Palau v. Larson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Palau v. Larson

81 A.D.3d 799, 916 N.Y.S.2d 808

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 15, 2011

StatusPublished

This text of 81 A.D.3d 799 (Palau v. Larson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Palau v. Larson, 81 A.D.3d 799, 916 N.Y.S.2d 808 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant George Larson appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated June 4, 2010, which, inter alia, granted that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint to allege a cause of action based on detrimental reliance.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint to allege a cause of action based on his detrimental reliance on the appellant’s “continued performance of [its] duties” (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 140 [2002]), as the proposed amendment would not cause prejudice or surprise and was neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025 [b]; see generally Botros v Flamm, 77 AD3d 602, 602-603 [2010]).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the appellant’s remaining contentions. Dillon, J.P., Covello, Florio and Hall, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant George Larson appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated June 4, 2010, which, inter alia, granted that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint to allege a cause of action based on detrimental reliance.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint to allege a cause of action based on his detrimental reliance on the appellant’s “continued performance of [its] duties” (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 140 [2002]), as the proposed amendment would not cause prejudice or surprise and was neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025 [b]; see generally Botros v Flamm, 77 AD3d 602, 602-603 [2010]).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the appellant’s remaining contentions. Dillon, J.P., Covello, Florio and Hall, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

81 A.D.3d 799, 916 N.Y.S.2d 808, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palau-v-larson-nyappdiv-2011.

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