Opinion issued November 4, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00730-CV ——————————— PADMANEE SHARMA, Appellant V. JAMIE LIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 333rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-54896
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises out of a dispute between two physician scientists employed
by the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center (“MD Anderson”) over
authorship credit for manuscripts prepared for publication in scholarly journals.
Appellee Dr. Jamie Lin sued her colleague and former mentor, Appellant Dr. Padmanee Sharma, for various intentional torts and a declaratory judgment about the
authorship of one of the articles at issue.
Dr. Sharma moved for dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s “election-
of-remedies” provision, arguing her allegedly tortious conduct was done in her
official capacity and, thus, MD Anderson was the only proper party to the suit. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(f). The trial court denied her motion, and
Dr. Sharma appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in denying Dr. Sharma’s
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and render
judgment dismissing Dr. Lin’s claims with prejudice.
Background
A. Drs. Sharma and Lin and their work at MD Anderson
Dr. Sharma and Dr. Lin are both employed by MD Anderson. MD Anderson
is a comprehensive cancer center and “one of the preeminent cancer research
facilities in the nation.” The research performed by MD Anderson’s faculty and
staff furthers its mission of “eliminat[ing] cancer in Texas, the nation, and the world
through outstanding programs that integrate patient care, research[,] and
prevention[.]”
Dr. Sharma, who began working for MD Anderson in 2004, is a senior
member of MD Anderson’s faculty; Dr. Lin is a more junior member. In her
pleadings in the trial court, Dr. Lin describes Dr. Sharma as “a very well-established,
2 recognized scientist and doctor on the senior faculty and in key leadership positions
at MD Anderson.” Dr. Sharma’s primary appointment is as a full professor in the
Department of Genitourinary Medical Oncology of MD Anderson’s Division of
Cancer Medicine, and she also has appointments as a full professor in its Department
of Immunology, as vice president of immunobiology in its Department of
Immunology, and as the director of scientific programs at its James P. Allison
Institute.
Dr. Lin began working for MD Anderson in 2017. In her pleadings below,
Dr. Lin describes herself as “a young, rising and promising scientist and doctor on
the junior faculty of [MD Anderson] aspiring to become a reputable figure within
the medical community.” Her position at MD Anderson is an assistant professor of
the science of nephrology in MD Anderson’s Division of Internal Medicine. Dr. Lin
“aspires to continue to advance her career at MD Anderson.”
Drs. Sharma and Lin are both engaged in medical research at MD Anderson.
As a senior researcher, Dr. Sharma’s work includes not only conducting research but
also supervising and guiding clinical trials and research performed by MD
Anderson’s other faculty and staff.
The publication of such research in academic journals is important not only
for the advancement of medical science, but also for the advancement of the
3 researchers’ careers. And because scientific research is often a collaborative effort,
multiple researchers can receive authorship credit when the research is published.
But not all authorship credit is equal. The sequence and categorization of the
authors’ names in a published research article can reflect each author’s respective
contribution and thus affect the level of prestige for each author accordingly. For
example, according to Dr. Lin’s pleadings, “First Author” credit generally goes to
the person who contributes most to the work (and this position is often sought after
because it is the only name used in some citation formats, such as “Smith et al.”).
The “Senior Author” is the person who took leadership for the project. A
“Corresponding Author” is someone who takes primary responsibility for
communicating with the journal during the manuscript submission, peer review, and
publication processes. MD Anderson has promulgated formal policies to help
identify these roles and require proper attribution for each type of authorship.
B. The CIR Manuscript
This case arose out of a dispute between Drs. Sharma and Lin over authorship
credit. Dr. Lin first joined MD Anderson in 2017, and Dr. Sharma began acting as
her mentor on an informal basis. By 2020, Dr. Lin had developed an interest in
immunology, and Dr. Lin became her professional mentor.
Around that time, Dr. Lin and at least two other doctors at MD Anderson, Drs.
Ala Abudayyeh and Adi Diab, began working on research relating to the presence
4 of “tertiary lymphoid structures” in certain cancer treatments (“TLS Research”).
According to Dr. Sharma, the TLS Research project was “a relatively small one,
involving the kidney biopsy samples and genetic materials of only a few clinical
patient samples,” but “a good way for a doctor new to clinical research, such as Dr.
Lin, to skill-build and gain experience.” The parties apparently do not dispute that
Dr. Sharma was also involved in the project. Dr. Sharma describes her involvement
as working with raw data to “deconvolute the information according to known
immunologic markers” and participating in multiple meetings with Dr. Lin and
others to discuss various aspects of the research.
The TLS Research continued through the summer of 2021. By August 2021,
Dr. Lin was finalizing a manuscript about the TLS Research, which she intended to
submit for publication to the journal Cancer Immunology Research (“CIR
Manuscript”). Dr. Lin also began preparing an invention disclosure report (“IDR”)
for the TLS Research, which would require her to name its inventors.1
The parties disagree about who came up with the idea for the TLS Research.
Dr. Sharma claims she had substantial prior experience in this area, including two
published articles and a patent, and that she was the one who initially proposed the
idea for the TLS Research. According to Dr. Lin, it was her husband—Dr. Cassian
1 Generally, an IDR is a document submitted to MD Anderson when intellectual property is created by MD Anderson researchers.
5 Yee, also on the faculty at MD Anderson—who “brainstormed and conceptualized”
the idea.
On September 27, 2021, Dr. Lin emailed Dr. Abudayyeh, one of the other
doctors who worked on the TLS Research, to ask whether he wanted to be listed as
an inventor on the IDR. Dr. Lin suggested one-third of the inventorship credit should
be given to herself, one-third to Dr. Yee, and one-third to Dr. Abudayyeh; she did
not mention Dr. Sharma.
