Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company

N.D. California

Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company

DecidedMarch 24, 2022

Docket4:21-cv-04438

StatusUnknown

This text of Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company (Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Pincite

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PACIFIC STRUCTURES, INC, Case No. 21-cv-04438-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY 10 GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 21 Defendant. 11

12 13 This is an insurance coverage dispute between a construction company, Plaintiff Pacific 14 Structures, Inc., and its insurance company, Defendant Greenwich Insurance Company. Plaintiff 15 seeks to recover damages suffered in an underlying state court action after Defendant allegedly 16 delayed in agreeing to defend Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings four claims: (1) declaratory relief; (2) 17 breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) an 18 Unfair Business Practices violation under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Before 19 the Court are two motions filed by Defendant: a motion to dismiss the UCL claim, Dkt. No. 15, 20 and a motion to stay the case pending resolution of the underlying action, Dkt. No. 21. 21 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 22 Plaintiff’s UCL claim must be dismissed. Plaintiff is not entitled to the UCL claim’s 23 remedy of equitable relief where, as here, Plaintiff’s contract and bad-faith claims for damages 24 provide an adequate remedy at law. Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 260 25 (2011), as modified (Dec. 28, 2011) (“[E]quitable relief (such as restitution) will not be given 26 when the plaintiff’s remedies at law are adequate.”). Moreover, the UCL claim merely states legal 27 conclusions “on information and belief,” “includ[ing] but . . . not limited to” all of the factual 1 790.3(h).” Dkt. No. 48 (“FAC”) ¶ 48. Plaintiff fails to plead “factual content that allows the court 2 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 3 v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).1 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim. The 5 Court has significant doubts as to whether Plaintiff can amend its Complaint, consistent with its 6 Rule 11 obligations, to allege facts sufficient to allege a valid UCL claim. However, because the 7 Court cannot conclude that amendment necessarily would be futile, it dismisses the complaint 8 with leave to amend this claim. Any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of the date 9 of this order and must not add any new claims or defendants. 10 II. MOTION TO STAY 11 Regarding Defendant’s motion to stay, both parties submit that the Court should apply the 12 standard set out in Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936), to the motion. However, 13 because Plaintiff’s complaint here seeks more than declaratory relief, it appears that the 14 appropriate standard comes from Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 15 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citation omitted). See Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1249 (8th Cir. 2013) 16 (“To permit a district court to rely solely on its inherent power to control its docket, when the 17 effect of the district court’s order is to accomplish the same result contemplated by Colorado 18 River, would allow a court to bypass the rigorous test set out by the Supreme Court [in Colorado 19 River].”); see also AIIRAM LLC v. KB Home, No. 19-CV-00269-LHK, 2019 WL 3779185, at *6 20 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding Landis inapplicable to a motion to stay based on a related state 21 action after concluding that Colorado River provided the controlling standard). 22 Because it appears likely that Colorado River controls, and because neither party addresses 23 that standard in the motion to stay, the Court DENIES that motion. This denial is without 24 prejudice to Defendant refiling a motion addressing the factors the Ninth Circuit has identified for 25 assessing the appropriateness of a Colorado River stay, R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 26 27 1 The Court agrees with Defendant that to the extent Plaintiff alleges fraudulent business practices, 1 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011), or explaining (based on controlling authority) why Colorado 2 || River does not apply in this circumstance. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: 3/24/2022

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12

= 17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PACIFIC STRUCTURES, INC, Case No. 21-cv-04438-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO STAY 10 GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 21 Defendant. 11

12 13 This is an insurance coverage dispute between a construction company, Plaintiff Pacific 14 Structures, Inc., and its insurance company, Defendant Greenwich Insurance Company. Plaintiff 15 seeks to recover damages suffered in an underlying state court action after Defendant allegedly 16 delayed in agreeing to defend Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings four claims: (1) declaratory relief; (2) 17 breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) an 18 Unfair Business Practices violation under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Before 19 the Court are two motions filed by Defendant: a motion to dismiss the UCL claim, Dkt. No. 15, 20 and a motion to stay the case pending resolution of the underlying action, Dkt. No. 21. 21 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 22 Plaintiff’s UCL claim must be dismissed. Plaintiff is not entitled to the UCL claim’s 23 remedy of equitable relief where, as here, Plaintiff’s contract and bad-faith claims for damages 24 provide an adequate remedy at law. Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 260 25 (2011), as modified (Dec. 28, 2011) (“[E]quitable relief (such as restitution) will not be given 26 when the plaintiff’s remedies at law are adequate.”). Moreover, the UCL claim merely states legal 27 conclusions “on information and belief,” “includ[ing] but . . . not limited to” all of the factual 1 790.3(h).” Dkt. No. 48 (“FAC”) ¶ 48. Plaintiff fails to plead “factual content that allows the court 2 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 3 v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).1 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim. The 5 Court has significant doubts as to whether Plaintiff can amend its Complaint, consistent with its 6 Rule 11 obligations, to allege facts sufficient to allege a valid UCL claim. However, because the 7 Court cannot conclude that amendment necessarily would be futile, it dismisses the complaint 8 with leave to amend this claim. Any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of the date 9 of this order and must not add any new claims or defendants. 10 II. MOTION TO STAY 11 Regarding Defendant’s motion to stay, both parties submit that the Court should apply the 12 standard set out in Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936), to the motion. However, 13 because Plaintiff’s complaint here seeks more than declaratory relief, it appears that the 14 appropriate standard comes from Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 15 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citation omitted). See Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1249 (8th Cir. 2013) 16 (“To permit a district court to rely solely on its inherent power to control its docket, when the 17 effect of the district court’s order is to accomplish the same result contemplated by Colorado 18 River, would allow a court to bypass the rigorous test set out by the Supreme Court [in Colorado 19 River].”); see also AIIRAM LLC v. KB Home, No. 19-CV-00269-LHK, 2019 WL 3779185, at *6 20 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding Landis inapplicable to a motion to stay based on a related state 21 action after concluding that Colorado River provided the controlling standard). 22 Because it appears likely that Colorado River controls, and because neither party addresses 23 that standard in the motion to stay, the Court DENIES that motion. This denial is without 24 prejudice to Defendant refiling a motion addressing the factors the Ninth Circuit has identified for 25 assessing the appropriateness of a Colorado River stay, R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 26 27 1 The Court agrees with Defendant that to the extent Plaintiff alleges fraudulent business practices, 1 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011), or explaining (based on controlling authority) why Colorado 2 || River does not apply in this circumstance. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: 3/24/2022

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12

= 17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

Pacific Structures, Inc v. Greenwich Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pacific-structures-inc-v-greenwich-insurance-company-cand-2022.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack