Palestino v. Lopez CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 Palestino v. Lopez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SILVIA GARCIA PALESTINO, 2d Civ. No. B343253 (Super. Ct. No. 19FL01063)

Petitioner and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

CRISTOBAL PALESTINO LOPEZ,

Respondent.

Silvia Garcia Palestino (Wife), through her guardian ad litem Robert Gutierrez, appeals a family court order directing her to buy out the 50 percent community property interest held by Cristobal Palestino Lopez (Husband) in the Santa Maria house they shared during marriage. Wife contends she and her sister own the house as their separate property. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The House

Husband and Wife married in 2003. They tried to buy a house but did not qualify for a loan. A loan officer recommended they find a co-borrower. Wife’s sister, Jacqueline Gutierrez, agreed to apply for an FHA loan on their behalf in 2009. Husband and Wife used the loan to buy a five-bedroom house in Santa Maria. They provided the down payment to Jacqueline and agreed to assume the mortgage and taxes. Jacqueline1 alone appeared on the deed.

Husband and Wife rented four of the house’s bedrooms for between $600 and $800 per month. Husband collected the rent. He used the rent proceeds and earnings from his job to pay the mortgage. They reported the property on their tax returns. Jacqueline never lived in the house or received rent from them.

In 2011, Jacqueline transferred a 50 percent joint tenancy interest to Wife as “a married woman as her sole and separate property . . . .” Wife paid nothing in exchange for the transfer. Husband signed an interspousal transfer grant deed at this time conveying any interest he held to Wife.

Husband and Wife separated in 2018. Wife petitioned for dissolution in 2019. The family court appointed Wife’s brother as her guardian ad litem soon after. Wife’s family members began collecting rent and paying the mortgage after Husband moved out of the house. The court entered a status-only judgment of dissolution in December of 2019.

2020 Trial

The family court held a three-day trial on property division and spousal support in October of 2020. Husband and Wife were

1 We use first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.

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the only witnesses. They disputed whether Husband held a community property interest in the house. Husband testified they bought the house together in 2009 but his undocumented status prevented him from appearing on title. They planned to add him once he received a social security number. The loan officer said Jaqueline needed to appear on title alone for the first two years for insurance reasons. When two years passed, Husband signed the interspousal transfer grant deed so Jacqueline could transfer an interest to Wife. His immigration status was not yet settled at the time so he did not yet have a social security number.

Wife testified only briefly. She stated Husband “didn’t mention” they would own the house together. She remembered Husband paid the mortgage but could not explain why he did not appear on title.

After closing argument, the court stated, “I found [Husband]’s testimony to be credible throughout, and I thought that the record showed pretty clearly that all of the payments that were necessary to purchase the house had come from the community; the down payment and each of the succeeding payments. So, it doesn’t seem to me that we have a case where there was separate property or separate rents.” The court found Jacqueline facilitated the purchase but contributed only her name and credit. It believed dividing the asset was necessary, ideally by ordering Wife to buy Husband’s interest. The court acknowledged it was “not in a position jurisdictionally to handle the interest of [Jacqueline]” because she was not a party to the case.

The parties proposed a stay so they could explore a buyout by Wife. Husband’s counsel stated he intended to file a quiet title

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action to determine Jacqueline’s interest. Wife’s counsel explained that Wife’s family would likely “do everything they [could]” to keep her in the house. The court responded, “Yeah. And the quiet title could affect that. So, I think the proposal for a stay, for a reasonable time at least – I mean, the court has made the – the decision that they would have an equal community property interest in whatever the community property is.” It stayed the case and reserved the issues of property division and spousal support.

2024 Trial

No quiet title action was filed. The court joined Jacqueline to the dissolution case in 2023.2 Husband requested an order to sell the house and split the proceeds. The family court held a two-day trial to determine Jacqueline’s interest. This time, the loan officer and Jacqueline testified.

The loan officer remembered Husband and Wife wanted to buy a house but did not qualify for a loan. He advised them to find a relative who could apply for an FHA loan as a “nonoccupying co-borrower.” This would allow Husband and Wife to occupy the house and would require them to pay the mortgage directly. Jacqueline agreed to serve in this role. Husband and Wife made the down payment and paid the mortgage going forward. The loan officer understood Husband and Wife would “own” the house. The only option was for Jacqueline to appear on title alone because Husband lacked a social security number and Wife had no income.

2 Support for this is a docket entry referencing a “complaint

for joinder” and statements made by the parties’ attorneys and the court at the June 4, and July 9, 2024 hearings that Gutierrez was joined to the case.

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Jacqueline testified she agreed to be on title because her sister needed a house. She did not want Husband on title when she transferred a 50 percent interest to Wife in 2011. She believed he mistreated Wife and the marriage would not last. She was sure someone explained or translated the interspousal transfer grant deed to Husband because she “wanted to be sure that he didn’t want anything with the property . . . .”