Later that day, Dr. Sharma emailed Drs. Lin and Yee that because she had
developed the idea for the TLS Research, she “expect[s] appropriate contribution in
the CIR [Manuscript].” Dr. Sharma also wrote that she “expect[s] that you will
include me as a co-inventor [on the IDR] based on my contribution.”
Dr. Lin alleges Dr. Sharma threatened to withdraw her support for the research
if she did not get attribution credit for the TLS Research. Fearing her research career
would be jeopardized without Dr. Sharma’s support, Dr. Lin ultimately acquiesced
to Dr. Sharma’s demands. Dr. Yee wrote back to Dr. Sharma, “We will include you
on the contribution per paper as you suggest and inventorship. Let us know how we
should divide the attribution when filling in the IDR.” Dr. Sharma responded that
“based on [her] understanding of the IDR,” she would suggest Drs. Lin and
Abudayyeh each receive twenty-five percent of the inventorship credit, Dr. Yee
receive twenty percent, and Dr. Sharma and Dr. Diab each receive fifteen percent.
6 On November 8, 2021, Dr. Sharma emailed the Senior Associate Editor of
Cancer Immunology Research about the CIR Manuscript “to be sure that my
attribution is accurate.” Dr. Sharma identified herself as “co-senior and co-
corresponding author” of the CIR Manuscript, Dr. Lin as “co-corresponding author,”
and Dr. Abudayyeh as “co-senior author.” Dr. Sharma told the editor she needed to
correct her attribution on the CIR Manuscript because “[i]n addition to my
attribution of supervision, writing, and editing, I need to also include: review of data
and concept of tertiary lymphoid structures involved in immune-related adverse
events.” Dr. Sharma sent the email from her MD Anderson email account.
The following day, Dr. Abudayyeh responded to Dr. Lin’s email (over a
month after she sent it) asking about inventorship credit on the IDR. Copying Dr.
Sharma, Dr. Abudayyeh wrote that she would like to be listed as an inventor on the
IDR “provided [Drs. Diab and Sharma] are included since they have been
instrumental in this project” and Dr. Sharma “came up with looking into the TLS
gene signature in my patients [sic] kidney tissue which now is the reason we have
an IDR discussion.” Dr. Lin emailed back, “To be clear, [Dr. Sharma] did not come
up with looking into the TLS gene signature, but in the spirit of collegiality we have
included her attribution in the manuscript. Any further discussion regarding the IDR
should include [Dr. Yee] who conceived the idea of investigating the TLS gene
signature prior to [Dr. Sharma] joining the project.” Dr. Sharma responded that Dr.
7 Lin’s email was a “blatant lie” and that if she “continue[d] this lie, Jim and I will
need to remove our names from the manuscript and let the editor know about your
dishonesty.”
The next day, Dr. Sharma again emailed the Senior Associate Editor of
Cancer Immunology Research, using her MD Anderson email, to request a “pause”
of the journal’s review of the CIR Manuscript. According to Dr. Sharma, “within
the past 24 hours, the 3 co-senior authors for this manuscript (Dr. Adi Diab, Dr. Ala
Abudayyeh, and myself) were informed that there will be ongoing reviews internally
at MD Anderson related to the work in this manuscript and the appropriate credit for
authors.” Dr. Lin alleges this statement was false. Dr. Sharma asked the journal to
suspend its review of the CIR Manuscript “until we have a resolution of the issues
being raised.” The journal complied with that request and put the manuscript on
hold. Apparently, the CIR Manuscript has never been published.
Throughout the remainder of 2021 and into January 2022, MD Anderson
attempted to facilitate a resolution of the authorship dispute over the CIR
Manuscript. These efforts culminated in a mediation in January 2022, which was
unsuccessful.
C. The JCII Manuscript
When the parties were unable to resolve their dispute over the CIR
Manuscript, Drs. Lin and Yee began working on other projects. Over the next year,
8 they conducted research, along with other doctors at MD Anderson, on what Dr. Lin
describes in her brief as “the relationship between TLS signatures and a cancer
immunotherapy causing swelling in the kidneys’ filters.” According to Dr. Lin, “Dr.
Yee conceptualized the project and [she] oversaw and contributed to all aspects of
the project.”
In September 2022, Dr. Lin submitted a manuscript of this research to the
journal JCI Insight (“JCII Manuscript”). After revisions, JCI Insight accepted the
JCI Manuscript for publication, and it was publicly available on the JCI Insight
website by December 2022. The JCII Manuscript named Drs. Lin and Yee as co-
corresponding authors and the other MD Anderson doctors who had worked on the
project as co-authors, none of whom was Dr. Sharma, Dr. Diab, or Dr. Abudayyeh.
Drs. Sharma, Diab, and Abudayyeh were not given authorship credit for the JCII
Manuscript.
Dr. Sharma reviewed the JCII Manuscript when it became available online.
She believed it involved the same or similar research on the TLS signature as the
unpublished CIR Manuscript. Dr. Sharma emailed the editor of JCI Insight, from
her MD Anderson email account, writing that “this work was originally submitted
to Cancer Immunology Research and author list consisted of multiple individuals
who are currently not on the JCII [Manuscript].” She continued:
I (along with my team) provided the expertise needed to evaluate the samples for tertiary lymphoid structures (which is the novelty of the 9 manuscript). Dr. Lin and Dr. Yee refused to acknowledge the contributions that were made by me and other team members. Initially, Dr. Lin tried to argue that she did all of the work for the project, but email communications were reviewed, and her claims were not accurate. . . . In addition, we were notified that Dr. Lin presented the data at a national scientific meeting without notifying the other co- authors. This . . . was viewed as a breach in scientific collaboration. . . . [I]t seems that Dr. Lin took all of our work on this project and, along with her husband, Dr. Yee, accumulated additional nephritis samples that they analyzed for TLS (based on our original work). They published the work in JCI Insight without including us as co-authors. This constitutes an ethical issue and I hope that you will review this issue appropriately.
