Page Woven Wire Fence Co. v. Land

49 F. 936, 1891 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan
DecidedDecember 16, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 49 F. 936 (Page Woven Wire Fence Co. v. Land) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Page Woven Wire Fence Co. v. Land, 49 F. 936, 1891 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 (circtedmi 1891).

Opinion

Jackson, Circuit Judge.

The complainant corporation, or assignee of the entire right, title, and interest in and to letters patent of the United States No. 414,844, granted November 12, 1889, to John W. Page and Charles M. Lamb, for a new and useful improvement in wire-fer.ce machines, brings this suit against the defendant, Abel Land, for inifingement thereof. The bill, which was filed September 13, 1890, contains the averments and allegations usual in such cases, and need not be specially noticed. In his answer the defendant denies knowledge of complainant’s title to said letters patent, but admits the issuance thereof at the date stated to said Page and Lamb. He denies that said pat[937]*937entees were the original, first, and joint inventors of the patented machine described in said letters, and states that said patentees—

“Surreptitiously and unjustly obtained said lotters patent for that which was in fact invented by this defendant and his son, Stephen Land, and who were using reasonable diligence in adopting and perfecting the same, as was well known to said Page and Lamb when they applied for their letters patent.”

He admits that he had made one or more machines in accordance with letters patent No. 435,042, granted to himself August 26, 1890, and that he intends to use them, and others like them, for specified business purposes, if found suitable, but he denies that his machines infringe complainant’s patent. The assignment of said letters patent to complainant is fully established, and its title thereto was not questioned at the hearing. The defendant offered no proof in support of his denial that Page and Lamb were not the original, first, and joint inventors of the patented machines covered by and described in said letters patent No. 414,844, nor did he make any attempt to establish the claim set up that he and his son were the real inventors thereof. These questions are therefore out of the case, under the well-settled rule that complainant’s introduction jn evidence of his patent in duo form is sufficient to show that he is the ’original and first inventor of his device or improvement, as the same may be construed and defined by the courts, unless sufficient evidence to overcome that presumption, and to establish the contrary allegation of the answer, is exhibited in the record. In other words, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the patentee was not the original and first inventor. Ransom v. Mayor, etc., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 252; Green v. French, 21 O. G. 1351, 11 Fed. Rep. 591; Doubleday v. Beatty, 22 O. G. 859, 11 Fed. Rep. 729; Stone Co. v. Allen, 14 Fed. Rep. 353; Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 538; and Mitchell v. Tilghman, 19 Wall. 390, 391. The letters patent subsequently granted to the defendant do not overcome this prima facie presumption in favor of the prior patentee. Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Gardner, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 224, and cases cited. It is also settled that said letters patent to Page and Lamb, as joint inventors, is prima facie evidence that the invention therein described was joint. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 4 McLean, 456.

At the hearing counsel for respondent contended that the proof failed to establish the fact that the defendant at the time the bill was filed had made or caused to be made, and had used for the manufacture of wire fence, one or more machines containing and embodying as a part thereof the inventions and improvements described and claimed in complainant’s letters patent. Without reviewing the evidence, we think it is clearly shown by the testimony of the witnesses Harvey and Abbott that prior to the filing of the bill on September 13, 1890, the defendant had constructed, and used the same in the making of wire fencing, one or more machines which it is claimed embodied complainant’s invention, and which contained substantially the same devices described in letters patent. No. 435,042, issued to him August 26, 1890. it admits of little or no question, under the proof, that prior to the grant of said letters [938]*938patent No. 435,042 he was constructing machines in accordance therewith, which he admits in his answer he intends to employ in making eaough fence to test, and, if found suitable for the purpose, “to sell terr tory and machines for the manufacture of wire fence.” Under these c.rcumstances, the complainant’s bill was not prematurely filed. Even i.' defendant had not prior thereto actually constructed machines for the manufacture of wire fence embodying the woof-winding mechanism cove nd by complainant’s letters patent, his intention to try machines embodying said invention, and, if found suitable for the purpqse, to sell the same for the manufacture of wire fence, would be sufficient to sustain the bill. In such cases, courts of; equity recognize and enforce a larger and more remedial process than can be obtained in actions at law. Ibis is clearly stated in Woodworth v. Stone, 3 Story, 749, 750, where it is said:

“The case is not that of an action at law for the breach of a patent, to suppirt which it is indispensable to establish a breach before the suit was brought. But in equity the doctrine is otherwise. A bill will lie for an injunction if the patent-right is admitted, or has been established upon well-grounded proof of the apprehended intention of the defendant to follow [inf inge] the patent-right. A bill quia timet is an ordinary remedial process in equity.”

While the bill rests primarily upon the theory of actual prior infringement, still if that was not sustained the court can, under the prayer for gineral relief, proceed to protect the complainant’s right from intended infringement by the exercise of its remedial process in the shape of an injunction, if the case warrants such relief.

The remaining and real controverted question in the case is whether tine defendant in the machines constructed or intended to be made by him for the manufacture of wire fencing infringes the complainant’s pate it, or embodies any of the devices thereof covered by its claims. A full and detailed description of .the letters patent sued on is not deemed mcessary to the correct determination of this question. The patent in its entire mechanism is exceedingly elaborate and complicated, containing 8 sheets of drawings, with 37 figures, 10. pages of specification and d iscriptions, and 21 different claims. As stated in the specification, the invention relates to a machine for manufacturing wire fences, and its o leration, taken as an entirety—

“ ts in the nature of a weaving operation, the wires referred to as eonstitutir g the horizontal fence-wires affording the warp in the weaving, and those r< ferred to as the vertical or stay wires affording the woof. 1 The warp-wires a"e fed from spools in desired number and at required distances apart to the U ke-up mechanism, which receives the finished article, and is actuated inter-it ittingly to take up lengths thereof, and alternates with a woof-wire windir g and stringing device, which as soon as a finished length of fencing has been taken up, is actuated to travel transversely across the warp-wires, stop-p ng at each, and winding around it a woof-wire, with which it is threaded.”

This woof-wire winding and stringing device or mechanisn and its opei ation is described at length and in great detail, and it is stated that at the forward end thereof there is—

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 F. 936, 1891 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/page-woven-wire-fence-co-v-land-circtedmi-1891.