1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAIGE KILBURN, Case No. 8:24-cv-01279-WLH-JCx
12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION [14] 14 DEL PATTERSON, DOTTIE 15 PATTERSON, et al. 16 Defendants.
18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Paige Kilburn (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action in Orange County 20 Superior Court (“OCSC”) by filing a complaint, dated October 30, 2023, alleging a 21 single cause of action for unlawful detainer regarding a property located at 13152 22 Laburnum Drive, Tustin, California 90872 (the “Subject Property”). (Notice of 23 Removal (“NOR”), Docket No. 1, Exh. 1). On June 13, 2024, nearly eight months 24 after the matter was initiated in OCSC, Alfred McZeal, Jr. (“McZeal”), proceeding 25 pro se, removed the matter to this Court invoking federal question and diversity 26 27 28 1 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and bankruptcy jurisdiction as an 2 alternative third basis for jurisdiction. 3 On July 29, 2024, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why the Action 4 Should not be Remanded for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (the “OSC”). (OSC, 5 Docket No. 14). McZeal filed his response to the OSC (the “Response”) on August 5, 6 2024, (Docket No. 18), and included a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) (Docket 7 No. 19) requesting that the Court take notice of two exhibits: (1) a “trustee deed upon 8 sale – (by reference to the record)”; and (2) a motion to consolidate.1 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing only “power 11 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 12 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Courts are presumed to 13 lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record. See 14 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). Additionally, federal 15 courts have an obligation to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before proceeding to the 16 merits of a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 17 Federal courts have jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or 18 where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. 20 §§ 1331, 1332(a). Thus, a notice removing an action from state court to federal court 21 must include “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 22 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 23 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Where “the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 24 25 1 McZeal’s RJN appears to request that the Court take notice of items already contained in the record. The Court, however, is unable to ascertain McZeal’s request 26 because not only does McZeal offer no explanation (other than the document’s title) 27 for which specific documents he seeks the Court to notice, but he also did not affix any of the exhibits to his request. Accordingly, the Court DENIES McZeal’s RJN. 28 (Docket No. 19). 1 defendant’s allegation” concerning the amount in controversy, “both sides [shall] 2 submit proof,” and the court may then decide whether the defendant has proven the 3 amount in controversy “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 88–89. “Federal 4 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 5 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 Further, claims related to bankruptcy cases may be removed to federal court 7 under 28 U.S.C. § 1452. The statute provides, in relevant part: “A party may remove 8 any claim or cause of action in a civil action ... to the district court for the district 9 where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim 10 or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Jurisdiction 11 exists over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases 12 under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The removing party bears the burden of 13 establishing federal jurisdiction and that removal was proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 14 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 McZeal contends that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it 17 involves a federal question including federal causes of action for RICO and under 18 18 U.S.C. § 1983, and because there is complete diversity between the parties, and the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as the Subject property is worth 20 approximately $1,100,000. (See generally Docket No. 18). For the reasons discussed 21 in detail below, the Court disagrees and remands this matter back to OCSC. 22 First, the Complaint only alleges a single claim for unlawful detainer. A claim 23 for unlawful detainer is insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. Wachovia 24 Mortg., FSB v. Rabb, 2:15-CV-03903-ODW, 2015 WL 3454558, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 25 May 29, 2015) (collecting cases). McZeal attempts to sidestep this issue by arguing 26 that this matter should be consolidated with another related action before this Court 27 that McZeal brought in a separately file case against Plaintiff and others involving the 28 Subject Property. McZeal, however, cannot bootstrap in federal claims from another 1 related case, as the issue of whether federal question jurisdiction exists applies to 2 cause of action contained in the instant matter. See Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 3 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In determining federal question jurisdiction, the 4 well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 5 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. 6 Thus, the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by 7 relying exclusively on state law.”) (cleaned up). Further, the Court issued a separate 8 Order dismissing the related action and denying McZeal’s Motion to Consolidate as 9 moot. 10 Second, even if the parties are diverse as McZeal alleges, the amount in 11 controversy does not exceed $75,000. Plaintiff filed this action as a “limited case not 12 to exceed $10,000” in damages. (Docket No. 1, Exh. 1). Therefore, the Court finds 13 that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. See, e.g., Ward v. 14 Hernandez, No. 13-CV-00383-JGB, 2013 WL 3934009, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 15 2013) (finding that the amount in controversy for a diversity case was not met in an 16 unlawful detainer action that was filed in state court as a limited civil case).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAIGE KILBURN, Case No. 8:24-cv-01279-WLH-JCx
12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION [14] 14 DEL PATTERSON, DOTTIE 15 PATTERSON, et al. 16 Defendants.
