Pakita Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-11084
PAKITA WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-60680-PAB
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Pakita Wright appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). She argues that the Administrative Law Judge
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(“ALJ”) failed to properly consider her migraine headaches at step three of the sequential disability evaluation process by not addressing whether they medically equaled epilepsy under Listing 11.02(B) and Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 19-4p, and in determining her Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). She also argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to discredit her subjective complaints.
After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument , we reverse and remand back to the ALJ to properly consider Wright’s migraine headaches at step three of the sequential disability evaluation process by addressing whether they meet or medically equal epilepsy under Listing 11.02(B) and SSR 19-4.
I.
When an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner ’s final decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In a Social Security disability case, we review de novo whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and review whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision . Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2021). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). In review-
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ing for substantial evidence, we “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The ALJ has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.
Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1988). Even still, “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district court or this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
II.
An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that he or she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled for both SSI and DIB claims. Id. First, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 1 Second, if a claimant has no impairment or combination of impairments that signifi-
1 Separate regulations govern eligibility for DIB and SSI. Compare 20 C.F.R. pt.
404 (DIB), with 20 C.F.R. pt. 416 (SSI). However, “[t]he regulations for both programs are essentially the same.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (setting out identical fivestep sequential evaluation process for evaluation of disability of adults).
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cantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities , then the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, if a claimant’s impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments, the claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled . Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments— considering her RFC, age, education, and past work—prevent the claimant from doing other work that exists in the national economy , then the claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
Here, steps one and two of the sequential evaluation are not at issue. That’s because the ALJ determined that Wright was not engaged in substantial gainful employment as of July 16, 2019, and concluded that she had multiple severe impairments, including migraine headaches. Our focus begins at step three.
At Step Three of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ consults the Listing of Impairments, which describes impairments severe enough to preclude a person from any gainful activity regardless of age, education, or prior work experience. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ then considers whether the claimant’s impairment meets a Listing or is equal in severity and duration to the criteria in any Listing. See id.; see also id. § 404.1526.
With respect to step three, the claimant has the burden of proving that the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991). To meet the requirements of a listing, a claimant must have a diagnosis included
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in the Listing and must provide medical reports documenting that their condition meets the Listing’s specific criteria and duration requirement . Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). However, a diagnosis that is not included in the Listing of Impairments , 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, may still be found to be medically equivalent to a listed impairment “[i]f the findings related to” the claimant’s impairment “are at least of equal medical significance to those of a listed impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b)(2).
Headache disorders, including migraine headaches, are not included in the Listing of Impairments. See generally 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; see also SSR 19-4p. However, SSR 19-4p, which provides guidance on how the Commissioner evaluates primary headache disorders in disability claims, states that a person with a primary headache disorder may be able to establish that their headache disorder is medically equivalent to epilepsy as listed in Listing 11.02(B) or (D). SSR 19-4p.
At issue here, Listing 11.02(B) provides that epilepsy must be “documented by a detailed description of a typical seizure and characterized by . . . [d]yscognitive seizures . . . occurring at least once a week for at least 3 consecutive months . . . despite adherence to prescribed treatment.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1, § 11.02(B). In turn, SSR 19-4p states that in determining whether a primary headache disorder is medically equivalent to epilepsy under Listing 11.02(B), the ALJ will consider a medical source’s de-
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tailed description of a typical headache that includes: (1) “all associated phenomena”; (2) “the frequency of headache events”; (3) “adherence to prescribed treatment”; (4) “side effects of treatment ”; and (5) “limitations in functioning that may be associated with the primary headache disorder or effects of its treatment, such as interference with activity during the day.” SSR 19-4p.
III.
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