Paeton Bangart v. Bonaventure of East Wenatchee LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 19, 2024
• Docket: 23-35528
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 19 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAETON BANGART, No. 23-35528

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00162-TOR

v. MEMORANDUM* BONAVENTURE OF EAST WENATCHEE LLC,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 6, 2024 Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER, BEA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Bonaventure of East Wenatchee LLC appeals the

district court’s order below, which denied Bonaventure’s motion to compel

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) of Plaintiff-Appellee Paeton

Bangart’s Washington state law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy. The parties are familiar with the facts, which we recount here only where

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. necessary. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), and we review de

novo the district court's decision to deny Bonaventure’s motion to compel

arbitration. Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). We

reverse and remand with instructions to grant Bonaventure’s motion.

1. The district court erred when it considered in the first instance whether the

arbitration agreement between Bonaventure and Bangart was enforceable as to

Bangart’s wrongful discharge claim. It is true that, normally, “question[s] of

arbitrability”—such as whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable as to a

“particular type of controversy”—are reserved “for judicial determination.” Martin

v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). But the parties may delegate such threshold issues to the arbitrator so long

as there is “an express agreement to do so.” Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 988

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 79–80

(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Such is the case here. The arbitration agreement

between Bangart and Bonaventure stated that “any legal dispute . . . concerning the

scope, validity, enforceability or breach of this Agreement, shall be resolved by final

and binding arbitration[,] . . . not by [a] court.” Given this “expansive” language, we

conclude that Bangart and Bonaventure “clearly and unmistakably” delegated to the

arbitrator the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable as to

Bangart’s wrongful discharge claim. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Momot, 652 F.3d at 988). It was therefore error for the

district court to decide that question instead.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.