Page v. Harr

278 S.W.2d 121, 224 Ark. 961, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 507
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedApril 11, 1955
Docket5-595
StatusPublished

This text of 278 S.W.2d 121 (Page v. Harr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Page v. Harr, 278 S.W.2d 121, 224 Ark. 961, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 507 (Ark. 1955).

Opinion

Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.

Fairview Memorial Park Association was created in 1922 by eight individuals and a business firm — Cravens & Co. The organizers subscribed to a declaration of trust containing a pledge that 28% acres, with all other property or funds thereafter acquired, should be “held, used, and managed upon the trust herein declared. ’ ’

By ex parte proceedings of February 16, 1953, Kenneth D. Harr and his wife, Lela Mae, who were joined by Hettie B. Moore and Chi Omega National Fraternity, procured from the Washington Chancery Court an order authorizing a sale to Fairview Cemetery, Inc. Shortly thereafter H. E. Page and twenty-five others who owned cemetery lots, acting for themselves and all others similarly situated, brought an action in the nature of an intervention. They sought an accounting of expenditures from the inception of trust activities, for the appointment of a board, and for an order requiring compliance with essential trust purposes. In particular it was urged that the decree authorizing a sale of the property be set aside. From a denial of most of the matters prayed for the interveners have appealed.

Of the original twenty-four shares held in 1922 by the nine organizers, nineteen came to Kenneth and Lela Mae Harr when Kenneth’s father died in 1942, or were acquired thereafter. Hattie B. Moore owned three shares and CM Omega two. The declaration of trust created a five-man hoard with staggering terms, the last terminating November 1, 1927. These trustees, however, were to serve until their successors should be chosen.

Shares owned by the organizers — the number not having been specified — are referred to as beneficial interests evidenced by certificates. The directors were given uncontrolled discretion in respect of conversion and distribution, except that this should occur not more than twenty years after the death of the last survivor of the nine organizers. These interests, however, were burdened with an obligation to set aside in a special fund twenty percent of money realized from the sale of lots. This one-fifth interest was dedicated as a Perpetual Care Fund.

The directors were also permitted to withdraw from the proceeds realized when lots were sold enough money to guarantee an annual budget of $360 when added to interest derived from the Perpetual Care Fund and moneys realized from digging graves. Section III of the Articles of Trust is copied in the margin.1 Trustees were permitted to purchase securities with these special funds. They were also allowed to change the form of the security from time to time, “to improve or increase [it], alivays preserving the capital sum, and expending only the interest or the proceeds therefrom.”

The decree referred to by appellants as having resulted from an ex parte hearing February 16th, 1953, contains a finding that the trust articles were duly recorded; that no dividends had been paid to any of the beneficial shareholders; that the declaration, though well-intentioned, “. . . has proven to be unrealistic over the years insofar as it applies to the creation of a Perpetual Care Fund; that accumulations to said fund have been inadequate to provide income with, which to maintain said cemetery, with the result that not only have the funds paid into said [account] been used for maintenance, but also the entire proceeds of the sale of lots and the charges for opening graves [have been so used].”

Other directions in this order as modified are to be found in the decree resulting in this appeal and will be discussed in sequence.

In their answer to the lot owners ’ intervention Kenneth and Lela Mae Harr admitted that they had been in control of the cemetery since January 1, 1942. Receipts from the sale of lots, they said, had amounted to $29,591.13, and $29,857.88 had been spent in maintaining the properties. Some additional sums had been received, but the amount was not estimated.

Touching the Perpetual Care Fund their plea was that necessity had required its expenditure, and the defendants, “as they had a right to do,” finally disposed of the property by selling it to Fairview Cemetery, Inc. It was further contended that the original trust was not put into effect. The trustees or board of directors did not qualify and they failed to make bond as required by their agreement. Because all of the individuals to the original transaction had been dead for more than seven years, limitation and laches were pleaded. The new purchaser had agreed to maintain and improve the cemetery.

By way of amendment the plaintiffs alleged that the Harrs had sold many lots- and had failed to account for the proceeds. The prayer was that a lien be declared on approximately eighteen acres not in use after the amount due had been determined.

In February, 1954 — a year after the first decree was rendered — the Chancellor found that Fairview Cemetery, Inc., was the owner of all beneficial interests. Holders of the certificates for twenty-four shares, said the court, were members of a business association commonly referred to as a Massachusetts Trust.2 It was the Court’s conclusion that these owners had the inherent power to make the sale. Terms of the 1922 trust were unworkable and did not carry forward the intentions of beneficial certificate-holders, the trustees, or the lot-holders.

By the Court’s order of February 16, 1953 (the ex parte proceeding resulting in sale) a new method of perpetual maintenance was established, “. . . placing the burden [of upkeep] ... on the beneficial interests, with the further provision that the amount of contribution to the trust fund be reduced from 20% to 15% until [it] reaches $30,000,” then reduced to 10%.

It was the Court’s view that the method adopted placed a greater burden on the holders of beneficial interests than the obligations assessed under the original agreement, “. . . and that plaintiffs and other lot-holders are in better position insofar as maintenance of the cemetery property is concerned than they were under the terms of the original trust.” Extent of the obligations flowing from holders of beneficial shares “in.said corporation” was $360 per year, while legitimate operating expenses incurred by the Harrs subsequent to the death of Kenneth’s father consumed all receipts from the sale of lots and other activities, hence the plaintiffs and other owners of lots benefited to the extent of $3,960. This figure was arrived at through a finding that if terms of the trust had been complied with 20% of lot sales would have amounted to $5,918.23. The difference between these two items — $1,958.23—was ordered placed in an irrevocable trust fund of the Fairview Cemetery, Inc., to be charged against certain unpaid amounts due by the corporation as part of the purchase price.

There was reference to the decree of February 16, 1953, which permitted a reduction of the trust obligation in favor of the Perpetual Care Fund. Under the revised arrangement this apportionment (formerly mentioned) was reduced from 20% to 15% until the fund reached $30,000 and thereafter 10%.

It is conceded that U. S. bonds having a face value of $800 were found among trust records following death of the elder Harr, and that these were delivered to appropriate authorities for safekeeping.

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Bluebook (online)
278 S.W.2d 121, 224 Ark. 961, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 507, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/page-v-harr-ark-1955.