Padgett v. Padgett

547 So. 2d 342, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1920, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4568, 1989 WL 90479
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedAugust 15, 1989
DocketNo. 88-2528
StatusPublished

This text of 547 So. 2d 342 (Padgett v. Padgett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Padgett v. Padgett, 547 So. 2d 342, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1920, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4568, 1989 WL 90479 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions

ERVIN, Judge.

Appellant Norman V. Padgett, Jr., the son of the deceased testator, Norman V. Padgett, Sr., seeks reversal of an order granting appellee’s motion to strike appellant’s petition for construction of a will and determination of beneficiary. Appellant argues that the provision of the will granting him an option to purchase certain businesses and real property owned by the testator,1 which businesses were later sold by the testator during his lifetime, was a devise to him of such property, thereby entitling him to all remaining unpaid payments owed by the purchaser following the testator’s demise. We disagree and affirm.

First, we approve the trial court’s determination that a testamentary option to purchase is not a specific devise of real or personal property within the meaning of Section 731.201(8), Florida Statutes (1987).2 This is so because a provision by will for an option to purchase does not, prior to death of the testator, effectuate an interest in the real property, as the option is not a binding, enforceable right, because it was contingent and without consideration.3 At most, the testamentary provision created an offer that was not effective until the testator’s death, and which was, in fact, revoked before it became effective, because the decedent sold the property before his death.

Second, even assuming that the will’s provision created a specific devise, [344]*344appellant still would not be able to recover anything under Section 732.606(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987),4 because any monies owing from the buyer to the estate arose from the sale of the businesses and real estate, not from the sale of an option to purchase the businesses and real estate.

AFFIRMED.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs and ZEHMER, J., specially concurs with written opinion.

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Related

Koplin v. Bennett
155 So. 2d 568 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1963)
Donahue v. Davis
68 So. 2d 163 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1953)
Ross v. Nelson
273 So. 2d 790 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
547 So. 2d 342, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1920, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4568, 1989 WL 90479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/padgett-v-padgett-fladistctapp-1989.