18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Paige Kilburn (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action in Orange County 20 Superior Court (“OCSC”) by filing a complaint, dated October 30, 2023, alleging a 21 single cause of action for unlawful detainer regarding a property located at 13152 22 Laburnum Drive, Tustin, California 90872 (the “Subject Property”). (Notice of 23 Removal (“NOR”), Docket No. 1, Exh. 1). On June 13, 2024, nearly eight months 24 after the matter was initiated in OCSC, Alfred McZeal, Jr. (“McZeal”), proceeding 25 pro se, removed the matter to this Court invoking federal question and diversity 26 27 28 1 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and bankruptcy jurisdiction as an 2 alternative third basis for jurisdiction. 3 On July 29, 2024, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why the Action 4 Should not be Remanded for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (the “OSC”). (OSC, 5 Docket No. 14). McZeal filed his response to the OSC (the “Response”) on August 5, 6 2024, (Docket No. 18), and included a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) (Docket 7 No. 19) requesting that the Court take notice of two exhibits: (1) a “trustee deed upon 8 sale – (by reference to the record)”; and (2) a motion to consolidate.1 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing only “power 11 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 12 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Courts are presumed to 13 lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record. See 14 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). Additionally, federal 15 courts have an obligation to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before proceeding to the 16 merits of a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 17 Federal courts have jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or 18 where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. 20 §§ 1331, 1332(a). Thus, a notice removing an action from state court to federal court 21 must include “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 22 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 23 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Where “the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 24 25 1 McZeal’s RJN appears to request that the Court take notice of items already contained in the record. The Court, however, is unable to ascertain McZeal’s request 26 because not only does McZeal offer no explanation (other than the document’s title) 27 for which specific documents he seeks the Court to notice, but he also did not affix any of the exhibits to his request. Accordingly, the Court DENIES McZeal’s RJN. 28 (Docket No. 19). 1 defendant’s allegation” concerning the amount in controversy, “both sides [shall] 2 submit proof,” and the court may then decide whether the defendant has proven the 3 amount in controversy “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 88–89. “Federal 4 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 5 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 Further, claims related to bankruptcy cases may be removed to federal court 7 under 28 U.S.C. § 1452. The statute provides, in relevant part: “A party may remove 8 any claim or cause of action in a civil action ... to the district court for the district 9 where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim 10 or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Jurisdiction 11 exists over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases 12 under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The removing party bears the burden of 13 establishing federal jurisdiction and that removal was proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 14 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 McZeal contends that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter because it 17 involves a federal question including federal causes of action for RICO and under 18 18 U.S.C. § 1983, and because there is complete diversity between the parties, and the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as the Subject property is worth 20 approximately $1,100,000. (See generally Docket No. 18). For the reasons discussed 21 in detail below, the Court disagrees and remands this matter back to OCSC. 22 First, the Complaint only alleges a single claim for unlawful detainer. A claim 23 for unlawful detainer is insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. Wachovia 24 Mortg., FSB v. Rabb, 2:15-CV-03903-ODW, 2015 WL 3454558, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 25 May 29, 2015) (collecting cases). McZeal attempts to sidestep this issue by arguing 26 that this matter should be consolidated with another related action before this Court 27 that McZeal brought in a separately file case against Plaintiff and others involving the 28 Subject Property. McZeal, however, cannot bootstrap in federal claims from another 1 related case, as the issue of whether federal question jurisdiction exists applies to 2 cause of action contained in the instant matter. See Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 3 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In determining federal question jurisdiction, the 4 well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 5 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. 6 Thus, the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by 7 relying exclusively on state law.”) (cleaned up). Further, the Court issued a separate 8 Order dismissing the related action and denying McZeal’s Motion to Consolidate as 9 moot. 10 Second, even if the parties are diverse as McZeal alleges, the amount in 11 controversy does not exceed $75,000. Plaintiff filed this action as a “limited case not 12 to exceed $10,000” in damages. (Docket No. 1, Exh. 1). Therefore, the Court finds 13 that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. See, e.g., Ward v. 14 Hernandez, No. 13-CV-00383-JGB, 2013 WL 3934009, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 15 2013) (finding that the amount in controversy for a diversity case was not met in an 16 unlawful detainer action that was filed in state court as a limited civil case). 17 Third, with respect to McZeal’s claim of bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is unclear 18 how McZeal, who is not a named party in the underlying state action, has the authority 19 to remove this case asserting bankruptcy jurisdiction. In re Queen Elizabeth Realty 20 Corp., 502 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[S]omeone who is not a party to the 21 state court action cannot remove it under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and the removal by a 22 non-party does not vest the federal court with subject matter jurisdiction.”) (internal 23 citations omitted). Further, McZeal does not offer a statutory basis for removal. 24 Instead, he claims that removal is proper “due to a pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy 25 case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania … 26 27 28 1 | in which [McZeal] is a co-debtor ... [and an] automatic stay is in effect and applies to 2 || the [Subject Property], and against co-debtor [McZeal].” (Docket No. | at 13). 3 In general, removal of an action from state court to district court invokes 28 4 || U.S.C. § 1452. Removal under Section 1452 is possible only if the state-court action 5 | was within the district court's jurisdiction under Section 1334(b), which means that the 6 | action must satisfy one of three requirements: “(1) arise under title 11 of the United 7 || States Code (the Bankruptcy Code), (2) have arisen in the bankruptcy case [], or (3) be 8 | related to the bankruptcy case. In re Agua Holdings, Inc., No. 19-34517-DWH11, 9 | 2023 WL 2333252, at *2 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 2, 2023), adopted sub nom. Burns v. 10 | Thuney, No. 3:23-MC-201-SI, 2023 WL 6004249 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2023). Based on 11 | the Court’s review of the record and Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court finds that this 12 | case is not within the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 1334(b) as the underlying 13 | matter is an unlawful detainer matter where no bankruptcy issues are involved and 14 | there is no explanation of how the Subject Property is related to the bankruptcy 15 | proceeding. As such, remand is proper as the state court action does not arise under, 16 | arise in, or relate to the bankruptcy case. 17 | IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the above-stated reasons, the Court REMANDS this matter to OCSC. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 | Dated: August 15, 2024 23 aoe fe HON. WESLEY L. HSU 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28