GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOGGS, C.J., MARTIN, DAUGHTREY, MOORE, COLE, CLAY, and GILMAN, JJ„ joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 779-89), delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which SILER, BATCHELDER, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, JJ., joined.
[769] OPINION
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Christopher J. Pagan filed the instant suit against the Village of Glendale, Ohio (“Glendale” or “the Village”) and Glendale Police Chief Matt Fruchey, alleging that section 76.06 of the Glendale Traffic Code constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment. Following the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that Glendale’s ordinance complied with the requirements of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because we conclude that the defendants have failed to produce evidence that justifies the restrictions on commercial speech imposed by the ordinance, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
I.
Pagan is a resident of Glendale and formerly the owner of a 1970 Mercury Cougar that he wanted to sell. After a classified advertisement elicited an inadequate response, Pagan posted a “For Sale” sign on the vehicle and left it parked on the public street in front of his residence. Pagan elected to place the car on the street instead of his driveway because his driveway abuts an unimproved alley and not a public roadway.
An officer with the Glendale Police Department noticed the sign, notified Pagan that the sign was a violation of Glendale Traffic Code § 76.06, and asked him to remove it or face being cited for a municipal violation; Section 76.06 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to stand or park any vehicle, motorized or towed, upon any public or private street, road, or highway within the village or upon any unimproved privately owned area within the village for the purpose of:
(A) Displaying it for sale, except that a homeowner may display a motor vehicle, motorized or towed, for sale only when owned and titled to said homeowner and/or a member of said household, and only when parked upon an improved driveway or apron upon the owner’s private property;
(B) Washing, maintaining or repairing such vehicle except repairs necessitated by an emergency.
(C) Any advertising.
Pagan corresponded with various Glendale officials, including Fruchey, but was ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining a satisfactory resolution of his dispute with the Village. In order to avoid a citation, Pagan removed the sign from his vehicle.
Pagan subsequently filed this lawsuit against Fruchey and Glendale, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights and challenging subsections (A) and (C) of the ordinance. Pagan’s original complaint contained requests both for injunctive relief and damages, but Pagan voluntarily [770] withdrew his request for an injunction. Both before the district court and before us on appeal, Pagan has argued that subsections 76.06(A) and (C) constitute impermissible restrictions on his right to engage in protected commercial speech.2 Following the parties’ cross-motions for summary-judgment, the district court determined that section 76.06 was a constitutional regulation of commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson framework and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Pagan subsequently appealed.
II.
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.2004). Summary judgment will be affirmed if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). If, on the other hand, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party,” summary judgment for the moving party is inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing the district court’s decision, this court draws all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
While other forms of expression are entitled to more protection under the First Amendment than is commercial speech, see, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) (noting that content-based restrictions on the political speech of candidates for office are subject to strict scrutiny), the protection provided to commercial speech is nevertheless considerable. The Supreme Court has outlined a four-part test that subjects restrictions on commercial speech to a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).3 Under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the commercial speech at issue must concern lawful activities and not be misleading, thus entitling it to First Amendment protection. 447 U.S. at 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343. If the speech is entitled to protection, the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson test provide the framework for [771] determining the validity of the restriction. More specifically, a restriction on protected commercial speech will be upheld if the government “assert[s] a substantial interest in support of its regulation,” “demón-stratela] that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest[,]” and draws the regulation narrowly. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 152 L.Ed.2d 563 (2002). These requirements form the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. On each point, the government bears the burden of establishing the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (noting that “the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions”).
The parties agree that the speech at issue in this case, the posting of “For Sale” signs on cars, is protected commercial speech. Furthermore, Pagan takes no issue with the substantiality of Glendale’s asserted regulatory interests: traffic/pedestrian safety and aesthetic concerns. Thus, the questions before us are whether Glendale has established (1) that the restriction directly and materially advances its regulatory interests and (2) that it has drawn the restriction narrowly.
A.
With respect to the third Central Hudson prong, whether the speech regulation advances the government’s asserted interests in a direct and material way, the Supreme Court has further explained:
Under Central Hudson ..., the State must demonstrate that the challenged regulation advances the Government’s interest in a direct and material way. That burden, we have explained, is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.
Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 625-26, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993)). Thus, the government must come forward with some quantum of evidence, beyond its own belief in the necessity for regulation, that the harms it seeks to remedy are concrete and that its regulatory regime advances the stated goals. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-72, 113 S.Ct. 1792.
