Page v. State

Nevada Supreme Court

Page v. State

580 P.2d 477, 94 Nev. 386, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 572

Nevada Supreme Court·Decided June 28, 1978·No. No. 10250·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

OPINION

Per Curiam:

Appellant was convicted of burglary, a felony. NRS 205.060. Following closing arguments, in addition to giving the jury the statutory instruction on reasonable doubt, the trial judge gave an instruction in contrast to a statute precluding any other definition of reasonable doubt than that contained in the statute.¹ On appeal Appellant asserts this constitutes reversible error. Here, we find the claim to be without substance.

[387] In the instant case, the additional jury instruction read:

It is not necessary that the defendant’s guilt should be established beyond any doubt or to an absolute certainty, but instead thereof that the defendant’s guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as hereinafter defined.

In Tucker v. State, 92 Nev. 486, 553 P.2d 951 (1976), this Court stated:

[w]hile we disapprove this practice, because we believe the reasonable doubt statute speaks for itself, this court has previously permitted such additional instructions that merely clarify the statutory instruction. . . . Here, we do not believe this district court’s attempted clarification could have misled the jury concerning its duties in this case.

Id. at 490, 553 P.2d at 953-54. In accord, Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 28, 572 P.2d 927 (1977).

As in Tucker and Jackson, supra, we reiterate our disapproval of the lower courts’ giving of the additional instruction. However, in doing so, it did not commit prejudicial error. ' The judgment is affirmed.

Footnotes

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OPINION

Per Curiam:

Appellant was convicted of burglary, a felony. NRS 205.060. Following closing arguments, in addition to giving the jury the statutory instruction on reasonable doubt, the trial judge gave an instruction in contrast to a statute precluding any other definition of reasonable doubt than that contained in the statute.¹ On appeal Appellant asserts this constitutes reversible error. Here, we find the claim to be without substance.

[387] In the instant case, the additional jury instruction read:

It is not necessary that the defendant’s guilt should be established beyond any doubt or to an absolute certainty, but instead thereof that the defendant’s guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as hereinafter defined.

In Tucker v. State, 92 Nev. 486, 553 P.2d 951 (1976), this Court stated:

[w]hile we disapprove this practice, because we believe the reasonable doubt statute speaks for itself, this court has previously permitted such additional instructions that merely clarify the statutory instruction. . . . Here, we do not believe this district court’s attempted clarification could have misled the jury concerning its duties in this case.

Id. at 490, 553 P.2d at 953-54. In accord, Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 28, 572 P.2d 927 (1977).

As in Tucker and Jackson, supra, we reiterate our disapproval of the lower courts’ giving of the additional instruction. However, in doing so, it did not commit prejudicial error. ' The judgment is affirmed.

Footnotes

Page v. State, 580 P.2d 477, 94 Nev. 386, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 572 (Neb. 1978).

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Opinion

Footnotes

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