Painter v. Keeshin Motor Express Co.

18 N.E.2d 65, 297 Ill. App. 557, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 686
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedDecember 13, 1938
DocketGen. No. 39,996
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 18 N.E.2d 65 (Painter v. Keeshin Motor Express Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Painter v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 18 N.E.2d 65, 297 Ill. App. 557, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 686 (Ill. Ct. App. 1938).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Burke

delivered the opinion of the court.

On issue joined on plaintiff’s amended complaint charging negligence the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty and assessing damages at the sum of $13,500, on which judgment was entered. Defendant did not offer any evidence nor move for a new trial. At the close of plaintiff’s case, and again at the.close of all the evidence, defendant requested the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict finding defendant not guilty. The court reserved ruling on the motions and on the instructions presented therewith. After verdict defendant moved that judgment be entered in its favor and against plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict returned, on the ground, first, that there was no evidence whatsoever to show that defendant was guilty of any negligence alleged in the complaint; second, that the evidence introduced by plaintiff established that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and, third, that the court should have granted the motion filed at the close of plaintiff’s case and at the close of all the evidence requesting the court to direct a verdict for defendant. The court overruled all of said motions and this appeal brings the case here for review.

Under the amended complaint it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove that defendant, by its servants and agents, carelessly and negligently drove a motor tractor into violent collision and contact with the front end of the trailer behind which plaintiff was working, and that at and about such time plaintiff was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. This court, in Gardiner v. Richardson, 293 Ill. App. 40, decided that in passing upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made by a defendant the court should not determine whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant maintains that there is no competent evidence to support the allegations of the complaint. The rule is that negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact for the jury. If the matter is open to a difference of opinion the jury must pass on it. It becomes a question of law only when the evidence is so clearly insufficient to establish due care or negligence that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion that there was contributory negligence or negligence. The proposition is aptly stated in Petro v. Hines, 299 Ill. 236, 240: “The general rule is that negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact for the jury, and so long as a question remains whether either party has performed his legal duty or has observed that degree of care and caution imposed upon him by law, and the determination of the question involves the weighing and consideration of evidence, the question must be submitted as one of fact. (Chicago, St. Louis and Pittsburg Railroad Co. v. Hutchinson, 120 Ill. 587; Austin v. Public Service Co., ante, p. 112.) Before we can say, as a matter of law, that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant or that there was such contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff as to defeat recovery, we must be able to say that all reasonable minds must agree that the defendant was not negligent in his acts or that the injury was the result of plaintiff’s own negligence.” And in Ziraldo v. Lynch Co., 365 Ill. 197, 199, the Supreme Court said:

“A motion to direct a verdict for the defendant preserves for review only a question of law whether from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, standing alone and when considered to be true, together with the inferences which may legitimately be drawn therefrom, the jury might reasonably have found for the plaintiff.” With these propositions the parties are in substantial agreement. It becomes necessary, therefore, to thoroughly consider the facts. Plaintiff filed an additional abstract for the purpose of showing the instructions that were given. The questions as to negligence and contributory negligence were submitted to the jury on instructions about which there is no complaint. Prior to giving the instructions the court had reserved ruling on the motion for a directed verdict. We agree with defendant that the fact that the trial court at the suggestion of the respective parties instructed the jury on both theories of the case, does not preclude defendant from now urging that error was committed in failing to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The injury about which plaintiff complains occurred on May 21,1936, in defendant’s freight yard or terminal, located between Canal, Clinton and Pulton streets and the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad tracks, in the city of Chicago. Defendant was engaged in the business of carrying freight by motor trucks. Many of the hauls were to points in other States. At the time of the occurrence plaintiff was in the business of repairing tarpaulins for various trucking concerns, including defendant. He operated a small shop in the rear of his residence and there repaired tarpaulins that were too badly torn to be repaired at the freight yards. For the most part the service he performed for defendant was in the latter’s freight yard. The vehicles upon which plaintiff worked were mostly tractor-trailer units. The tractor is the motor vehicle which is detachable from the large cargo-bearing vehicle known as the “trailer.” To make a coupling between the trailer and the tractor it was necessary for the latter to meet the former with some force, and in making such coupling, if the end of the trailer was not resting against a wall, it was necessary to place large blocks under its wheels. The trailers having been loaded, if they were not to be taken out until the night drivers came on duty at seven o ’clock, they were taken from the loading platform to a point in the yards under the elevated railroad structure of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company and placed against a concrete supporting wall. When plaintiff commenced work for defendant he asked its agent who hired him as to how he should do his work, and was told to “take them as you find them.” He understood that the statement meant that he was to go out into the yards, observe the equipment as it came in, and when he saw a trailer that had a tarpaulin that needed fixing, to fix it, and that he was to use his own judgment as to whether he would fix it on the grounds or whether he would take the tarpaulin home. Plaintiff testified that he started to work for defendant in October, 1935; that to make repairs on the canvas covers he would go to the terminal where most of the trailers were and walk along and inspect them; that if there were any tears or any ropes loose he would fix them right then and there, but would first ask somebody if it was all right to do so; that “during the course of my work Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 N.E.2d 65, 297 Ill. App. 557, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 686, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/painter-v-keeshin-motor-express-co-illappct-1938.