Paduano v. Chemical Mortgage Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Paduano v. Chemical Mortgage Co.

220 A.D.2d 731, 633 N.Y.S.2d 183, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10642

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 30, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 220 A.D.2d 731 (Paduano v. Chemical Mortgage Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Paduano v. Chemical Mortgage Co., 220 A.D.2d 731, 633 N.Y.S.2d 183, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10642 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to foreclose an alleged vendor’s lien on certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), entered April 14, 1994, which, upon an order of the same court, dated February 25, 1994, granting the motion of the defendants Chemical Bank and Chemical Mortgage Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them, dismissed the complaint as against the moving defendants and declared their mortgage on the subject property to be entitled to priority over the plaintiff’s alleged interest in the property.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

In moving for summary judgment, the respondents established prima facie that they possessed a first mortgage entitled to priority over any lien held by the plaintiff’s decedent. We conclude that the plaintiff failed to submit admissible evidence indicating the existence of a vendor’s lien, i.e., that the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff’s decedent did not receive the full purchase price for the property in question (see, 91 NY Jur 2d, Real Property Sales and Exchanges, § 157). Because the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, to foreclose an alleged vendor’s lien on certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), entered April 14, 1994, which, upon an order of the same court, dated February 25, 1994, granting the motion of the defendants Chemical Bank and Chemical Mortgage Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them, dismissed the complaint as against the moving defendants and declared their mortgage on the subject property to be entitled to priority over the plaintiff’s alleged interest in the property.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

In moving for summary judgment, the respondents established prima facie that they possessed a first mortgage entitled to priority over any lien held by the plaintiff’s decedent. We conclude that the plaintiff failed to submit admissible evidence indicating the existence of a vendor’s lien, i.e., that the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff’s decedent did not receive the full purchase price for the property in question (see, 91 NY Jur 2d, Real Property Sales and Exchanges, § 157). Because the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

220 A.D.2d 731, 633 N.Y.S.2d 183, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paduano-v-chemical-mortgage-co-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack