Pallares-Medina v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-3184
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GRISEL PALLARES-MEDINA; L. A. No. 24-3184 GUZMAN-PALLARES; G. G. GUZMAN- Agency Nos. PALLARES, A246-597-420 A246-597-421 Petitioners, A246-597-422 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 13, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

Grisel Pallares-Medina, together with her minor children, seeks review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing an appeal of the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de

novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Rodriguez Tornes

v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2021), and we deny the petition. 2

To qualify for asylum, a petitioner must prove an inability to return to his or

her country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A). The persecution

must be by the government or a group the government is unable or unwilling to

control. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 652 (9th Cir. 2023). Pallares-Medina

contends she suffered persecution because the man who killed her father in 2004—

who is in a Mexican prison serving a lengthy sentence for the murder—is rumored

to wish to harm her and her children when he is released.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s holding that Pallares-Medina is

ineligible for asylum. The IJ found that Pallares-Medina failed to establish the

1 Because all petitions rely on the facts set forth in Grisel Pallares-Medina’s (“Pallares-Medina”) application, we refer to her application when evaluating Petitioners’ argument for ease. 2 The court has issued a show-cause order to Adolfo Ojeda-Casimiro, counsel for Pineda-Guardado, based on the poor quality of his briefing in this matter. See Order to Show Case, In re Adolfo Ojeda-Casimiro, Esq. (Aug. 20, 2025) (No. 25-5260).

2 24-3184 government of Mexico was unable or unwilling to control the man she fears given

that he was arrested, convicted, and remains in jail, and she failed to challenge this

finding before the BIA, which considered the issue waived. As the issue is

unexhausted, we also may not address it here. Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th

544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This issue alone is dispositive, but

substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s alternative holding that Pallares-

Medina did not suffer past persecution and did not establish an objectively

reasonable fear of future persecution. She did not personally suffer any harm, was

never threatened directly, and testified only to unsubstantiated rumors. See Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). Having failed to satisfy the

requirements for asylum, Pallares-Medina necessarily failed to satisfy the higher

standard for withholding of removal. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th

Cir. 2006) (noting threats alone, particularly vague ones, rarely constitute

persecution).

Pallares-Medina also sought humanitarian asylum. Substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s conclusion that she is not eligible for this relief. Such relief is

“reserved for rare situations of ‘atrocious’ persecution, where the [noncitizen]

establishes that, regardless of any threat of future persecution, the circumstances

surrounding the past persecution were so unusual and severe that he is unable to

return to his home country.” Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999).

3 24-3184 Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that she did not suffer

persecution at all, let alone of the severity required for this rare relief.

The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of CAT protection and held that

Pallares-Medina waived any challenge to the denial of her CAT claim because she

made only “general and conclusory arguments” that she was entitled to protection

without meaningfully challenging the IJ’s findings. Having failed to properly

exhaust her CAT claim before the BIA, we may not consider it in the first instance.

Umana-Escobar, 69 F.4th at 550.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-3184