The family court found Jaqueline did not have an “actual interest” in the house but deserved “some amount of compensation” for “enabling the transaction to go forward and to be maintained.” It granted the parties’ request for a three-week stay to negotiate an agreed judgment. They did not reach an agreement. The court filed findings and orders directing Wife to buy out Husband’s community property share in the house. It ordered $2,500 deducted from Husband’s proceeds to compensate Jacqueline “for her assistance in facilitating the original purchase of the home.” The court set Wife’s spousal support at $0 but reserved jurisdiction “with the understanding that [Wife] is awarded the house, support from family, and the ability to rent out the rooms in the home.” The parties did not request a statement of decision.

DISCUSSION Property Division

Wife contends the family court failed to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof when it found Husband held a community property interest in the house. (See Evid. Code, § 662 [clear and convincing proof required to overcome presumption of ownership based on title].)3 She states the court

3 We assume for the sake of argument that Evidence Code

section 662 applies. (Cf. In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th

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disregarded Jacqueline’s presumptively valid 50 percent interest because the equities favored Husband—not because Husband made the required evidentiary showing.

The transcript of oral proceedings contains no discussion of Husband’s burden of proof at the 2024 trial. The parties’ trial briefs are not contained in the clerk’s transcript. They did not request a statement of decision. We cannot determine from this record whether Wife raised the purported error with the family court. This issue is forfeited. “‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings . . . where an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.’” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1.) “‘[I]t is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

We would affirm regardless. The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that it is “‘highly probable’” the facts which he asserts are true. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.) We review the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party giving “deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) We uphold the finding if any reasonable finder of fact could have found it highly probable the fact was true. (Id. at p. 1011.)

1396, 1406 [“We need not and do not decide here whether Evidence Code section 662’s form of title presumption ever applies in marital dissolution proceedings.”].)

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The record supports the family court’s findings under section 662’s heightened burden of proof that the house was community property. (See Fam. Code, § 760 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.”]) Many important facts were not disputed. Husband and Wife made the down payment on the house and paid property taxes from community funds. They lived together in the house for a decade. They paid the mortgage, found tenants, collected rent, and maintained the house during this time. Jacqueline did not live with them or contribute financially to the household prior to Husband’s and Wife’s separation. In addition, their loan officer— a disinterested witness—testified Jacqueline served as a “nonoccupying coborrower” whose credit allowed Husband and Wife to achieve home ownership. He understood Husband and Wife “were to be the owners of the home,” with Jacqueline appearing on title only to facilitate the purchase. This testimony corroborated Husband’s. Wife’s testimony contributed few details. Jacqueline’s focused mostly on the reasons she disliked Husband.

The court’s unstated, but implied conclusion was that Wife and Husband possessed the beneficial interest in the house by virtue of a resulting trust whereby Jacqueline held title merely as a convenience.4 “When a transfer of real property is made to one

4 We review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning (J.B.

Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 6, 15) and will affirm on any theory established by the record. (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, fn. 1.)

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person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.” (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 342, (Ruelas) disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) A resulting trust “‘arises by operation of law, without an expressed intent, and . . . the resulting trustee ordinarily has no duty other than to transfer the property to the person entitled.’” (Ibid.)

Wife next contends the court erred by refusing to recognize the 2011 deed as a valid inter vivos gift of a 50 percent interest in the house from Jacqueline to her. She argues this vested her with a separate property interest in the house. (Evid. Code, § 770.) Any transfer of this interest to Husband, she reasons, required a written transmutation. (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a) [“A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected”].) Our affirming of the family court’s characterization of the house as a community asset moots this contention. No written transmutation was required because no transmutation occurred.

Lastly, Wife contends the court erred when it took judicial notice of its prior finding “that it did appear that [Husband] was not explained or necessarily even understood” the interspousal transfer grant deed he signed in 2011. Wife did not object at the time. The contention is forfeited, but, again, we would find any error harmless. The court later permitted Wife’s counsel to examine Jacqueline about the interspousal transfer deed and her belief that Husband understood its legal effects. Wife’s counsel highlighted this testimony during closing argument. Taking

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judicial notice of the prior finding does not appear to have precluded or limited the court’s inquiry into the substantive issues the parties sought to resolve.

Spousal Support

Wife contends the family court abused its discretion when it set Husband’s spousal support obligation at $0. Her contention is based on the court’s findings and orders after the 2024 trial, which state in relevant part: “Spousal support shall be set at $0.00 per month. The Court reserves jurisdiction on the issue of spousal support with the understanding that [Wife] is awarded the house, support from family, and the ability to rent out the rooms in the home.” Wife argues the court made no findings addressing the factors set forth in Family Code section 4320. She describes the court’s decision as based instead on its mischaracterizing the house as community property, speculating about support she received from her family, and assuming she would receive income in the form of rent.

The court reserved the issue of spousal support after the 2020 trial. Wife’s counsel briefly mentioned this on the second day of the 2024 trial. The 2024 trial, however, appears to have focused exclusively on Husband’s request for an order to divide and sell the house. The subject of spousal support appears nowhere else in the record of the 2024 proceedings. The clerk’s transcript on appeal contains no trial briefs, requests for orders, or objections related to support. The parties did not request a statement of decision—or even an oral ruling— on the issue at trial. We must apply the doctrine of implied findings and presume the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)

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DISPOSITION

Judgment is affirmed. Neither party shall recover costs because respondent did not appear on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Jed Q. Beebe, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Egan Law, M. Jude Egan, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.