Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission

272 P.2d 818, 126 Cal. App. 2d 554, 1954 Cal. App. LEXIS 2055
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 15, 1954
DocketCiv. 16129
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 272 P.2d 818 (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 272 P.2d 818, 126 Cal. App. 2d 554, 1954 Cal. App. LEXIS 2055 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinion

KAUFMAN, J.

This is a petition for a writ of review in which petitioner Pacific Gas and Electric Company seeks to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission of 77 per cent permanent disability to its employee, Edwin C. Burton, for an injury sustained in the course of his employment.

On July 6, 1942, Burton was awarded partial permanent disability indemnity against the Associated Indemnity Corporation for permanent disability of 25% per cent arising out of an accident while in the employ of the National Tank and Manufacturing Company. He sustained some loss of motion in his left ankle and foot, and some damage to the lower leg, for which he was compensated for 102 weeks at $13.58 per week.

On January 6, 1951, Burton while employed by Pacific Gas and Electric as a hand pipe wrapper, was knocked down and run over by a backing truck, sustaining fractures of the pelvis, fracture dislocation of the right sacroiliac joint with displacement of the innominate bone and traumatic asphixia with capillary hemorrhages of the upper chest, neck, face and scalp.

On January 2, 1952, Burton filed application for adjustment of claim, and the Subsequent Injuries Fund was joined as a party defendant. At the hearing Burton testified on cross-examination by counsel for the Subsequent Injuries Fund that there was an improvement in his left ankle during the *556 10-year period following the ankle injury. The 1951 injury caused a one-inch shortening of the employee’s right leg, as well as other disabilities. The Permanent Disability Rating Specialist recommended a permanent disability rating of 77 per cent attributable solely to the injury of January 6, 1951. Only 5 per cent was added for the preexisting injury (which in 1942 had been rated at 25% per cent), making a combined permanent disability rating of 82 per cent.

Petitioner contends that the commission has no power to award a percentage of permanent disability in excess of 100 per cent to an individual employee, and argues that if the permanent disability rating of 25% per cent is added to 77 per cent the total is 102% per cent. Since the Labor Code refers to total disability as synonymous with 100 per cent, petitioner maintains that it is illogical to assume that an employee could be more than 100 per cent permanently disabled. Section 4658, Labor Code, provides that if the injury causes permanent disability “the percentage of disability to total disability shall be determined and the disability payment computed” according to the schedule set forth in the section.

Section 4750, Labor Code, provides as follows: “An employee who is suffering from a previous permanent disability or physical impairment and sustains permanent injury thereafter shall not receive compensation for the later injury in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with or in relation to the previous disability or impairment.

“The employer shall not be liable for compensation to such an employee for the combined disability, but only for that, portion due to the later injury as though no prior disability or impairment had existed.” (Emphasis ours.)

From a study of section 4750 we must conclude that in cases such as the present, the commission must consider the later injury apart from the prior disability, and it must not be considered in relation to the prior injury or impairment in determining the rating. (See Wolski v. Industrial Acc. Com. 70 Cal.App.2d 427, 429-431 [161 P.2d 283].) It is clear from the reports and findings of the referee that the 77 per cent permanent disability was attributable solely to the 1951 injury without reference to the injury of 1940. When the preexisting disability was added to the later injury of 77 per cent, the combined injuries produce a rating of 82 per cent. The additional 5 per cent could not, of course, b§ *557 assessed against the present employer, under section 4750, Labor Code, but under provisions of section 4751, he was entitled to receive the 5 per cent from the Subsequent Injuries Fund provided by the state. *

Petitioner cited State Compensation Insurance Fund. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 43 Cal.App.2d 233 [110 P.2d 510], a case in which an employee sustained two separate injuries suffering total temporary disability from each of them. The periods of total temporary disability overlapped, and the commission held that the employee could not receive 200 per cent total temporary disability for the overlapping period, holding in effect that the employee could not be more than 100 per cent temporarily totally disabled at one time. The period of temporary total disability is that period when the employee is totally incapacitated for work. It is entirely logical to maintain that an employee can be only 100 per cent incapacitated for work at any given time. And under the commission’s rating schedule an employee cannot be more than 100 per cent permanently disabled, in any one accident. Nor can he be more than 100 per cent permanently disabled by a series of accidents as measured by the commission’s rating schedule when ratings are combined, even though if added they total over 100 per cent.

In the instant case the employee received a rating of 25% per cent permanent disability in 1942 entitling hfm to compensation for 102 weeks thereafter. When the 102 weeks had expired some time in 1944 the employee received no further compensation for the 1940 injury. It must be assumed that the employee was then fully compensated for the loss of earning power suffered in that accident. The theory of permanent disability rating, according to Campbell, is that the employee will be able to rehabilitate and readjust himself to his new earning capacity within an average period, and the ratings are computed so as to provide disability during *558 that estimated period. (1 Campbell, Workmen’s Compensation, § 820.) Petitioner’s interpretation of permanent disability, on the other hand, is that the injured workman can never be rehabilitated beyond the point when the permanent rating is made. It is contended that the employee herein must forever after in any proceedings be considered 25% per cent permanently disabled, and have therefore only a potential possibility of 74% per cent disability, even though conceivably he might sustain later injury conclusively presumed to be 100 per cent under section 4662, Labor Code. If the employee herein, during the 102 weeks in which he received compensation payments for the 25% per cent permanent disability rehabilitated himself by training to become a skilled telegrapher, and then sustained industrial injury resulting in the loss of both his hands, the conclusive presumption of 100 per cent permanent disability would have to be applied, and clearly the 25% per cent for the ankle injury could not be subtracted, even though the mathematical total of the two would be more than 100 per cent.

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Bluebook (online)
272 P.2d 818, 126 Cal. App. 2d 554, 1954 Cal. App. LEXIS 2055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pacific-gas-electric-co-v-industrial-accident-commission-calctapp-1954.