Paige v. Brown

260 F. 955, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1066
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 31, 1919
DocketNo. 1791
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 260 F. 955 (Paige v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paige v. Brown, 260 F. 955, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1919).

Opinion

DICKINSON, District Judge.

The plaintiff is influenced naturally, and indeed necessarily, by a situation which has no evidential value and is not very clearly reflected by the evidence. It is, however, this: He had negotiated and reached an agreement, and had tentatively made it, with one of the counsel (none of the present counsel however) for the defendants. By this agreement, if defendants had made it, the defendants would have used plaintiff’s machine under a license and upon terms accepted by both parties. We make no finding of this fact, because there is no evidence of it in the cause, and in the nature of things could not be. Without intending any play upon words, although there is no evidence of it in the record, it is none the less evident that the plaintiff dealt with the defendants in the reasonable expectation that some such agreement would be made. It was not made, and of course the defendants were within their legal rights in refusing to make a contract, no matter how far (short of an agreement) the negotiations had been carried. We have no thought of criticism of the defendants in mind. The to-be-expected effect of this and other things, however, was to make the plaintiff suspicious of the defendants, and, when he found they had put out what is known to this record as defendants’ machine, he drew his own inferences of the motives and conduct of the defendants in doing whatever they did. His inference, as again to be expected, was that, instead of buying from him, they had taken the inventive ideas, which were his property, and which he had brought to them, and had designed a machine which was the equivalent of his machine, but had cleverly constructed it so that the principles of its construction would seem to differ from the principles on which his machine was made to operate.

[956]*956This attitude and state of mind of the plaintiff, coupled with the other feature of the case, that he has himself conducted the trial without the assistance of counsel, has added to the difficulties of the trial judge. Being in the state of mind in which he was, it was impossible to keep down the expression of the feeling of injustice done him, with which he was filled, and although at all times he was careful to exclude, so far as possible, opposing counsel from incrimination (and the plaintiff and opposing counsel are to be commended for the dignity and courtesy which they have displayed throughout the trial), it was again impossible for the defendants to refrain from angry retort and recriminations. So far as could be done, these by suggestion and ruling have been kept out of the record. It is one of the duties of a trial judge to get into sympathy with each party to a controversy, so as to understand his attitude and through this his point of view. We in consequence, feel toward the plaintiff this measure of sympathy, even when we do not share his suspicions.

The trial of this cause, largely for the reason intimated, has taken a very wide range, and the discussion an even wider one. Many issues have been raised which ordinarily would call for discussion and length of discussion. The record is very voluminous, and as the argument was held some time after the trial, and time had to be given to prepare paper books, this necessitated taking the time to go over the entire record. We felt the duty of doing this, because the first impression received was that the one issue of infringement was the controlling issue in the cause, and none other need be considered. Before adhering to this first view, we felt that we should review the whole case, and this we have done. The result is our first impression is confirmed.

We state the conclusions reached with some diffidence, because they involve wholly a mechanical construction with its principles of mechanical operation. There is a type of mind which, if not wholly devoid of mechanical ideas, does not take kindly to them, and comprehends them with difficulty, and is without that power of imagination which, given the idea, at once constructs a machine embodying and applying it. To get the point upon which this case is ruled, we need to know only two types of machines with which this case concerns itself.

The machines with which we are concerned are mechanisms for shaping ophthalmic glasses. The letters patent are No. 1,260,022, bearing date March 19, 1918, and relating back to an original application filed March 4, 1915, and carrying the serial number 12,028. The original application was divided, and the application upon which the grant of letters was made was filed July 4, 1917, and bears the serial number 178,523.

To enable one unfamiliar with the art to get an intelligent grasp of the question of infringement involved, a number of general ^conditions and principles affecting the art must b® understood. The motive (aside from the commercial one and entering into this) which induces the effort to promote the art is to provide -artificial aids to and means for correcting defects in human vision. These objects are accomplished by [957]*957interposing between the eye and the objective of vision a transparent glass lens, to which has been given the proper form of surface. Generally classified, these forms are. spherical, cylindrical, and toric. As the objective of vision may be near to or remote from the observer, we have the classification of near sight and far sight. This brings to those concerned with the development of .the art, as one feature of tlie problem presented to them, the necessity of the convenience of providing for near sight and far sight in one glass or lens. A very common defect in vision is astigmatism, a correction for which must also be provided through and by the forming of the lens. The ultimate end 10 be reached by making glass adapted 1o the use of the individual user can be reached only through and by calling in the aid of the knowledge and skill of the oculist and predetermining the kind of glasses required. Out of this has grown the practice of making glasses to conform to prescription.

The general methods of the art are to first form the glass into plates of a convenient size and mold them into a rough similitude of the form they are finally intended to be given. They are then called “blanks.” The glass is then, by grinding, made to assume common prescribed forms, at least approximately adapted to different desired uses. The lenses in this form are sold to opticians, who grind them to conform to what has been prescribed for the individual who is to use them. This art, as every other, has its own nomenclature. Those engaged in supplying lenses to the opticians are called manufacturers of lenses. The most generic term applied to the process of perfecting lenses is “surfacing,” although “grinding” is also a term employed. Shop terms are employed to designate different steps of the process, and we have rough grinding, surface grinding, and polishing. To enable the user of glasses to look at objects near at hand, or at distant objects, or those intermediately placed, without changing his glasses to accord with the distance, he is given what are really two glasses in one. In the common phrase, when he looks through one part of the glass there ••s one focus, and when he looks through another part of the glass there is another focus. Devices enabling him to do this have been successively, and perhaps in merit progressively, brought into use.

The means of meeting the relatively simple problem of providing what are commonly called reading and distance lenses in the same glass may be used as an illustration of the different devices to which resort has been made.

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Related

Paige v. Brown
272 F. 686 (Third Circuit, 1921)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
260 F. 955, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1066, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paige-v-brown-paed-1919.