D. MD Anderson’s investigation of the authorship dispute
In December 2022, MD Anderson’s senior vice president and chief scientific
officer, Dr. Giulo F. Draetta, along with MD Anderson’s chief academic officer, Dr.
Carin Hagberg, informed Drs. Lin, Sharma, and Yee that MD Anderson had retained
an outside law firm and doctor to investigate the authorship dispute and
“recommend . . . an informed, ethical, and equitable resolution.” They did so
“[b]ased on the considerable institutional resources invested in the research made
the basis of the [JCII Manuscript].” Drs. Draetta and Hagberg told Drs. Lin, Sharma,
and Yee that “[i]f adopted by the two of us, [the recommendations of the outside
doctor and law firm] will be the institution’s final position on the matter.”
Drs. Draetta and Hagberg reported the results of the investigation in March
2023. The outside law firm and doctor recommended: (1) “the [JCII Manuscript] is
a clear outgrowth of the original work done for the [CIR Manuscript]”; (2) “[t]he
10 TLS finding cannot reliably be attributed to Dr. Cassian Yee, and the preponderance
of the evidence supports attributing the TLS finding to Dr. Sharma”; and (3) the
“author list” should place Dr. Shaibala Singh as “first author” and “corresponding
author,” with Drs. Lin, Abudayyeh and Sharma sharing “co-senior authorship,” and
Drs. Yee and Diab as “middle authors.”
Drs. Draetta and Hagberg decided to “fully adopt” these recommendations.
Dr. Lin objected through a letter to MD Anderson from her counsel and then filed
this suit against Dr. Sharma.
E. Relevant proceedings in the trial court
In her original and amended pleadings, Dr. Lin asserted claims for
defamation, slander, libel, conversion, and theft, and for a declaratory judgment that
“she is named and provided the authorship attribution of senior, co-corresponding
author on the JCII Manuscript” and that “Dr. Sharma was not an author.” Dr. Lin’s
claims for defamation, libel, and slander are based in part on statements Dr. Sharma
made in her emails to the editors of Cancer Immunology Research and JCI Insight,
as well as to “colleagues [and] collaborators,” about the authorship dispute. Dr. Lin
does not identify any specific statements that Dr. Sharma made to colleagues and
collaborators as forming the basis for her claims.
Dr. Sharma filed a motion to dismiss based on the election-of-remedies
provision of the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
11 CODE § 101.106(f). She argued that her allegedly defamatory statements were all
made within the course and scope of her work as a senior researcher for MD
Anderson, that Dr. Lin’s claims could have been brought against MD Anderson
under the TTCA, and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Dr.
Lin’s declaratory-judgment claims.
Dr. Lin filed a response, arguing Dr. Sharma’s reliance on the TTCA’s
election-of-remedies provision is misplaced. She contended the TTCA is
inapplicable to this case because her claims are for intentional torts and, by its terms,
the TTCA excludes intentional torts. See id. § 101.057(2). Dr. Lin argued Dr.
Sharma is not immune to her claims because Dr. Sharma committed the allegedly
tortious acts while acting outside the scope of her employment. And Dr. Lin also
argued that any construction of the election-of-remedies provision allowing for the
dismissal of her claims would violate the Open Courts provision of the Texas
Constitution because it would leave her without a forum in which to seek redress.
See TEX. CONST. art. I, §13.
The trial court held a hearing on Dr. Sharma’s motion in May 2024. At the
hearing, counsel for Dr. Lin agreed her claims for conversion and theft fall within
the scope of Dr. Sharma’s employment and stated, “We actually intend to amend our
issue and nonsuit those claims.” The trial court later denied Dr. Sharma’s motion,
and this appeal followed.
12 Analysis
Dr. Sharma raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred by
denying her motion to dismiss under the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision.
A. Standard of review
A governmental employee’s motion to dismiss under section 101.106(f) is an
assertion of immunity and thus a challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. Elias v. Griffith, No. 01-17-003330CV, 2018 WL 3233587, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). “When a jurisdictional
plea ‘challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence
submitted by the parties.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004)). “The standard of review for a jurisdictional plea
based on evidence ‘generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 166a(c).’” Id. (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228).
Likewise, our determination involves statutory construction, which is also
reviewed under a de novo standard. See ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512
S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam).
B. The TTCA and its election-of-remedies provision
The parties do not dispute that MD Anderson is a unit of state government and
as such generally has sovereign immunity. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer
Ctr. v. Eltonsy, 451 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
13 pet.) (“The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center is a governmental unit
generally entitled to sovereign immunity.”). The doctrine of sovereign immunity
implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement
Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178, 182 (Tex. 2023).
If a governmental defendant is immune from suit, the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over a suit for damages against it. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer
Ctr. v. Contreras, 576 S.W.3d 439, 442–43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,
no pet.).
The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain tort claims.
Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. 2017); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 101.025. Where the waiver applies, a unit of government can be held
vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of its employee. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021.
The TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision requires a plaintiff to make a
choice between suing the governmental unit or its employee, depending on whether
the employee was acting within her official capacity:
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the employee’s motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the
14 governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.
