Pales v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises
This text of 2009 OK CIV APP 65 (Pales v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
¶ 1 Petitioner Frankie R. Pales seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Court which dismissed Pales’s claim for compensation based on lack of jurisdiction. *310 The trial court held that Respondent Cherokee Nation Enterprises (Employer) is an entity of the sovereign Cherokee Nation which has enacted its own workers’ compensation laws, and that Respondent Hudson Insurance Company had issued a policy of workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to tribal law. The trial court found Employer was entitled to immunity as a sovereign tribe with its own workers’ compensation protections and therefore dismissed Pales’s claim. We sustain.
¶ 2 Pales filed her Form 3 June 5, 2008, in which she sought compensation for an injury occurring April 12, 2008. Employer filed its Form 10 June 12, 2008, in which it denied Pales was covered by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act and asserted tribal sovereign immunity. Respondent filed a Form 13 Motion to Dismiss the same day.
¶ 3 Hearing on Employer’s Motion to Dismiss was held November 12, 2008, and the trial court entered its Order Dismissing Claim November 19, 2008. In dismissing the claim, the court found: 1) the Cherokee Nation is a federally-recognized tribe; 2) Employer is a wholly-owned entity of the Cherokee Nation; 3) the Cherokee Nation had enacted its own workers’ compensation laws; 4) the Cherokee Nation had not express3y waived its sovereign immunity in workers’ compensation matters; 5) nor had the U.S. Congress waived the Cherokee Nation’s immunity in such cases; and 6) Employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy was issued pursuant to Cherokee Nation tribal law and not pursuant to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act, and therefore the estoppel provisions of the Act were not applicable.
¶4 Pales contends the trial court erred in finding Employer was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and was not es-topped from denying coverage. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and we therefore review the trial court’s order de novo. Hall v. Cherokee Nation, 2007 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 10, 162 P.3d 979.
¶ 5 The first five of the trial court’s findings were made by stipulation of the parties. The parties stipulated that Employer had not waived its tribal sovereign immunity; nevertheless, Pales notes that in some cases a tribal employer may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Court pursuant to the estoppel provisions of the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act. 1 Wahpepah v. Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, 1997 OK 63, ¶ 5, 939 P.2d 1151. The issue therefore is whether Employer’s insurance policy caused Employer to be subject to the Act in this case.
¶ 6 Initially, we must determine whether the insurance policy at issue provides for the payment of compensation pursuant to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act. Hall, supra, at ¶ 15. If so, then Pales has the burden of proving three elements to come within the estoppel provisions of the Act: (1) she sustained an injury while Employer maintained a compensation liability policy; (2) Employer made premium payments based on Pales’s salary; and (3) Pales’s injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Id., citing Dominic v. Creek Nation, State Ins. Fund, 1997 OK 41, ¶ 9, 936 P.2d 935, 938.
*311 ¶ 7 Employer contended at the hearing that its policy did not subject it to the Workers’ Compensation Act, relying on Hall, supra. Pales countered that certain language in the policy referred to state workers’ compensation benefits and therefore subjected Employer to the court’s jurisdiction under the reasoning of Squirrel v. Bordertown Bingo, 2005 OK CIV APP 95, 125 P.3d 680. In Squirrel, this court explained that whether a workers’ compensation policy was issued “for the purpose of insuring an employer against liability under the (Oklahoma) Worker’s Compensation Act” depends on the provisions of the contract. Id. at ¶ 10. In Squirrel, the appellate court relied on the facts that the policy defined “workers’ compensation” as “the workers’ ... compensation benefits of the state ... named ...,” and specifically referred to Oklahoma’s statutory benefits to find that the policy indicated it was issued to insure the employer under Oklahoma’s state worker’s compensation law, as well as the tribe’s. Id. at ¶¶ 11-14. In Hall, the appellate court reached the opposite result, based on policy language which deliberately avoided any reference to Oklahoma workers’ compensation law. 162 P.3d at 983. The court held that the policy language was unambiguous and did not indicate it was issued to cover the employer under Oklahoma law. Id. The policy provision which Pales cited to support her argument at trial is similar to the language in Hall. 2 We find the policy language in this case also shows expressly and unambiguously that it was not issued to cover Employer under Oklahoma law. We disagree with Pales’s contention that the reference to “a state” in the quoted provision is sufficient to create an ambiguity such that the estoppel provision applies.
¶ 8 Even if we were to find an ambiguity and use the reasonable expectation test used in Squirrel, it is clear that the insured’s reasonable expectation of this policy was that it was not issued under the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act specifically to insure the application of the sovereign immunity defense.
119 The parties also stipulated that Pales is not a tribal member. Pales argues that this case should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC, 2009 OK 6, 212 P.3d 447. 3 Cossey involved a tort claim by an injured tribal casino patron. The non-tribal member patron sued the tribe in state court under the Oklahoma Indian Gaming Compact. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state court was a court of competent jurisdiction for tort claims under the Compact. Cossey addresses the waiver of sovereign immunity under a specific provision of the gaming compact, which does not reference workers’ compensation law. We are not persuaded that the analysis in Cossey changes Oklahoma precedent on sovereign immunity for workers’ compensation cases.
¶ 10 On de novo review, we find that the policy in this case does not show it was issued to cover Employer under the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act. And, the tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity *312 for workers’ compensation matters. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing Pales’s claim is SUSTAINED.
.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2009 OK CIV APP 65, 216 P.3d 309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pales-v-cherokee-nation-enterprises-oklacivapp-2009.