Page v. City of Lockhart

397 S.W.2d 113, 1965 Tex. App. LEXIS 2589
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 1, 1965
Docket11343
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 397 S.W.2d 113 (Page v. City of Lockhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Page v. City of Lockhart, 397 S.W.2d 113, 1965 Tex. App. LEXIS 2589 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

HUGHES, Justice.

Mr. Ed H. Page, Mr. Robert L. Holder and Miss Nettie Holder have appealed from a judgment denying them any relief in their suit against the City of Lockhart, Texas, whereby they sought to have declared invalid and unenforceable an ordinance of the City levying a paving assessment against their properties which abutted the streets to be paved.

Mr. Page owned a tract of land containing 12.09 acres which abutted South Medina Street for a distance of 1,722.4 lineal feet. The paving assessment levied against Mr. Page by the ordinance was $3,846.64, or about $318.00 per acre.

The Holders jointly owned a tract of land containing 31 acres which abutted Center Street for a distance of 813 lineal feet. The paving assessment levied against the Holders was $1,815.67, or about $59.00 per acre.

These assessments amounted to $2,233 per lineal foot.

Article 1105b, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St., authorizes certain cities and towns to improve their streets and to apportion the cost thereof between the City and owners of property abutting the streets to be improved, subject to certain limitations not here involved, and to levy assessments against the abutting property and its true owners and to create liens against such property for the cost thereof apportioned to such property, Sec. 9 of such Article providing, in part, that, “ * * * no assessment shall be made against any abutting property or owners thereof in excess of the special benefits of such property, and its owners in the enhanced value thereof by means of such improvements as determined at such hearing.”

The “hearing” referred to is described in Sec. 9 and is one to be held by the gov *114 erning body of the city or town and which the owners of property to he assessed may attend and may contest, among other matters, “ * * * the special benefits to the abutting property and owners thereof by means of the improvements for which assessments are to be levied * *

Appellants attended the hearing held by the governing body of the City of Lockhart and contested the amount of special benefits which the properties owned by them would be benefited by the street improvements to be made, contending that the amount of such special benefits and the enhanced values of their properties occasioned thereby was less than the amount of the assessments levied against them and their properties. From an adverse decision by the City Commission, this suit was filed as an appeal under Sec. 9, supra.

The case was tried to a jury, but the trial court withdrew the case from the jury and rendered judgment for the City. The Supreme Court has held, since the trial of this case, that an appeal taken under Sec. 9 of Art. 1105b, supra, shall be tried, insofar as the question of special benefits conferred by the improvements is concerned, under the substantial evidence rule. City of Houston v. Blackbird, 394 S.W.2d 159.

While appellants have numerous points of error, the only real question presented is whether the judgment below is reasonably supported by substantial evidence. If so, it is valid. If not, it is arbitrary. This inquiry presents a question of law.

The City is paying more than one-half the cost of the improvements. The portion of the cost which the City determined should be paid by the abutting property owners was apportioned between such owners on a front foot basis. This system is expressly authorized by Sec. 9 of Art. 1105b, except in cases where the governing body of the City or town is of the opinion that its application would result in injustice or inequality. No such opinion was formulated by the City Commission.

Appellants rely, primarily, upon evidence that the lands owned by them are used for farming purposes only and that the paving of these streets would not enhance the value of the lands for farming. This evidence is not controverted and, standing alone, it would bring about invalidation of the assessment ordinance. There is other evidence in the record, however, which, if it is of sufficient probative force to constitute substantial evidence, would require us to affirm the judgment. This evidence relates to the prospective use of the property for residential, commercial and other uses. If these lands may properly be considered to have a value for the purposes mentioned, then there is testimony that the enhanced value of the lands, attributable to the paving, would equal or exceed the amount assessed against the properties.

Mr. J. T. Dickens, Mayor of Lockhart, testified that the Page property would not be enhanced in value approximately $300.00 per acre, the amount of the assessment, considered as farm property but that considered as possible residential property its value would be increased in this amount by reason of the paving. He was asked, “When would that investment, in your opinion, ripen into something that would be profitable to him?” and he answered, “I would say in about eight or ten years. Maybe sooner than that.”

We quote some of the Mayor’s testimony regarding the Holder property:

“Q Now, Mr. Dickens, how many lots did you contemplate the Holder property could be divided into?
A That wasn’t ever platted and never given — we felt it was in that general location and could be used; maybe the school might need it at some future date or some other developer might want to come in and open it up. There was a large acreage; I don’t remember the exact acreage. But, anyway, it is larger than Page’s. So, they *115 would have quite a bit of opportunity to develop it.
Q Of course, this development, there is no way to tell or see the development in sight right now, is there ?
A When you look back, in the last seven years, six years, and see where there has been 121 homes built in Lockhart, I don’t see why you wouldn’t think there is a development.
Q In other words, you are saying- it is possible that — how many years, would you say, in your opinion, under oath, it would be before there would be a development and there would be demand for subdivision properties that would authorize the holders to divide their property into a subdivision for residential purposes?
A Well, that depends on numerous things, Mr. Kuykendall.
Q For example?
A If we are successful in obtaining some light industry — and every effort is being made toward that —why, you will naturally — and as Austin grows and Bergstrom expands, there are, more or less, people who rather live in a smaller town than live in the city.
Q In other words, what you are saying, it depends on a number of other development situations arising.
A Well, yes, it will.
Q Did I understand you to say that in your opinion, in some eight or ten years from now, there would be a development out in that area for subdivision purposes?
A It could possibly be sooner than that.
Q That is just a guess, of course, isn’t it?

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Bluebook (online)
397 S.W.2d 113, 1965 Tex. App. LEXIS 2589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/page-v-city-of-lockhart-texapp-1965.