Id. § 101.106(f). The practical effect of this provision is that a plaintiff must decide,
before filing suit, whether a governmental employee acted independently of her
employment and thus is individually liable, or whether the employee acted in her
official capacity such that the governmental unit is vicariously liable. See Laverie,
517 S.W.3d at 752.
The election-of-remedies provision “reduce[s] the delay and expense
associated with allowing plaintiffs to plead alternatively that the governmental unit
is liable because its employee acted within the scope of his or her authority but, if
not, that the employee acted individually and is individually liable.” Univ. of Tex.
Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Rios, 542 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). It does so by forcing “an irrevocable election
at the time suit is filed whether to su[e] the governmental unit under the Tort Claims
Act or proceed[] against the employee alone.” Id. (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A plaintiff therefore must determine whether the employee was acting in an
official or individual capacity when she committed the allegedly tortious conduct.
A governmental employee acts within her official capacity when she acts within the
scope of her employment. See Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Off. v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d
350, 357 (Tex. 2013). If the plaintiff sues the governmental employee in her official 15 capacity, the suit is “in all but name only, a suit against the governmental unit.” Id.
In that situation, the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision entitles the defendant
to an early dismissal “upon proof that the plaintiff’s suit is (1) based on conduct
within the scope of the defendant’s employment with a governmental unit and
(2) could have been brought against the governmental unit under the [TTCA].”
Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 752.
C. Dr. Lin’s claims for defamation, slander, and libel
We first consider Dr. Lin’s claims for defamation, slander, and libel. We
consider those claims collectively, just as Dr. Lin does in her amended petition.
1. Dr. Sharma made the allegedly tortious statements within the scope of her employment
Dr. Sharma contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss in
part because she satisfied the first element of the TTCA’s election-of-remedies
provision when she established that she made the challenged statements within the
scope of her employment by MD Anderson. See id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 101.106(f). We agree.
The TTCA defines “scope of employment” as “the performance for a
governmental unit of the duties of an employee’s office or employment and includes
being in or about the performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by
competent authority.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001(5). In
determining whether an employee acted within the scope of employment, the 16 “critical inquiry” is whether, viewed objectively, there is a connection between the
employee’s job duties and the allegedly tortious conduct. Garza v. Harrison, 574
S.W.3d 389, 401 (Tex. 2019); see also Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 753. “Simply stated,
a governmental employee is discharging generally assigned job duties if the
employee was doing his job at the time of the alleged tort.” Garza, 574 S.W.3d at
401.
Whether an employee acts with ulterior motives, with personal animus, or in
part to serve her own purposes is immaterial, so long as the employee was
performing her job duties. See Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 753; Anderson v. Bessman,
365 S.W.3d 119, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Therefore,
“co-existing motivations do not remove an employee’s actions from the scope of his
employment so long as the conduct also serves a purpose of the employer.” Fink v.
Anderson, 477 S.W.3d 460, 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
“Conduct that serves any purpose of the employer is within the scope of employment
even if the conduct escalates beyond that assigned or permitted.” Id. (“[F]or
example, when an employee’s job duties include making statements to prospective
customers to induce them to buy from the employer, intentional misrepresentations
may be within the scope of employment.”); see also Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats,
885 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. 1994) (insurance agent was acting within scope of
17 employment when explaining terms of policy even though he made false
representations about policy that employer did not authorize).
An employee who commits a tort like defamation can also be acting within
her scope of employment so long as the tort occurs while the employee is engaged
in conduct to further her employer’s purpose and the act is an escalation of, rather
than a deviation from, her job duties. Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 467–69; see also Elias,
2018 WL 3233587, at *9 (city employees who allegedly defamed plaintiff while
giving city-council update were acting within scope of employment); Melton v.
Farrow, No. 03-13-00542-CV, 2015 WL 681491, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb.
10, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (board members who allegedly defamed plaintiff
in board meeting were acting within scope of employment); Hopkins v. Strickland,
No. 01-12-00315-CV, 2013 WL 1183302, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Mar. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (mayor who allegedly defamed plaintiff in
conversation with another mayor was acting within scope of employment).
The relevant question is not whether the employee was authorized by her
employer to commit the specific act that forms the basis of the plaintiff’s tort claim,
but whether she was performing her job duties when she committed the alleged tort.
See Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 470 (“More recent cases likewise have broadened the focus
to ask whether the general conduct was within the scope of employment instead of
whether the specific act was somehow wrongful.”); see also Celtic Life Ins., 885
18 S.W.2d at 99 (in agency relationship, question is not whether principal authorized
specific wrongful act because then principals would rarely be liable for agents’
misconduct; rather, proper inquiry is whether agent was acting within scope of
agency relationship when committing wrongful act).
By contrast, when an employee pursues an “independent course of conduct”
unrelated to her job that does not serve any purpose of her employer, she engages in
that conduct for her own reasons and is not acting within the scope of employment.
See Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 754. An employee who deviates from the general nature
of her employment to engage in unauthorized conduct is also not acting within the
scope of employment. See Zarzana v. Ashley, 218 S.W.3d 152, 160 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. struck) (employee’s selling counterfeit car inspection
stickers was not within scope of employment because employer did not conduct
inspections or sell car inspection stickers); see also Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 467.
We conclude Dr. Sharma was acting within the scope of her employment,
rather than pursuing an independent course of conduct, when she made the allegedly
defamatory statements. Dr. Lin contends the statements fall into three categories:
statements made to third parties like the journals Cancer Immunology Research and
JCI Insights; statements made as part of MD Anderson’s investigation of the
authorship dispute; and statements made to other MD Anderson employees. But
regardless of which category they fall into, it is undisputed that all of Dr. Sharma’s
19 allegedly defamatory statements concerned the TLS Research and who should
receive attribution for it. It was within the scope of Dr. Sharma’s employment to
make these statements.
