Pacific Fast Mail v. United States

338 F. Supp. 506, 68 Cust. Ct. 41, 68 Ct. Cust. 41, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2561
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1972
DocketC.D. 4333; Protest 68/40668-27321 and 66/56565-25933
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 338 F. Supp. 506 (Pacific Fast Mail v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pacific Fast Mail v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 506, 68 Cust. Ct. 41, 68 Ct. Cust. 41, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2561 (cusc 1972).

Opinion

MALETZ, Judge:

In this case, plaintiff challenges the assessment of duty on certain model railroad locomotive superstructures and various other components of model locomotives, such as boiler fronts, stacks, steam domes, sand domes and pilot decks. The articles — which were imported from Japan and entered at Seattle, Washington, in 1965 and 1968 — were assessed by the government at the rate of 35 percent for the 1965 entries and 31 percent for the 1968 entries under item 737.90 of the tariff schedules (19 U.S.C. § 1202) which covers “[t]oys, and parts of toys, not specially provided for * * * [ojther.”

Insisting that this assessment is erroneous and seeking refund, plaintiff claims that the imported model articles are not toys and are properly assessable under item 657.35 as articles of brass, not specially provided for, and thus duti *508 able at the rate of 1.275 cents per pound plus 15 percent for the 1965 entries and 1 cent per pound plus 13.5 percent for the 1968 entries.

Defendant, in turn, while adhering to its contention that the importations consist of toys, contends that they are also models. Noting that the superior heading to the model provisions (items 737.-05 through 737.15) provides for “[m]odel trains * * * and other model articles, all the foregoing whether or not toys * * *” [emphasis added], defendant claims primarily that the record demonstrates that all the importations properly fall within the provisions for models and should have been classified therein even though they consist of toys since the provisions for models take precedence over the toy provisions. Alternatively, defendant argues that in the event the court determines that the model provisions do not apply to the importations, the articles are toys and were thus properly classified under item 737.-90 as other toys and parts of toys.

Set forth below are the relevant statutory provisions:

Government’s classification
Schedule 1, Part 5, Subpart E:
Subpart E headnotes:
1. The articles described in the provisions of this subpart (except parts) shall be classified in such provisions, whether or not such articles are more specifically provided for elsewhere in the tariff schedules, * * *
* if >Jí >¡C !,’! *
2. For the purposes of the tariff schedules, a "toy" is any article chiefly used for the amusement of children or adults.
* * * * *
Toys, and parts, of toys, not specially provided for:
* * * * *
737.90 Other .................. 35% ad val.
31% ad val. 1
Government’s claimed classification
Model trains, model airplanes, model boats, and other model articles, all the foregoing whether or not toys; and construction kits or sets for making or assembling such model articles:
$ sit s¡c * # sit
Other models, and construction kits or sets:
737.07 Rail locomotives * * * all the foregoing made to scale of the actual article at the ratio of 1 to 85 or smaller .. 16% ad val. 14% ad val. 2
S|t i¡í if 5’f S|t if
737.15 Other ............... 35% ad val. 31% ad val. 3
Plaintiff’s claimed classification
Schedule 6, Part 3, Subpart G:
Subpart G headnotes:
1. This subpart covers only articles of metal which are not more specifically provided for elsewhere in the tariff schedules.
Articles of copper, not coated or plated with precious metal:
657.30 Of copper, other than alloys of copper; of nickel silver or of cupro nickel...... * * *
657.35 Other.................. 1.2750 per lb. +15% ad val. 10 per lb. + 13.5% ad val. 4

Locomotive superstructures

At the outset, it is to be noted that the defendant has raised its alternative claim for classification of the importations as models for the first time at the briefing stage. However, plaintiff has not been prejudiced thereby inasmuch as the factual criteria for classification under this claim is not in dispute. See e. g., Border Brokerage Co., Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust.Ct. 446, 448, C.D. 4017 (1970). Thus the parties agree that the evidence establishes not only that the importations are components of models but also that they are made to the actual scale of existing trains at a ratio of 1 to 85 or smaller.

It is in this setting that we turn now to the locomotive superstructure models to determine whether, as claimed by defendant, they are “unfinished” model rail locomotives — in which event they would come within the pur *509 view of item 737.07 by virtue of General Interpretative Rule 10 (h) which provides that “unless the context requires otherwise, a tariff description for an article covers such article * * * whether finished or not finished.” Samples in evidence of these superstructures show that they consist of completely finished locomotives save for wheel and boiler front assemblies and hence are so far advanced toward their final form and shape that it is manifest that they are dedicated to use only as model locomotives. And when an article “has been so far processed towards its ultimate completed form as to be dedicated to the making of that article or that class of articles alone,” it is classifiable under the eo nomine provision for the article. American Import Co. v. United States, 26 CC PA 72, 74, T.D. 49612 (1938). Indeed, the imported superstructure has reached the point where “in name' and character” it has become a model rail locomotive. See Snow’s United States Sample Express Co. v. United States, 8 Ct.Cust. App. 17, 21, T.D. 37161 (1917); Redden & Martin v. United States, 5 Ct.Cust. App. 485, 487, T.D. 35147 (1915); F. W. Myers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 425 F.2d 781, 57 CCPA 87, 90, C.A.D. 982 (1970). Cf. Pacific Fast Mail, Inc. et al. v. United States, 63 Cust.Ct. 468, 473, C.D. 3938 (1969). We therefore conclude that the imported superstructures are properly classifiable under item 737.07 as unfinished rail locomotive models dutiable at the rate of 16 percent or 14 percent, depending on the date of entry.

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Bluebook (online)
338 F. Supp. 506, 68 Cust. Ct. 41, 68 Ct. Cust. 41, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pacific-fast-mail-v-united-states-cusc-1972.