Page v. Chapman

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 21, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-12570
StatusUnknown

This text of Page v. Chapman (Page v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Page v. Chapman, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Herman Page,

Petitioner, Case No. 20-12570

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Willis Chapman, Warden, and People of the State of Michigan Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti

Respondents.

________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE [1] AND DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [3]

Herman Page, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Thumb Correctional Facility in Lapeer, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Michigan Court Rule § 3.303(C) and Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.4310. Petitioner appears to challenge his 2003 conviction out of Lapeer County for first-degree murder. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316. For the reasons set forth below, the case is dismissed without prejudice and Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied. When a state prisoner challenges the very fact or duration of their physical imprisonment and when the relief that they seek is a

determination that they are entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a

petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle” for prisoners who are in custody under a state-court judgment, who wish to challenge

anything affecting the legality of that custody. See Greene v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000)).

It is unclear from Petitioner’s pleadings whether he wishes to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court for the following reasons. First, Petitioner does not label his petition as being filed under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Rather, Petitioner labels his action as one being brought under Michigan Court Rule 3.303(C), which is the state-court rule for bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He also cites to

Michigan Complied Laws § 600.4310, which is the statutory provision for bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Michigan courts. Next, Petitioner names the Lapeer County Prosecutor as a “Defendant- Appellee” in this action (ECF No. 1, PageID.1), rather than the Michigan Attorney General, who normally represents the State of Michigan on

habeas petitions filed in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, as an initial matter, it does not appear that Petitioner intended to bring

his claim as a federal habeas case or he has mislabeled his civil action. When a pro se prisoner files a mislabeled civil action that should have been filed under the habeas corpus statute, the suit should not be

converted into a habeas corpus action and decided on the merits. Instead, the proper action is to dismiss the action without prejudice. See Staples v. Casperson, 6 F. App’x 481, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, rather than

re-characterizing Petitioner’s action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner’s case will be dismissed without prejudice. This will prevent any adverse consequences

with respect to any § 2254 claim or claims that Petitioner may wish to file in the future. See Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court should have dismissed the habeas

petitioner’s § 2241 petition without prejudice to allow petitioner to raise his potential civil rights claims properly as a § 1983 action rather than to re-characterize it as a § 2254 petition without notice to petitioner); see also Hornsby v. Booker, No. 06–11612, 2006 WL 932101, * 1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2006) (dismissing Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment that

had been brought to challenge state-court conviction without prejudice, rather than converting it to a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Warren v. Miller, 05-651; 2005 WL 3007107, * 3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2005) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by state prisoner under section 2241 without

prejudice, rather than converting it to a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Moreover, even if this Court were to construe this action as a

habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petition is subject to dismissal because there is no indication that Petitioner exhausted his claim with the state courts. As a general rule, a state

prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust his or her available state-court remedies before raising a claim in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–78

(1971); See also Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 638 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Although exhaustion is not a jurisdictional matter, “it is a threshold question that must be resolved” before a federal court can reach the merits of any claim contained in a habeas petition. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, each claim must be

reviewed by a federal court for exhaustion before any claim may be reviewed on the merits by a federal court. Id. Further, federal district

courts must dismiss mixed habeas petitions which contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982)). A habeas

petitioner has the burden of proving that he or she has exhausted his or her state court remedies. See Sitto v. Bock, 207 F. Supp. 2d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2002). A petitioner’s failure to exhaust state-court remedies may

be raised sua sponte by a federal court. See Benoit v. Bock, 237 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). This action is subject to dismissal because Petitioner failed to allege

or indicate in his petition that he has exhausted his state-court remedies. See Peralta v. Leavitt, 56 F. App’x. 534, 535 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Fast v. Wead, 509 F. Supp. 744, 746 (N.D. Ohio 1981).

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Related

Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Pliler v. Ford
542 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Samuel Keener v. L. G. Ridenour, Warden
594 F.2d 581 (Sixth Circuit, 1979)
Eric Martin v. William Overton
391 F.3d 710 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Wagner v. Smith
581 F.3d 410 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Fast v. Wead
509 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ohio, 1981)
Warren v. Hogan
373 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. New York, 1974)
Triplett v. Deputy Warden, Jackson Prison
371 N.W.2d 862 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1985)
Sitto v. Bock
207 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Michigan, 2002)
Banks v. Smith
377 F. Supp. 2d 92 (District of Columbia, 2005)
Foster v. Withrow
159 F. Supp. 2d 629 (E.D. Michigan, 2001)
Benoit v. Bock
237 F. Supp. 2d 804 (E.D. Michigan, 2003)
In Re Stone
294 N.W. 156 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1940)
Staples v. Casperson
6 F. App'x 481 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)

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Page v. Chapman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/page-v-chapman-mied-2020.