MD Anderson has instituted formal policies governing the conduct and
publication of research, as well as attribution for it. MD Anderson Policy RES3535,
entitled “Principles for Scientific Research Policy,” requires that “[p]roper credit
through authorship or acknowledgement must be given for the nature and scope of
contributions or collaborating faculty, students, or staff.” Likewise, MD Anderson
Policy RES3532, entitled “Scientific Publication Policy,” defines various kinds of
authorship and states that “[a]ll persons who satisfy the conditions for Authorship
Credit should be designated as an Author.” Within her responsibilities as a senior
researcher, professor, vice president, and director of scientific programs at MD
Anderson, Dr. Sharma has an interest in ensuring these policies are followed and
proper attribution given to those who contributed to the research, particularly in light
of the MD Anderson resources that were used to conduct it. As Dr. Draetta stated
in his declaration, “Dr. Sharma acted within the course and scope of her employment
with [MD Anderson] in her attempts to resolve the authorship dispute with Dr. Lin
and in relation to both the CIR Manuscript and the [JCII] Manuscript.”
Resolving authorship disputes among MD Anderson researchers regarding
research that utilized MD Anderson resources facilitates the ultimate publication of
20 the manuscripts, thereby benefitting MD Anderson because the publication adds the
scholarship of MD Anderson researchers to the scientific community. The
importance to MD Anderson of resolving the authorship dispute is demonstrated by
MD Anderson’s authorizing an independent investigation into the authorship dispute
in 2022 and adopting the findings of the investigation as its “institutional position”
regarding who should get what level of authorship recognition.
Dr. Lin contends Dr. Sharma’s comments were an “attempt to sabotage and
destroy a fellow employee’s promising medical career.” But even assuming that
statement is true, Dr. Sharma’s motives are irrelevant to the scope-of-employment
inquiry. See Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 753; Anderson, 365 S.W.3d at 125–26. Instead,
the “critical inquiry” is whether Dr. Sharma was “doing h[er] job at the time of the
alleged tort.” Garza, 574 S.W.3d at 401. The attempt to resolve the authorship
dispute concerning the TLS Research was within the scope of her employment as a
senior researcher at MD Anderson.
Dr. Lin also contends Dr. Sharma was acting outside the scope of her
employment because the challenged statements did not serve any purpose of MD
Anderson. See Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 471 (conduct is within scope of employment
“so long as the conduct also serves a purpose of the employer”). Dr. Lin argues that
because the Board of Regents of the University of Texas System owns the
intellectual property rights to research done by MD Anderson researchers, “MD
21 Anderson’s business interest is unaffected by who receives authorship credit for Dr.
Lin’s research.” From there, she concludes Dr. Sharma’s comments were made
solely in her interest in the “share of professional prestige” she receives rather than
for any purpose of MD Anderson.
This argument overlooks the myriad interests MD Anderson has in ensuring
proper attribution is given for research, such as talent retention. As Dr. Lin
concedes, publication in scientific journals “is important for [the careers of
researchers] and establishing their reputations within the medical research
community.” And the statements Dr. Sharma made to Dr. Lin and other colleagues
about who should be listed as inventors on the IDR regarding the TLS gene signature
were clearly made in the scope of her employment with MD Anderson because the
IDR is a document submitted to MD Anderson.2
Dr. Lin next points to Dr. Sharma’s statement to the editor of Cancer
Immunology Research that “there will be ongoing reviews internally at MD
Anderson related to the work in this manuscript and the appropriate credit for
authors.” According to Dr. Lin, this statement suggests there was an ongoing review
at the time Dr. Sharma made it (November 2021), whereas MD Anderson’s formal
2 Moreover, before and during this dispute, MD Anderson has had an “Intellectual Property Policy” which governs the commercialization of intellectual property and when intellectual property must be disclosed to MD Anderson. This policy states, “The decision whether to develop and commercialize Intellectual Property is in the sole discretion of the President of MD Anderson.”
22 review did not begin until December 2022. Dr. Lin contends this statement shows
Dr. Sharma was acting outside the scope of her employment because she made it
“outside any formal MD Anderson process” and “Dr. Sharma’s general duties do not
include lying about her employer’s activities.”
Assuming Dr. Sharma sent the emails prior to the start of MD Anderson’s
“formal review,” that fact would not remove them from the scope of her
employment. For the reasons we explained above, Dr. Sharma’s job duties include
taking steps to ensure appropriate authorship credit, consistent with MD Anderson
policies. Dr. Lin cites no authority, and we have found none, to suggest those steps
must be taken within the context of an employer’s “formal” review process to fall
within the scope of employment. To the contrary, “[c]onduct that serves any purpose
of the employer is within the scope of employment.” Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 466. And
Dr. Sharma’s emails, sent for the purpose of ensuring appropriate authorship credit,
served MD Anderson’s purposes.
Likewise, even if we were to assume Dr. Sharma’s statement that there “will
be” internal reviews was false or defamatory, neither of those characterizations
would remove it from the scope of her employment.3 “[A]n act may still be within
3 In their briefing, the parties dispute whether MD Anderson’s review had begun as of the time Dr. Sharma sent her email to the editor of Cancer Immunology Research, and thus whether her statement was factually accurate. But in considering a motion to dismiss under the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision, we “may not weigh the claims’ merits.” Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002) 23 the scope of the employee’s duties even if the specific act that forms the basis of the
civil suit was wrongly or negligently performed, so long as the action was one related
to the performance of his job.” Hopkins, 2013 WL 1183302, at *3 (affirming
dismissal of former police chief’s slander and malicious prosecution claims against
mayor because mayor made allegedly slanderous comments within scope of his
employment as mayor).