B.
Under the fourth Central Hudson prong, the relevant question is whether the speech restriction is narrowly tailored; that is, we must determine whether the speech restriction at issue is “more extensive than is necessary to serve [the asserted] interests.” Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367, 122 S.Ct. 1497 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343). The tailoring inquiry does not require a “least restrictive means” analysis. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556, 121 S.Ct. 2404. Instead, there must be a “reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The tailoring prong allows the reviewing court to assure itself that the government has “carefully calculated the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed” by regulation. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[772] III.
At the outset, we note appellees’ suggestion that subsection (A) of the ordinance does not implicate the First Amendment because it prohibits the act of parking a vehicle on Glendale’s roadways for the purpose of displaying it for sale. As a result, appellees contend, the ordinance regulates commercial activity and not speech. Under appellees’ construction, a seller’s chosen means of advertising a desire to sell {e.g., posting a “For Sale” sign, placing a classified ad, advertising online, etc.) is irrelevant. The act of placing a car on the street for the purpose of displaying it for sale purportedly violates subsection (A). Appellees’ argument on this point is not well taken. During argument, they conceded that Glendale has no interest in enforcing subsection (A), except in those instances where the potential seller has displayed a “For Sale” sign. Thus, even if we construed the literal language of subsection (A) as not implicating the First Amendment, Glendale concedes that it enforces the ordinance in a manner that does. In this case, subsections (A) and (C) reach the same conduct,4 and we must determine whether or not Glendale has constitutionally prohibited the posting of “For Sale” signs on cars parked in its streets.
A.
In arguing that appellees have not met their burden under the third Central Hudson prong, Pagan relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993). Pagan argues that the affidavit of Fruchey, the only evidence provided by the appellees in support of section 76.06, fails to discharge appellees’ burden under Edenfield. We agree.
In Edenfield, Scott Fane, a CPA, challenged a Florida rule that prevented public accountants from engaging in direct, uninvited solicitation of potential clients. 507 U.S. at 763-64, 113 S.Ct. 1792. Applying Central Hudson, the Court first noted that the speech at issue was protected and that the government had articulated substantial interests to justify the speech restrictions at issue. Id. at 768-70, 113 S.Ct. 1792.
As to the third Central Hudson inquiry, the Court held that the state failed to carry its burden. According to the Court, while fraud prevention and professional ethics constitute substantial governmental interests, the absence of any evidence—statistical, anecdotal, or otherwise—to suggest that the speech at issue posed any threat of concrete harm to those interests caused the regulation to fail. Id. at 771-72, 113 S.Ct. 1792. The Court characterized the state’s evidence as follows:
The only suggestion that a ban on solicitation might help prevent fraud and overreaching or preserve CPA independence is the affidavit of Louis Dooner, which contains nothing more than a series of conclusory statements that add little if anything to the Board’s original statement of its justifications.
Id. at 772, 113 S.Ct. 1792. In the absence of evidence of real harm, the state could not show that its speech restriction had any connection to furthering its asserted regulatory interests. See id. Thus, Central Hudson requires more from the government than bald assertions that a particular speech restriction serves its articulated interests.
Upon review of the record, it is clear that the evidence adduced by the appellees is insufficient to satisfy their burden under Central Hudson. The rele[773] vant portion of the Fruchey affidavit reads in its entirety as follows:
The primary purpose of the Ordinance is to promote the goal of traffic safety within the Village of Glendale. The objective of the Ordinance is to prohibit attractions or activities which will induce people to come into the roadway who are not a part of normal vehicular or pedestrian traffic, such as individuals washing or repairing their cars which are parked on the street, or individuals who are looking over a motor vehicle which is displaying a for sale sign parked on the street. In addition ..., the Ordinance also addresses aesthetic objectives of the Village of Glendale.
The Fruchey affidavit amounts to nothing more that a conclusory articulation of governmental interests. While it suffices for the second part of the Central Hudson test by identifying two substantial government interests, it fails to address the third prong at all: that is, how the particular restriction chosen by Glendale directly and materially advances those interests. Its reference to people in the roadway looking at cars displaying “For Sale” signs is most accurately characterized as simple conjecture by the police chief about something that might occur. Certainly, it is not evidence that “For Sale” signs on cars in streets pose any concrete harm to traffic or aesthetics or that the ordinance has any connection to the interests Glendale asserts. In fact, the Fruchey affidavit is of exactly the type deemed insufficient by the Supreme Court in Edenfield.
In addressing this issue, the district court incorrectly applied a deferential standard and ultimately held that Pagan had not pointed to anything in the record that would suggest that Glendale’s belief that section 76.06 was needed to further its asserted interests was “unreasonable” or “palpably false.” The court, relying upon Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), improperly placed the burden on Pagan to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. Railway Express has no applicability in the present case. Decided over twenty-five years before the Supreme Court recognized that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, Railway Express examines the constitutionality of a City of New York ordinance prohibiting operation of advertising vehicles on the streets under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies a rational basis test. The case is simply irrelevant in the context of intermediate scrutiny, to which we subject restrictions on commercial speech. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028.
The issue before us is narrow in scope. This is not a question of the quality of the evidence supporting a speech regulation. It is the absence of any evidence of the need for regulation that is fatal to section 76.06. Appellees suggest that it would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to conduct studies and provide empirical evidence in support of section 76.06. However, the Supreme Court has made quite clear that the evidentiary requirement the state must meet under intermediate scrutiny does not prescribe the manner by which evidence must be gathered or the precise form that it must take.5
[774] Instead of actual evidence of harm, ap-pellees ask us to adopt a standard of “obviousness” or “common sense,” under which we uphold a speech regulation in the absence of evidence of concrete harm so long as common sense clearly indicates that a particular speech regulation will directly advance the government’s asserted interest. The difficulty with this proposition, however, is that the standard established by the Supreme Court depends neither on obviousness nor common sense. Edenfield requires some evidence to establish that a speech regulation addresses actual harms with some basis in fact.6
The thrust of appellees’ arguments is not that the Fruchey affidavit is the type of evidence required by Edenfield but rather that other Supreme Court authority relieves them from the obligation of meeting the Edenfield requirements as to how a governmental entity must meet its burden under Central Hudson. They present three versions of this general argument.
First, appellees say that even in the absence of evidence of concrete harm, we should defer to legislative judgments on matters of traffic safety and aesthetics. Appellees argue that Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981), demands deferential review of speech regulations promulgated in vindication of traffic safety and aesthetic interests. In their view, because the Supreme Court found that San Diego’s rule banning offsite billboard advertising— supported by both traffic safety and aesthetic concerns—was permissible under Central Hudson, the “For Sale” sign ban addressing the same concerns must also be permissible.
But Metromedia does not control the outcome of this case. After noting the difficulty of applying broad First Amendment principles to “unique forms of expression,” id. at 500, 101 S.Ct. 2882, the Metromedia plurality stated, “[e]ach method of communicating ideas is a law unto itself and that law must reflect the differing natures, values, abuses and dangers of each method. We deal here with the law of billboards.” Id. at 501, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The plurality recited at some length the Court’s many summary rulings upholding billboard restrictions, referred to the history of billboards, and generally emphasized the frequency with which governments had placed restrictions on billboards. The plurality ultimately concluded, “[w]e likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments [775] of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety.” Id. at 509, 101 S.Ct. 2882. Thus, Metromedia looked to its own substitute for the sort of evidence Edenfield requires—the collective judgment of many legislative and judicial decisionmakers. No similar substitute exists here.7 The record before us demonstrates no comparable legislative or judicial history supporting the conclusion that restrictions placed on “For Sale” signs posted on vehicles address concrete harms or materially advance a governmental interest.8
The position advocated by the appellees assumes, without discussion, that billboards and “For Sale” signs posted on parked cars raise practically indistinguishable aesthetic and traffic safety issues. Appellees’ analogy hardly strikes us as obvious. In fact, it appears to sidestep the ultimate issue: namely, whether or not the speech Glendale seeks to regulate poses the harms that all agree would justify regulation. If “For Sale” signs are a threat to the physical safety of Glendale’s citizens or implicate aesthetic concerns, it seems no great burden to require Glendale to come forward with some evidence of the threat or the particular concerns. Our research has revealed only one other case, post-Edenfield, that has ruled on this precise issue, and that court arrived at a result identical to ours on the issue of the evidence required by Edenfield. See Burkow v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1080-81 (C.D.Cal.2000).
