cause does not 8 exist where the arrestee’s conduct does not constitute a crime). 9 The motion to dismiss the second and third claims of 10 the complaint will accordingly be denied. 11 C. Mrs. Palmer’s First Amendment Claim (Claim 4) 12 Mrs. Palmer’s claim for violation of her First 13 Amendment rights presents different considerations. Both sides 14 discuss Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 15 1999), at length in arguing whether Mrs. Palmer’s claim is 16 derivative of her husband’s. In Biggs, the court explained that 17 where one spouse brings a First Amendment retaliation claim for 18 retaliatory conduct taken against the other plaintiff spouse, the 19 spouse’s claim is derivative of the plaintiff spouse’s claim. 20 However, as the court reads the complaint in this action, Mrs. 21 Palmer is not pursuing a derivative claim based her husband’s 22 cause of action. Rather, she seeks to pursue a separate claim 23 based upon her allegations that the officers’ conduct was in 24 retaliation for her exercise of her own First Amendment right of 25 free speech. 26 Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, 27 Mrs. Palmer’s statements at the scene when she told Detective 28 Heitzman, “you guys are bored, obviously” (Compl. ¶ 66.) could be 1 found to constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, 2 and coupled with Detective Heitzman’s epithet shouted at her and 3 the detention of Mr. Palmer shortly afterwards could give rise to 4 an inference that the officers’ ensuing conduct was in 5 retaliation for Mrs. Palmer’s remarks. Mrs. Palmer has 6 accordingly alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment right of free 8 speech. 9 The court expresses no opinion in this order, however, 10 as to what damages, if any, Mrs. Palmer may be entitled to 11 recover if the trier of fact finds that any of the officers’ 12 conduct was taken in retaliation against Mrs. Palmer for her 13 exercise of that right. Mrs. Palmer appears to advance the novel 14 theory that she is entitled to recover for her own emotional 15 distress as a result of seeing her husband arrested. She also 16 appears to seek damages for the loss of her husband’s 17 companionship, and perhaps income, while he was detained for over 18 50 hours on a mental hold. That theory has not been adequately 19 briefed in the papers, and the court need not address it in this 20 order. 21 For those reasons the motion to dismiss the fourth 22 claim of the complaint will be denied. 23 D. General § 1983 Claim (Claim 1) 24 While plaintiffs bring claims under § 1983 for 25 violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, as discussed 26 above, they also bring a “general allegation” claim under § 1983. 27 (Compl. ¶¶ 94-99.) Section 1983 is not itself a source of 28 substantive rights -- it provides a cause of action against any 1 person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 2 federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 3 rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 4 Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs’ first § 1983 claim 5 is premised on a general allegation,6 as opposed to a specific 6 constitutional or statutory violation, the court must grant 7 defendant’s motion to dismiss claim one of the complaint. 8 E. Defendants Matthews and Rapattoni 9 Plaintiffs do not describe any specific conduct linking 10 either defendants Matthews or Rapattoni to the alleged First or 11 Fourth Amendment violations. A plaintiff cannot demonstrate the 12 liability of a particular officer “without a showing of 13 individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. 14 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). Because plaintiffs 15 do not allege facts that Matthews and Rapattoni individually 16 participated in the alleged violations of Mr. Palmer’s 17 constitutional rights, the claims against Matthews and Rapattoni 18 are insufficient. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the 19 action as against defendants Matthews and Rapattoni will be 20 granted.

21 6 Plaintiffs argue that the general § 1983 claim should 22 not be dismissed because: “Count I realleges all of the facts in the ‘General Allegation’ section of the [c]omplaint”; “the 23 inclusion of Count I in the [c]omplaint is important to [p]laintiffs’ remaining claims”; and “while Count I conceptually 24 refers to the other claims, it does so in a broad manner, allowing for the possibility of additional counts upon further 25 discovery, while also giving fair notice of the [p]laintiffs’ claims.” As the court has already stated, § 1983 is not a source 26 of substantive rights. If plaintiffs wish to clean up their 27 pleading by incorporating some of the allegations in their general § 1983 claim into any of their specific claims, they may 28 do so by amending their complaint pursuant to this Order. 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 2 dismiss the complaint (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, 3 GRANTED as to plaintiffs’ first claim, alleging a general § 1983 4 claim; and plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Matthews and 5 Rapattoni; and DENIED as to all of plaintiffs’ other claims. 6 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file 7 an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with this 8 Order. a bleo~ (hi. 9 | Dated: November 3, 2022 i her VS eh 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13