Both the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court have consistently held that a
government employee’s comments are not made outside the scope of employment
simply because they were defamatory, so long as the employee was “doing h[er] job
at the time of the alleged tort.” Garza, 574 S.W.3d at 401; see Rios, 542 S.W.3d at
532, 535–36 (rendering judgment dismissing defamation claims by resident
physician against faculty physicians at the University of Texas Health Science
Center at Houston, based on comments faculty physicians made about resident to
Texas Medical Board and others, because faculty physicians made the challenged
statements “in connection with their operation of [the Center’s] residency program”
and thus “squarely within the scope of their employment at the Center”); Laverie,
517 S.W.3d at 750, 752–53 (rendering judgment dismissing Texas Tech professor’s
(courts do not consider merits of plaintiffs claims in deciding a plea to the jurisdiction); Elias, 2018 WL 3233587, at *5 (motion to dismiss under TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision is procedurally similar to plea to the jurisdiction). And for the reasons explained in the main text, the truth or falsity of Dr. Sharma’s statement is immaterial to the scope-of-employment analysis.
24 defamation claim against colleague based on statements colleague made during
search for new dean of business school because colleague made the challenged
statements within the scope of her employment, regardless of colleague’s
“subjective intent” in making the statements”); Ferebee v. Law Office of Frank
Powell, No. 01-22-00681-CV, 2023 WL 5918110, at *1, 4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Sept. 12, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rendering judgment dismissing
slander claims against city attorney based on statements he made during city council
meeting because city attorney was “doing his job at the time of the alleged tort,”
regardless of whether city attorney “was authorized to make defamatory comments,”
“had ulterior motives, acted with personal animus, or acted to serve his own
purposes”); Elias, 2018 WL 3233587, at *7–9 (city employees were acting within
scope of employment when they made allegedly defamatory statements during
presentation to city council).
Thus assuming Dr. Sharma’s statements were knowingly false at the time they
were made, she nevertheless made them within the scope of her employment. See
Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 466 (“[W]hen an employee’s job duties include making
statements to prospective customers to induce them to buy from the employer,
intentional misrepresentations may be within the scope of employment.”).
Dr. Lin’s reliance on Cai v. Chen to support the contrary conclusion is
misplaced. 683 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. granted,
25 judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). In that case, Li Cai and Jasper Chen were colleagues at
MD Anderson. Id. at 101. Chen sued Cai for defamation, alleging she made two
kinds of defamatory statements about him. Id. First, Chen alleged Cai falsely
reported to her supervisor that Chen had sexually harassed Cai and made false
statements about Chen during MD Anderson’s investigation of the alleged
harassment. Id. Second, Chen alleged Cai made false statements about him to other
colleagues with whom they both worked. Id. Cai sought dismissal under the
TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision, arguing she made the allegedly defamatory
statements within the scope of her employment. Id. at 101–02.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reached a bifurcated result. With one justice
dissenting, the Fourteenth Court concluded Cai’s statements made to report the
alleged harassment to her supervisor and within the context of MD Anderson’s
investigation were made within the scope of her employment. Id. at 104–05. But
the court also concluded Cai’s statements about Chen “to a co-worker in the lab
where they worked,” which “do not appear related to a report about sexual
harassment” or “in any way connected to Cai’s job duties for [MD] Anderson,” were
not made within the scope of Cai’s employment. Id. at 105–06. The dissenting
justice agreed with the majority that Cai’s reports of the alleged sexual harassment
were made within the scope of her employment, but he “disagree[d] with the
majority’s holding that an employee’s disparaging comments to a coworker about
26 another coworker, made at the place of employment in the employment setting, are
not ‘within the general scope of that employee’s employment.’” Id. at 107 (Wise,
J., dissenting) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(f)).
Here, Dr. Lin contends “Dr. Sharma’s communications with third party
journal editors are even farther afield from her job duties than the statements to a co-
worker in Cai,” and therefore “Dr. Sharma’s premature outreach to journals before
any official process started is clearly beyond the scope of her role as an MD
Anderson faculty member.” But the Fourteenth Court held Cai’s comments to her
co-worker—comments to the effect that Chen was “very mean” and “a scary,
intimidating person” whom “everyone should stay away from”—were unrelated to
both her allegations of sexual harassment and her “job duties for [MD] Anderson”
and thus they “do not appear to fall under [MD] Anderson’s policy.” Id. at 105–06.
By contrast, Dr. Sharma’s challenged statements relate to the authorship attribution
for research manuscripts, which is a topic addressed directly by MD Anderson
policies.4 Dr. Sharma’s emails to journal editors at most were an “escalation” of her
duties and not a “deviation” from them. See Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 466–67 (“Conduct
4 In making this observation, we do not suggest that a governmental employee’s allegedly defamatory statement must be addressed directly by a written policy of her employer to be made within the scope of employment. But here, Dr. Sharma’s challenged statements fall squarely within and in furtherance of MD Anderson Policies RES3532 and RES3535, which shows she made them while acting within the scope of her employment. See Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 753.
27 that serves any purpose of the employer is within the scope of employment even if
the conduct escalates beyond that assigned or permitted.”).
Finally, Dr. Lin contends Dr. Sharma’s statements were made outside the
scope of her employment because “MD Anderson, unsurprisingly, neither authorizes
nor condones defamatory statements.” But “[o]ur inquiry is not whether the
employee was authorized to commit a tort but whether he was performing his job
duties when he committed the tort.” Ferebee, 2023 WL 5918110, at *2.
We conclude Dr. Sharma made the challenged statements within the scope of
her employment.
2. Dr. Lin’s claims could have been brought under the TTCA
Dr. Sharma next contends she satisfied the second element of the TTCA’s
election-of-remedies provision, that Dr. Lin’s claims “could have been brought
against the government under the [TTCA].” Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 752. Again,
we agree.
