Pacheco v. United States

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided January 6, 2021·No. 2:15-cv-01175·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON YESENIA PACHECO, et al., Case No. C15-1175RSL Plaintiffs, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO v. ENTER JUDGMENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. Following a bifurcated bench trial, the Court determined that defendant is liable to plaintiffs in the amount of $10,042,294.81. Defendant requested that the Court impose a medical reversionary trust over the $7.5 million portion of the award that represents SLP’s future special damages, citing RCW 4.56.260. The Court therefore requested, and the parties have submitted, proposals for periodic payment as required by the statute and Dutra v. U.S., 478 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (“After the United States requested that the district court apply § 4.56.260, the district court was required to solicit payment plan proposals from each party . . . .”). The Court has now reviewed the parties’ proposals. As an initial matter, neither party has proposed a periodic payment plan that complies with RCW 4.56.260. The proposals do not provide for periodic payments of any type, either of the whole or part of the future economic damage award, instead specifying lump sum payments to be made immediately upon entry of judgment. Contra RCW 4.56.260(1). In addition, neither proposal provides an opportunity for modification of the judgment to apportion and award unpaid future damages, if any, upon SLP’s death. Contra RCW 4.56.260(5). In Dutra, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested that neither defect is disqualifying. The panel was fully aware that the United States is prohibited from making periodic payments under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and that the government was seeking the imposition of a trust instrument that would automatically return unused funds to the United States upon the judgment creditor’s death. The court nevertheless held that “[a] reversionary trust is one possible mechanism to effectuate the periodic payment of future medical expenses; it is not an alternative remedy, nor is it inconsistent with § 4.56.260.” 478 F.3d at 1092. Where the state statute and the FTCA are not entirely compatible, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal act “authorizes courts to craft remedies that approximate the results contemplated by state statutes . . . .” Id. The result contemplated by the state statute is a payment plan “which in the discretion of the court and the interests of justice best provides for the future needs of” SLP. RCW 4.56.260(2). The United States, while barely mentioning SLP’s best interests,1 asserts that the “purpose of Washington’s periodic payment statute is to prevent payment for future medical expenses that are never incurred” and that RCW 4.56.260(1) provides that the payments “cease once the plaintiff dies or no longer requires future medical care.” Dkt. # 212 at 3. Subsection (1) contains no such sunset provision, and defendant’s assertion regarding the legislature’s intent or purpose is unsupported by any citation to legislative history, case law, or the text of the statute. Considering the statute as a whole (including the preamble to 1986 c 305, of which RCW 4.56.260 is a part), it is at least as likely that the legislature was concerned about bankrupting an uninsured defendant if the 1 Defendant’s suggestion that a reversionary trust instrument is necessary to protect SLP from parental malfeasance is contradicted by the evidence presented at trial and wholly unsupported by the existing record. entire judgment amount came due immediately and therefore chose to provide a mechanism through which a payment plan could be established to level out the hardship imposed by a significant judgment. If the legislature had been concerned about the unfairness of a tortfeasor having to pay for future economic damages that were never incurred, as urged by defendant, it would have included a sunset provision or created an automatic reversionary interest in unpaid amounts. It did not do so, however, instead postponing any decision regarding what to do with unpaid funds until the need arises (and affirmatively prohibiting reversion in certain circumstances): Upon the death of the judgment creditor, the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future damages. Money damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor. RCW 4.56.260(5). The Court finds that plaintiffs’ proposal for lump sum payments which resolve counsels’ claim for attorney’s fees and costs, establish a Special Needs Trust, and fund the purchase of an annuity to make periodic payments into the Special Needs Trust best provides for the future needs of SLP. The $7.5 million that represents the present value of SLP’s future special damages shall be paid as follows: $2 million to Maxwell Graham in full payment of all attorney’s fees and costs associated with the $7.5 million award; $3 million to a Special Needs Trust established for SLP with Christi Fried as the Trustee; and $2.5 million to BHG Structured Settlements, Inc., as assignee, to be used to procure an annuity contract issued by Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska to fund the Trust at $6,425 per month for 40 years certain and life thereafter. The periodic payments to the Trust will begin on April 1, 2021, and end after 40 years or the death of SLP, whichever comes second. The obligation to make the periodic payments established by this judgment will be assigned to BHG Settlements, Inc. The procurement of the annuity used to meet the obligation to make periodic payments will be facilitated through the Ringler office in Bellevue, Washington. The monthly payment set forth above is based on current rates with the annuity issuer, Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska. The actual monthly payment amount will be determined at the time the annuity is funded using the present value cost of $2,500,000. For purposes of the annuity and assignment, the parties agree that SLP was born with epilepsy and bilateral perisylvian polymicrogyria, which contributes to her cognitive delays. Upon SLP’s death, 100% of the remaining certain payment (i.e., those to be paid in the first 40 years of the annuity), if any, will be canceled and commuted to a lump sum payment that is reduced and discounted to present value as calculated by the annuity issuer according to the formula described in the footnote.2 Contingent payments (i.e., 2 The annuity issuer will establish the annual discount rate to be applied to the payments that are subject to commutation as either the annual rate determined below or a two percent (2%) annual rate, whichever annual discount rate is higher: The annual Internal Rate of Return at which the annuity contract will be issued, as stated on the annuity contract; plus 1.25% (125 basis points); plus The reported effective annual yield of the U.S. Treasury 30-year Bond available on the date of SLP’s death; minus The reported effective annual yield of the U.S. Treasury 30-year Bond available on the contract date, as

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Pacheco v. United States, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

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Related

§ 26
Washington § 26
§ 4.56.260
Washington § 4.56.260