Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. v. Michelle Renee Floyd

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 15, 2025
Docket4D2024-0019
StatusPublished

This text of Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. v. Michelle Renee Floyd (Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. v. Michelle Renee Floyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. v. Michelle Renee Floyd, (Fla. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

PALM BEACH RESURFACING, INC., Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE RENEE FLOYD, Appellee.

No. 4D2024-0019

[January 15, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes and Carolyn R. Bell, Judges; L.T. Case No. 50-2021-CA-007932-XXXX-MB.

Wesley T. Mathieu of Sklawyers, PLLC, Cape Coral, for appellant.

Alterraon Phillips of APLaw, LLC, Royal Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONNER, J.

In this construction lien enforcement case, the plaintiff, Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. (“the Contractor”), appeals the final summary judgment and attorneys’ fees award in favor of the defendant, Michelle Renee Floyd (“the Homeowner”). For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the final summary judgment and the attorney’s fees award.

Background

This case stems from pool-area resurfacing work which the Contractor completed for the Homeowner. After the Contractor completed the work, the Homeowner refused to pay the Contractor. The Contractor recorded a claim of lien and filed suit.

The Homeowner asserted affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for poorly performed work. The Homeowner’s primary defense was that the Contractor’s claims were barred because the Contractor was not properly licensed under the Palm Beach County codes pertaining to construction contractors. The Homeowner asserted this defense in moving for summary judgment. The summary judgment motion cited various state statutes preventing unlicensed contractors from enforcing construction liens. The Homeowner also cited Palm Beach County code and ordinance provisions governing contractor competency certification requirements.

The only Palm Beach County code penalty provision that the Homeowner cited in the summary judgment motion was section 7-20, which provides:

Any person who commits an act prohibited by section 7-17 of this article may be charged with a first degree misdemeanor and may be punished accordingly. In accordance with the F.S. section 489.127, any unlicensed person who commits a violation of subsection 7-17(a) of this article, after having been found previously guilty of such violation, commits a felony of the third degree. In accordance with F.S. section 489.127, any person who refuses to accept a citation commits a second degree misdemeanor.

Palm Beach County Code, § 7-20 (Nov. 30, 2018).

The Homeowner also filed a copy of Palm Beach County Ordinance 97- 56, which was incorporated into the county code in 1997. Ordinance 97- 56 granted the county certification board (or a special master) with authority to “assess fines as set forth in Fla. Stat. § 489.127 and the Special Act.” (emphasis added). The ordinance did not otherwise incorporate the penalties provided in chapter 489.

The Contractor responded that while it did not hold a state license or county certificate at the time of the work, its president held a certificate of competency, albeit listing a different company. The Contractor admitted that Palm Beach County ordinances required a certificate of competency for the work performed for the Homeowner. However, the Contractor emphasized that a state contractor’s license was not required for the work. The Contractor argued that chapter 489’s unenforceable contract remedy was unavailable to the Homeowner.

After finding the contract was unenforceable, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Homeowner on the Contractor’s claims. In addition, the trial court ordered the contractor’s lien and lis pendens dissolved, but did not resolve the Homeowner’s counterclaim. Eventually, the Homeowner voluntarily dismissed the counterclaim, and the trial court issued a final summary judgment. The Contractor appealed.

2 Appellate Analysis

The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

[W]here the question involves interpretation of a statute, it is subject to de novo review.” Brown v. City of Vero Beach, 64 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (emphasis omitted). “Municipal ordinances are subject to the same rules of construction as are state statutes.” Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of North Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1973). “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Valencia Rsrv. Homeowners Ass’n v. Boynton Beach Assocs., XIX, LLLP, 278 So. 3d 714, 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

ABA Interior Inc. v. Owen Grp. Corp., 338 So. 3d 264, 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

The Contractor argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because, as a matter of law, chapter 489’s unenforceable contract remedy applies exclusively to state (not local) licensing violations.

Whether chapter 489’s “unenforceable contract” remedy was correctly applied by the trial court requires an analysis of two categories of law: (1) chapter 489’s governing remedies for licensing violations; and (2) Palm Beach County ordinance and code provisions governing remedies for competency certification violations.

1. State Provisions

Section 489.105(3), Florida Statutes (2018), defines who is a “Contractor” as the term used in Chapter 489:

“Contractor” means the person who is qualified for, and is only responsible for, the project contracted for and means, except as exempted in this part, the person who, for compensation,

3 undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by others construct, repair, alter, remodel, add to, demolish, subtract from, or improve any building or structure, including related improvements to real estate, for others or for resale to others; and whose job scope is substantially similar to the job scope described in one of the paragraphs of this subsection. . . . Contractors are subdivided into two divisions, Division I, consisting of those contractors defined in paragraphs (a)-(c), and Division II, consisting of those contractors defined in paragraphs (d)--(q)[.]

§ 489.105(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The listing and definition of contractor types in subsections (a)-(q) that are potentially relevant to this case are “commercial pool/spa contractor,” “residential pool/spa contractor,” and “swimming pool/spa servicing contractor.” § 489.105(3)(j), (k), and (l), Fla. Stat. However, based on the work performed by the Contractor, it does not appear a state license was required pursuant to section 489.105(3). Significantly, the Homeowner makes no argument on appeal that the Contractor was required to have a state license for the work performed.

Section 489.128, Florida Statutes (2018), provides a limited remedy for parties who have contracted with unlicensed contractors: “As a matter of public policy, contracts entered into . . . by an unlicensed contractor shall be unenforceable in law or in equity by the unlicensed contractor.” § 489.128(1), Fla. Stat.

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Related

Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach
760 So. 2d 126 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2000)
Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of North Miami
286 So. 2d 552 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1973)
A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, as Admrx.
137 So. 157 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1931)
Brown v. City of Vero Beach
64 So. 3d 172 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
Palm Beach Resurfacing, Inc. v. Michelle Renee Floyd, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palm-beach-resurfacing-inc-v-michelle-renee-floyd-fladistctapp-2025.