A plaintiff’s suit “could have been brought” against a governmental unit
“under” the TTCA if: (1) the plaintiff alleges a tort claim; and (2) the claim is not
brought under any other statute that waives immunity, even if the alleged tort is one
for which the TTCA does not waive immunity. Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d
367, 375 (Tex. 2011).
28 Both conditions are satisfied here. Dr. Lin’s claims for defamation, slander,
and libel are tort claims, and she did not assert a tort under any other statute that
waives immunity. Therefore, Dr. Lin could have brought her claims against MD
Anderson under the TTCA. See id.; see also Elias, 2018 WL 3233587, at *10
(slander-per-se claim could have been brought against governmental unit “under”
TTCA).
Dr. Lin contends otherwise because the TTCA expressly excludes intentional
torts and by its terms waives immunity only for tort claims seeking recovery for
“property damage, personal injury, and death.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.057(2) (“This chapter does not apply to a claim . . . arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort[.]); id. § 101.021(1)
(waiving governmental immunity for “property damage, personal injury, and death
proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an
employee acting within the scope of employment if [certain conditions are
satisfied]”). According to Dr. Lin, her claims are intentional torts that seek recovery
for reputational damage, and thus they are outside the TTCA’s immunity waiver and
therefore could not have been brought against MD Anderson “under” the TTCA.
The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that “any tort claim against the
government is brought ‘under’ the [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106 [the
TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision], even if the [TTCA] does not waive
29 immunity.” Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (emphasis added). Relying on Franka, this
Court has rejected Dr. Lin’s argument. See, e.g., Hopkins, 2013 WL 1183302, at *4
(“[A]ll common-law tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, even if not
waived under the [TTCA], are assumed to be ‘under the [TTCA],’ because it is the
Act that delineates governmental tort liability.” (citing Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375)).
Dr. Lin contends Franka is not controlling because it involved claims of
medical malpractice and thus “did not address the specific situation we face here,
where the [TTCA] expressly excludes the type of claim at issue.” She is correct that
Franka itself did not involve an intentional tort. 332 S.W.3d at 370. But in earlier
cases on which Franka relied, the Supreme Court of Texas rendered judgment for
governmental employees after concluding that intentional-tort claims were subject
to dismissal under the TTCA’s election-of-remedies provision. See Mission Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008) (addressing
defamation claim and stating that “all tort theories,” including intentional torts, “are
assumed to be ‘under [the Tort Claims Act]’ for purposes of Section 101.106.”
(brackets in original)) (discussed in Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 377–79); Newman v.
Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622–23 (Tex. 1997) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress and conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress)
(discussed in Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375–76); see also Alexander v. Walker, 435
S.W.3d 789, 791–92 (Tex. 2014) (rendering judgment dismissing officers in case
30 alleging intentional torts of assault, conspiracy, slander, false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution). Accordingly, our precedent has
interpreted the holding of Franka to include intentional torts, and we follow that
interpretation here. See Ferebee, 2023 WL 5918110, at *6; Hopkins, 2013 WL
1183302, at *3.
We conclude Dr. Lin’s defamation, libel, and slander claims could have been
brought against MD Anderson under the TTCA.5
D. Section 101.106(f) does not violate the Open Courts provision
Dr. Lin also contends interpreting section 101.106(f) to include defamation
and other intentional torts would violate the Open Courts provision of the Texas
Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. She argues that if a plaintiff’s defamation
claim against a government employee is subject to dismissal under section
101.106(f), she will be left with an intentional-tort claim against the governmental
employer for which immunity is not waived, leaving her “without a remedy.” See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057(2). According to Dr. Lin, this
“construction will effectively deny plaintiffs that are defamed by government
employees access to the courts,” in violation of the Open Courts provision.
5 At oral argument, Dr. Lin’s counsel conceded that her claims for theft and conversion are based on conduct within the scope of Dr. Sharma’s employment and thus that those claims should be dismissed under section 101.106(f). 31 In Franka, the Supreme Court, while recognizing no constitutional challenge
had been raised, anticipated that litigants would make Open Courts challenges to its
holding:
We recognize that the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution “prohibits the Legislature from unreasonably abrogating well- established common-law claims,” but restrictions on government employee liability have always been part of the tradeoff for the [TTCA’s] waiver of immunity, expanding the government’s own liability for its employees’ conduct, and thus “a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare.”
332 S.W.3d at 385 (footnotes omitted).
Following Franka, we have rejected Open Courts challenges to section
101.106(f). In Williams v. Nealon, the plaintiff argued section 101.106(f) required
“him to give up an actionable malpractice claim against the doctors individually ‘for
a potentially dismissable [sic] and non-viable claim under’” the TTCA. 394 S.W.3d
9, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). We rejected that
argument, explaining that, “[i]n exchange for the [TTCA’s] waiver of sovereign
immunity in certain situations, the statute limits a litigant’s cause of action against
employees of the state acting in the course and scope of their employment.” Id. at
13–14. We held this restriction is “a reasonable exercise of the police power in the
interest of the general welfare.” Id. at 14 (quoting Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 385); see
also Elias, 2018 WL 3233587, at *10 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that dismissal
of his slander-per-se claim under section 101.106(f) would violate Open Courts
32 provision because “[w]e have previously considered this same constitutional
challenge to section 101.106(f) on several occasions and have found it to be without
merit”); Harold v. Carrick, No. 01-12-00175-CV, 2013 WL 4828744, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 10. 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting Open
Courts challenge to section 101.106(f) because the TTCA’s limitation on “a
litigant’s cause of action against employees of the state acting in the course and
scope of their employment” is “a reasonable exercise of the police power in the
interest of the general welfare” (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, application of
section 101.106(f) to Dr. Lin’s claims does not violate the Open Courts provision.6
E. Dr. Lin’s declaratory-judgment claim
Dr. Sharma also contends she was entitled to dismissal of Dr. Lin’s
declaratory-judgment claim. Dr. Lin seeks a “declaration against Dr. Sharma
individually and specifically naming Dr. Lin as senior, co-corresponding author of
the JCII Manuscript in accordance with [Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Section] 37.003, and confirming that Dr. Sharma was not the author.”
