Palma v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

8 Fla. Supp. 2d 80
CourtCircuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida
DecidedAugust 15, 1984
DocketCase No. 83-4113 CA(L) 01 E
StatusPublished

This text of 8 Fla. Supp. 2d 80 (Palma v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Palma v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 8 Fla. Supp. 2d 80 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

W. C. WILLIAMS, III, Circuit Judge.

OPINION: FINDING OF FACTS: FINAL JUDGMENT

Margarita J. Palma filed an amended complaint in the circuit court seeking payment for unspecified medical and other expenses under her PIP coverage with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The only [81]*81item in dispute was a bill for a thermogram sent to the plaintiff Palma by Thermographic Medical Associates, Inc., a corporation directed by one Harry Rein, J.D., M.D. By the time it became known that the claim involved only $600.00 this Court had jurisdiction as a result of a counterclaim (later an amended counterclaim) for declaratory relief filed by State Farm against Margarita J. Palma.

The action for declaratory relief asked the Court to declare that thermographic examinations in musculoskeletal injuries and nerve root impingement were not necessary medical treatment as defined under Florida Statute 627.736 (Personal Injury Protection) and, therefore, were not reimbursable to the plaintiff, or any plaintiff, under her PIP coverage in the insurance policy issued by State Farm. The policy language tracked F.S. 627.736.

State Farm also asked the Court to declare that its refusal to pay for thermograms and claims involving musculoskeletal injuries or nerve root impingement did not constitute an unfair business practice under F.S. 624.155, commonly known as the Civil Remedies Act.

The parties agreed to waive jury trial and this case proceeded to trial before the Court.

ISSUES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

By the time of trial the issues involved in the case had become clearly defined.

On the main claim of the plaintiff the issues were:

1. Whether or not the thermographic examination (a diagnostic study) performed under the plaintiff was a necessary medical service.
2. Whether or not the cost of the thermographic examination was reasonable.

The issues presented by State Farm in its action for declaratory relief were as follows:

1. Whether or not thermographic examinations in the case of musculoskeletal injuries and nerve root impingement constitute a “necessary medical service” within the meaning of F.S. 627.736 (l)(a).
2. Whether or not failure to pay for such examinations constitutes an unfair business practice under F.S. 624.155. It therefore clearly follows that if the Court finds that thermographic examinations of this nature are not a necessary medical treatment, then failure to pay for the examinations is not an unfair business practice (although the [82]*82opposite is not necessarily true because of the provisions of F.S. 624.155).

All parties concede that a necessary medical service would include not only necessary medical treatment but a necessary diagnostic test. Consequently, the primary issue further resolves itself into whether or not a thermogram, used in connection with a musculoskeletal injury or suspected nerve root impingement, constitutes a medically necessary diagnostic study.

Resolution of these issues involves another problem:

3. How does the Court determine whether or not a given medical procedure is a medically necessary diagnostic study?

The phrase “necessary medical service” lacks definition in F.S. 627.736(1).

The phrase “medically necessary” is used also in the Workers Compensation Act. There the phrase “medically necessary” is defined in 440.13(c). This was not always the case; the need for definition was recognized and the definition was added by amendment in 1983. Although the statute is not binding for interpretation of “medically necessary” in this case, it is, nonetheless, helpful in pari materia interpretation of the same phrase in other statutes or regulations.

The Court is therefore asked, and finds it necessary, to set some broad standard as to what type of diagnostic treatments qualify as “medically necessary” under F.S. 627.736 in order to determine factually whether the use of thermography in musculoskeletal and nerve root impingement constitutes a necessary medical diagnostic procedure as contemplated by F.S. 627.736.

ULTIMATE FINDINGS

On the main claim by Margarita J. Palma the Court finds the thermographic studies performed in her case did not constitute a medically necessary diagnostic study and therefore was not a necessary medical service in the meaning of F.S. 627.736(1). As a result of this finding, the Court does not reach the issue as to whether the charge was reasonable, if, indeed, any charge can be reasonable in the circumstances.

It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in the main claim on behalf of Margarita J. Palma that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, a foreign corporation, and against the plaintiff Margarita J. Palma, the plaintiff to take nothing from her suit and the defendant to go hence without delay.

[83]*83The reasons for this final judgment will be explained in the remainder of this Opinion concerning the counterclaim for declaratory relief by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.

ENTITLEMENT TO DECLARATORY RELIEF

There are countless Florida cases dealing with the scope of declaratory relief and there is no question in the mind of this Court that it is severely abused. Some decisions seem more restrictive than other decisions, but under the facts of this case, the relief sought is highly appropriate. The basic philosophy behind actions for declaratory judgment seems well expressed in Platt v. General Development Corporation, 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). There the court cited earlier decisions which held:

... it should be, clearly made to appear that there is a bona fide, actual, present, practical need for the declaration; that the declaration should deal with the present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts; that some immunity, power, privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon the facts or the law applicable to the facts; that there is some person or persons who have, or reasonably may have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in law or fact, that the antagonistic or adverse interest (sic) are all before the court by proper process of class representation and that the relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity.

These requirements are not inflexible. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 432 So.2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

There can be no doubt as to the existence of a bona fide, present, practical need for a declaration on whether thermography is a necessary medical diagnostic study under the PIP Statute, F.S. 627.736(1). Thermography for musculoskeletal injuries and suspected nerve root impingement is mushrooming as a business in the State of Florida and, indeed, nationally, usually in the form of thermography clinics. Unlike other medical diagnostic studies, it is widely advertised in periodicals read by the legal profession and by direct mail to lawyers.

The admissibility of thermograms into evidence is, unfortunately, not before the Court in this case.

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Related

Holland v. State
432 So. 2d 60 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1983)
Rodriguez v. State
327 So. 2d 903 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1976)
Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corporation
103 So. 2d 202 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1958)
Platt v. General Development Corporation
122 So. 2d 48 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 Fla. Supp. 2d 80, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palma-v-state-farm-fire-casualty-co-flacirct-1984.