Second, appellees say that Edenfield does not apply to all commercial speech cases but only to those dealing with advertising by professionals. This argument does not explicitly appear in appellees’ brief but was mentioned at oral argument and is perhaps best viewed as a variation of their first argument that traffic safety and aesthetics are entitled to greater deference than other interests in analyzing commercial speech cases. While Edenfield involves advertising by accountants and has been applied in lawyer advertising cases, see Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 625-26, 115 S.Ct. 2371, nothing in Edenfield or any other Supreme Court precedent suggests that Edenfield’s applicability is limited in the manner suggested by appellees. Moreover, the Court’s continued reliance on Edenfield and its requirement that the harms articulated by the state in support of a commercial speech not be merely conjectural or speculative belies any claim that Edenfield is confined to advertising by professionals. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 555, 121 S.Ct. 2404 (addressing state regulation of tobacco advertising); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999) (addressing FCC restrictions on advertising of legal gambling); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487, 115 S.Ct. [776]*7761585, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995) (addressing restrictions on the advertising of beverage alcohol content).
Third, appellees focus on the notion that less is required of a governmental entity when its interests are aesthetics. Appellees suggest that the invocation of aesthetic objectives carries with it some talismanic quality that, under case precedents, legitimizes all signage regulation and relieves them from making the showing required in Edenfield. Appellees direct our attention to Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). They argue that Vincent, when read in conjunction with Me-tromedia, establishes that billboards and signs constitute visual blight and clutter that justify ameliorative regulation. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-09, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (“It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’ The same is true of posted signs.”) (quoting Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882). Under appellees’ theory, they need not provide evidence that “For Sale” signs create aesthetic harm because the Court has accepted as a matter of course that signs and billboards may be considered a visual blight.
The appellees’ view of Vincent overlooks several critical points. The Court in Vincent was not considering a restriction on commercial speech only and was not applying the Central Hudson test. Rather, the restrictions on posting signs in Vincent applied to all forms of speech and were truly content-neutral, unlike the ordinance here (which, as we discuss below, is not content-neutral). In this context, the Court recognized the legitimacy of aesthetics as a governmental interest, a point with which we agree and Pagan does not contest. Looking to Metromedia, the Court then noted that signs as well as billboards could pose aesthetic harm. This is another point with which we have no disagreement. We differ from appellees, however, in believing that recognition of aesthetics as a substantial governmental interest tells us nothing about how to resolve this case. Vincent certainly does not suggest, either explicitly or'implicitly, that, in examining restrictions on commercial speech, aesthetic interests' are to be treáted differently from other governmental interests. Also, Vincent gives us no instruction about application of the Central Hudson test, and it says nothing about the rule of Edenfield, decided some nine years later. In fact, the Court in Vincent does not specifically tell us what evidence Los Angeles presented about its interests or the concerns that prompted enactment of the ordinance. Vincent, then, to the extent that it is relevant, simply tells us that the Court has recognized that proven aesthetic interests may prompt restrictions on signs, a point that leads nowhere in the resolution of this case.
Appellees’ argument about the special nature of aesthetic concerns does not address the more fundamental problem with appellees’ aesthetic justification. As we have noted, as an abstract matter, aesthetic issues are appropriate considerations in developing speech regulations. The record before us does not, however, disclose what Glendale’s aesthetic objectives are. Perhaps Glendale hopes to avoid -unsightly signage cluttering neighborhood streets; perhaps Glendale seeks to avoid having its streets filled with vehicles that may often not be the sort of automobiles people would like to have parked on their neighborhood streets; perhaps “For Sale” signs posted on cars are simply not in keeping with the character of Glendale’s neighborhoods. There are various possibilities,' but it is not the [777] place of the reviewing court to supply hypothetical justifications for speech regulation. Cf. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (noting that with respect to the second Central Hudson prong regarding the existence of substantial government interests, “[ujnlike rational-basis review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions.”) (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028).
Even if appellees’ view of Metromedia and Vincent is closer to the mark than ours and whatever the evidentiary requirement may be to show that a particular medium of communication poses aesthetic harm, a reviewing court must, as a preliminary matter, be apprised of what the government’s aesthetic motivations are. Glendale fails to supply even this rudimentary information, saying in the Fruchey affidavit only that the ordinance addresses unspecified “aesthetic objectives.” This general assertion fails to identify Glendale’s aesthetic concerns with “For Sale” signs. Certainly, it does not suffice to show concrete harms addressed by the ordinance or that the ordinance directly and materially advances the government interest, as required by the third prong of Central Hudson. While the dissent questions any requirement that would mandate a study before limiting speech in furtherance of undoubtedly subjective aesthetic aims, our decision imposes no such requirement. Assuming that the subjective nature of aesthetics requires that we give regulators a freer hand when examining restrictions on commercial speech, it seems no great burden to require, as a threshold matter, that they offer something more specific than a bald assertion that the regulation reflects aesthetic considerations.