6 While it can lead to seemingly harsh results, the fact that a plaintiff might be denied the right to bring an otherwise viable claim against a governmental entity is a function of sovereign immunity: “Simply described, sovereign immunity generally shields our state government’s ‘improvident acts’—however improvident, harsh, unjust, or infuriatingly boneheaded these acts may seem—against the litigation and judicial remedies that would be available if the same acts were committed by private persons.” Bacon v. Tex. Hist. Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 172 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
33 The Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”), under which Dr.
Lin brings her claim for declaratory relief, confirms that “[a] court of record within
its jurisdiction has power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 37.003(a). But “the UDJA . . . ‘does not enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction, and a
litigant’s request for declaratory relief does not alter a suit’s underlying nature.’”
Collier v. Suhre, 605 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no
pet.) (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009)). In
other words, the UDJA is “a procedural device for deciding cases already within a
court’s jurisdiction.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 458 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex.
2015) (quotation omitted). “A party cannot, therefore, circumvent the bar of
sovereign immunity by simply characterizing the suit as a declaratory judgment
action when sovereign immunity has not been waived for the relief actually sought.”
Koch v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 273 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet.
denied).
Dr. Lin’s declaratory-judgment claim violates this rule. It asks the trial court
to declare the truth of the factual allegations comprising her theft and conversion
claims, as shown by the following comparison:
Theft/Conversion Allegations Declaratory-Judgment Claim
“Dr. Lin was/is entitled to the possession Seeking declaration “specifically (and in fact had legal possession) of the naming Dr. Lin as senior, co- 34 Theft/Conversion Allegations Declaratory-Judgment Claim
research, analysis, and findings in the corresponding author of the JCII JCII Manuscript evidenced by the fact Manuscript.” that Dr. Lin relentlessly assisted in the research and analysis, and drafted significant portions of the JCII Manuscript.” “Dr. Sharma continues to unlawfully Seeking declaration that “Dr. Sharma possess or is thereby preventing was not an author” of the JCII publication of the JCII Manuscript Manuscript. despite the fact that Dr. Lin conducted the research, analysis, and drafting of the JCII Manuscript.” “Dr. Lin conducted the necessary Seeking declaration “specifically research and analysis to draft the JCII naming Dr. Lin as senior, co- Manuscript . . . . Dr. Sharma unlawfully corresponding author of the JCII appropriated the JCII Manuscript Manuscript . . . and confirming that without Dr. Lin’s consent and with the Dr. Sharma was not an author.” intent to permanently deprive Dr. Lin of the correct authorship attribution of the JCII Manuscript.”
Dr. Lin’s declaratory-judgement claim is coextensive with her theft and
conversion claims, because all of them are based on the same set of alleged facts and
effectively request the same relief. Her claim for declaratory relief merely restates
her theft and conversion claims by asking the trial court to determine the parties’
property rights in the JCII Manuscript. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer
Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2011) (“The central test for determining
jurisdiction is whether the ‘real substance’ of the plaintiff’s claims falls within the
scope of a waiver of immunity from suit.”).
35 Dr. Sharma is thus immune to Dr. Lin’s declaratory-judgment claim for the
same reason she is immune to Dr. Lin’s theft and conversion claims, claims Dr. Lin
concedes are subject to dismissal under section 101.106(f). Because her declaratory-
judgment claim merely recasts her theft and conversion claims as a request for
declaratory relief, it is likewise subject to dismissal under section 101.106(f). See
City of Dallas v. Groden, No. 05-15-00033-CV, 2016 WL 1367380, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[W]e previously concluded in
our analysis of Groden’s tort claims that he did not allege any actions by Golbeck
and Worden that were outside the general scope of their employment [for purposes
of section 101.106(f)], and Groden complains about those same actions in his claim
for declaratory relief. Groden may not avoid dismissal of his claims for which
Golbeck and Worden have immunity by filing the claims in the form of a request for
declaratory relief.”); see also Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74
S.W.3d 849, 859–60 (Tex. 2002) (where state agency had immunity from breach-
of-contract claim, it also had immunity to declaratory-judgment claim that
effectively recharacterized breach-of-contract claim for declaratory relief); City of
Eagle Pass v. Wheeler, No. 04-07-00817-CV, 2008 WL 2434228, at *5 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 18, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because Wheeler’s
declaratory judgment claim against the City merely recasts the intentional tort claims
from which the City retains immunity from suit, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
36 and erred in denying the City’s plea.”); Koch, 273 S.W.3d at 455 (“[T]he Texas Tort
Claims Act governs when immunity is waived for a plaintiff’s tort claims, . . . and a
plaintiff cannot circumvent a state official’s immunity from suit by recasting a
defamation claim as a claim for declaratory relief[.]” (internal citation omitted)).
We conclude the trial court erred in denying Dr. Sharma’s motion to dismiss
Dr. Lin’s declaratory-judgment claim, and we sustain Dr. Sharma’s sole issue on
appeal.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Dr. Sharma’s motion to dismiss and
render judgment dismissing with prejudice Dr. Lin’s claims against her.
Andrew Johnson Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.