Packard v. Stevens

46 A. 250, 58 N.J. Eq. 489, 13 Dickinson 489, 1899 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 69
New Jersey Court of Chancery·Decided September 30, 1899·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Grey, V. C.

The first question to be determined is whether the complainant is entitled to a decree requiring the defendants to interplead touching the question in dispute.

Lord Redesdale has declared that the right to exhibit an interpleader bill exists when two or more persons claim' the-same thing by different or separate interests, and another person, not knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to-render a debt or duty, or to deliver property in his custody, fears he may be hurt by some of them. Mitf. Eq. Pl. *59. The spirit of the equity of the complainant is that being, so far as his own acts are concerned, under a single liability only, he is-yet subject to be vexed by more than one claim. Where the com[497] plainant has the thing in dispute in his custody, or admits his obligation to pay, but, from the circumstances of the case, is unable to say to whom of two or more, delivery or payment should be made, the practice of the court is liberal in his favor. Lozier v. Van Saun, 2 Gr. Ch. 329.

The complainant having no interest in the money or thing in dispute, it is inequitable that he should be compelled to take the risk of determining which of the conflicting claims is superior. ’

In Wakeman v. Kingsland, 1 Dick. Ch. Rep. 114, Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet held a bill of this character, where the claims were obviously variant in amount and some of them legal and some equitable, to be a strict interpleader bill, upon the ground that the fund was insufficient to pay all the claims, which were uncertain and disputed, and that the complainant was an indifferent stakeholder, ready to pay the fund to the claimants whenever their respective rights could be determined.

If the determination of the dispute between the defendants will settle the claim of each against the complainant, they should be compelled to litigate with each other, the complainant having no interest save the rightful distribution of the fund.

Conflicting claims of this character may arise wholly because of the acts or omission of the contesting parties, and wholly without the fault or even the participation of the complainant, yet unless this court protects him he may be subjected to actions at law by each claimant and be obliged to defend many suits at great disadvantage (for the defence of the one would probably give points for the prosecution of the others), though all the while the complainant stands ready to pay out all of the money in dispute if only he knows the portions to which each contestant is entitled. Plainly, in such case, the complainant has an equity to bring all claimants into court, and delivering the fund, to say, “ I have no quarrel with any of you; dismiss me and settle your disputes among yourselves.”

The same difficulty and right to relief may happen when the complainant employs two or more persons to do work upon a common object, under an agreement that each shall be paid [498] according to the amount of the .work he may separately do, to be ascertained by measurement when the work shall be completed, and without fault of the complainant, a confusion of the work done arises which prevents an ascertainment of the amount separately done by each, so that the complainant cannot safely pay either.

This is the case under consideration. The work agreed to be done by each of the claimants was the filling in of League Island with mud and sand from the Delaware river. It is undisputed that they, though contracting separately, each agreed to engage in doing the same work, at the same time, in substantially the same way, for a compensation to be ascertained by measuring after completion of the work separately done by each. Each knew that the other was so engaged, and that the work of each was to be so measured when in place. Each knew that if by his act the means of measurement in place was destroyed or interfered with, a confusion would arise which would probaably lead to conflicting claims as to the quantity of cubic yards each had deposited. Stevens, after he began the work, consented in writing that Somers should be employed, and therefore knew the whole situation in advance. Somers denies for his company that it had knowledge of this consent, and that it formed the basis of Packard’s subsequent agreement with him. The weight of the evidence indicates that the consent was in fact read to him, as an explanation and justification for engaging him to undertake the work which he had formerly competed for but had failed to secure. He knew Stevens had underbidden him and secured the work, and it was entirely natural and reasonable that when he was invited to aid in hastening it, he should be assured that Stevens, who held the contract for doing it, assented to his employment.

But whether Somers knew of Stevens’ consent or not, the character of the work itself, on the ground, was so extensive and apparent, in the nature and size of the territory being operated upon and the machinery and its performance in actual use, that the fact that Stevens was actually doing it was manifest to Somers when he first began to work.

[499] Somers’ contract did not exclude Stevens from going on with the work. On the contrary, it was supplementary to that of Stevens, and Somers was taken off the work without objection by him, when by his aid it had been advanced according to the requirements of the government officers.

Nothing in the contract of either specified that he should fill in any prescribed' part of the island, nor that any wall or line of separation should be put up by Packard for their benefit. When they began, and for some short time afterwards, the evidence indicates that it was within their power, by the action of either or both, to have erected such a wall or bank north and south across the island as would have effectually kept the deposits of each to the east or west of the wall. Their contracts provided for measurement in place. They knew this during the whole of their working period, and should have so deposited their material that commingling would be prevented and that separate measurement in place would be possible. The very nature of the case and the operation of the work made it apparent to both of them that this could not be done unless a barrier of separation of their deposits was constructed and maintained as the work progressed.

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Packard v. Stevens, 46 A. 250, 58 N.J. Eq. 489, 13 Dickinson 489, 1899 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 69 (N.J. Ct. App. 1899).

46 A. 250 (Packard v. Stevens) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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