The dissent critiques our decision as “reading] into the First Amendment a requirement that governments go through pointless formalities before they enact ... commonsense rule[s].... ” We have no interest in preventing the adoption of common sense rules or requiring legislative bodies to engage in “pointless formalities.” In contrast to those situations in which we apply rational basis review, the intermediate scrutiny we apply in the commercial speech context charges the government with the burden of justifying its chosen form of regulation. Thus, even common sense decisions require some justification. Otherwise, we have no basis for concluding that Glendale’s legislative decision is animated by reasoned judgment and not hostility toward particular speech. Moreover, if the need for the regulation is as obvious as Glendale and the dissent believe it to be, it seems that Glendale should be ideally positioned to provide some evidence of the need for its regulation—a task that Glendale has been entirely unwilling to undertake.9 We do not hold Glendale’s ordinance invalid because Glendale has failed to produce sufficient evidence. [778] Rather, we simply cannot uphold the ordinance without any evidence at all to support the need for its enactment and simultaneously follow what we view to be the clear command of the Supreme Court.
One aspect of our decision the dissent appears to find particularly troubling is its belief that it will impose a severe burden on municipalities seeking to regulate signage that they believe raises legitimate and undeniably important traffic safety and aesthetic concerns. While we disagree that the burden is severe and instead believe it fairly easily met, we note that the fact that the First Amendment imposes a requirement of evidentiary justification upon a regulatory authority is not, in and of itself, a cause for dismay.
As previously stated, our decision today does not prescribe the manner by which municipalities must justify these sorts of ordinances. Instead, we simply conclude that we cannot discharge our obligation to scrutinize commercial speech restrictions if we deem sufficient the conjectural affidavit of Glendale’s police chief that offers nothing more than a statement of what he believes to be Glendale’s regulatory objectives. It is Glendale’s obligation to provide something in support of its regulation, and we do not find ourselves free to hold that obligation has been discharged based on principles of common sense or obviousness, especially where, as here, all do not agree as to what is obvious or a matter of common sense. A judicial pronouncement that an ordinance is consistent with common sense hardly establishes that it is so.
B.
The district court did not specifically address tailoring, but Pagan argued before the trial court, as he does on appeal, that the regulatory means chosen by Glendale lack a reasonable fit to the regulatory ends. The district court did, however, note that Pagan’s claims along these lines were nothing more than conclusory assertions regarding his own notions of a more reasonable regulatory scheme and that it was not the'place of the courts to second-guess Glendale’s decision regarding appropriate traffic ordinances.
While we need not reach the issue of tailoring because our decision regarding the third Central Hudson prong is dispositive in this case, it is important to note that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the regulatory authority bears the burden of establishing a reasonable fit when regulating commercial speech. In the commercial speech context at least, our review will, to some extent, require examination of the means chosen by the government. The obligation rests with the government to establish that its regulation is “narrowly tailored” and that it has carefully calculated the costs and benefits of regulation. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417-18, 113 S.Ct. 1505; see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028.
IV.
Appellees also argue that we need not engage in an analysis under Central Hudson because the prohibition on parking a car on the streets of Glendale for the purpose of advertising is a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation and should be analyzed under that framework. Although their brief does not specify whether this argument refers to subsection (A) or (C), or both, it is most naturally understood as relating to subsection (C), because subsection (A) contains its own implicit reference to content. If appellees were successful in characterizing the ordinance as content-neutral, our inquiry here would still be a form of intermediate scrutiny, focusing on whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve substantial government interests and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. [779] See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).
The Glendale ordinance cannot be evaluated as a content-neutral restriction, however, because, as appellees conceded during oral argument, the restriction on advertising does depend on the content of the speech: namely, the ordinance, as construed by Glendale, draws a distinction between promotional speech and speech asserting belief or fact.10 The Supreme Court has made clear that any regulation that requires reference to the content of speech to determine its applicability is inherently content-based. Cf. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (“Under the city’s newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside.... Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content based.’ ”). Characterization of the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction is simply inaccurate.
Y.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.