25CA1198 Pacheco v Kamin 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1198 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24CV32685 Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge
Steve Pacheco, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Both Kamin, Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD* Welling and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
Belzer Law, Kyle R. Hosmer, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Hall & Evans, LLC, Brian Molzahn, Mark S. Ratner, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Plaintiff, Steve Pacheco, whom we will call “husband,” appeals the trial court’s decision to dismiss his complaint against defendant, William Both Kamin, whom we will call “the appraiser.” (We note the court also dismissed husband’s complaint against the company for which the appraiser worked, Appraisal Consultants. Husband does not appeal that decision.)
¶2 Husband asserts the trial court erred when it concluded the appraiser is absolutely immune under the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine for the actions he took that form the basis for husband’s complaint. We disagree, so we therefore affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶3 Husband and his wife married in 2016. During the marriage, husband and wife lived in the marital home, which husband had purchased before the marriage. In October 2021, the couple filed a petition to dissolve their marriage.
¶4 During the dissolution proceedings, the couple agreed husband would retain the marital home and wife would be compensated for her share of the home’s marital equity. But because they disagreed about the marital home’s value, wife asked the domestic relations court to appoint an appraiser. The court
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found such an appointment was “appropriate and necessary,” and it encouraged the couple to “agree upon an appraiser.” If they could not come to an agreement, the court would allow each of them to “nominate up to two individuals,” and it instructed them to include their nominees’ curricula vitae, along with other information, with the nominations. It ordered husband to pay for the appraisal “due to his significantly greater financial resources.”
¶5 Wife nominated the appraiser, and the domestic relations court appointed him because his nomination was the only one accompanied by a curriculum vitae.
¶6 Husband and wife entered into an agreement with the appraiser. The agreement required the appraiser to determine and report (1) the marital home’s market value on the date the couple married; and (2) its then-current market value, meaning its market value at the time of the dissolution proceedings. The appraiser charged $1,400 to prepare his report. The appraiser decided the marital home’s value on the date of the couple’s marriage was $640,000 and its then-current value was $1,035,000.
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¶7 The domestic relations court held a hearing to, among other things, value the marital home. Husband testified that the home was only worth $825,000.
¶8 The domestic relations court accepted the appraiser’s then- current-value figure because the appraiser had “substantial expertise in the property appraisal field,” and the court found husband’s estimate was “less credible” because he lacked “expertise” and because he had a “strategic interest in deflating the current value of the home.” The court also noted husband “could have, but did not, seek a rebuttal expert to conduct [an] additional appraisal.”
¶9 On appeal, husband submits he had to pay wife about $200,000 more to buy wife’s share of the marital home’s equity because the domestic relations court accepted the appraiser’s valuation and not husband’s. He adds the appraiser made several mistakes when appraising the marital home.
¶ 10 In August 2022, husband filed a complaint against the appraiser with the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies. After investigating husband’s complaint, the department decided
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“[a]vailable evidence appears sufficient to indicate that a violation or violations of Colorado appraisal license law may have occurred.”
¶ 11 About two months later, the appraiser stipulated to a diversion agreement with the Board of Real Estate Appraisers. In it, he admitted to violating several appraisal laws when he appraised the marital home.
¶ 12 Husband filed this lawsuit against the appraiser almost two years later. He asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The appraiser filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He contended he was “entitled to absolute litigation immunity, because he was appointed by the [domestic relations court] as an expert, to offer an opinion of value.”
¶ 13 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It stated, “Professionals involved in the court process have absolute immunity for functions that are” essential and integral parts of the judicial process. When deciding whether a professional is entitled to such immunity, “[t]he focus is on the function performed by the
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professional, and the relationship of this function to the judicial process.”
¶ 14 The trial court observed that the appraiser’s involvement in the marriage dissolution case arose out of the domestic relations court’s “need for information”; the domestic relations court appointed the appraiser; and the domestic relations court “relied on [the appraiser’s] appraisal report and testimony.” The trial court therefore decided the appraiser’s appraisal and testimony were “essential to the judicial process,” and the appraiser was, therefore, entitled to immunity from husband’s claims.
II. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
¶ 15 Husband asserts the appraiser is not, or should not be, immune from civil liability for the appraisal. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 16 We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. In doing so, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to determine whether the complaint states a plausible
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claim for relief. Id.; Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 10. We will affirm a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) dismissal “when the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not, as a matter of law, support the claim for relief.” Norton, ¶ 7. Whether a party is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law that we review de novo. Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 COA 71,
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¶ 17 Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for their judicial acts, “even if such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction.” Merrick v. Burns, Wall, Smith & Mueller, P.C., 43 P.3d 712, 714 (Colo. App. 2001). “This absolute immunity applies to actions in a legal proceeding no matter how erroneous, how injurious the consequences, or how malicious the motive.” Id. The purpose of judicial immunity is to ensure judicial officers are “free to act upon their own convictions without apprehension of personal consequences.” Id.
¶ 18 Other persons may receive quasi-judicial immunity “when conducting activities judicial in nature.” Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Colo. App. 1993). The source of such immunity is “rooted in the principle of absolute immunity for judges.” Merrick, 43 P.3d at 714. Quasi-judicial immunity, however, extends “only to
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those functions intimately related and essential to the judicial decision-making process.” Awai, 872 P.2d at 1335.
¶ 19 For example, a court-appointed psychologist’s evaluation of a party for the court’s benefit would be subject to quasi-judicial immunity, but the same psychologist’s court-mandated treatment of the party would not. See id. at 1336. In the first instance, the “appointee acts as an officer of the court.” Dalton v. Miller, 984 P.2d 666, 668 (Colo. App. 1999). In the latter, the appointee is acting in “the best interests of the patient.” Awai, 872 P.2d at 1336.
¶ 20 For another example, quasi-judicial “immunity extends to activities related to a probation officer’s pre-sentence report, but not to activities related to supervision of probationers.” Id. at 1335.
B. Analysis
¶ 21 We conclude, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the appraiser is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his appraisal of the marital home and his testimony about the appraisal. He was “appointed by” the domestic relations court to perform the appraisal, which he “report[ed] directly to [that] court.” Dalton, 984 P.2d at 668. He was not an “independent examiner” for husband or wife. Id. He only became involved in the case because husband
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and wife could not agree on the marital home’s value, leading the domestic relations court to require an appraisal by a neutral third party. See Awai, 872 P.2d at 1336 (“Court-appointed therapists have been afforded immunity for their evaluations and recommendations.”). The appraiser’s function, therefore, was to “aid[] the [domestic relations] court to separate truth from falsity,” which is “intimately related and essential to the judicial decision- making process.” Id.
¶ 22 Husband asserts the appraiser is not immune because the appraiser owed him independent duties arising out of the engagement agreement. But husband did not preserve this contention because he did not raise it in the trial court.
¶ 23 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present “the sum and substance” of the issue to the district court, Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO, LLC, 2025 COA 8M, ¶ 31 (citation omitted), providing the district court with “an adequate opportunity” to address the argument before we will consider it on appeal, Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (citation omitted).
¶ 24 As we indicated above, the appraiser filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss this case. In his response, husband did not
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assert there was a contractual relationship based on the engagement agreement. As a result, we will not address husband’s contention the appraiser owed him independent duties arising out of the engagement agreement. See Forgette, ¶ 21; Good Life Colo., LLC, ¶ 31; see also People v. Syrie, 101 P.3d 219, 223 (Colo. 2004)(holding the prosecution did not preserve its theory for admissibility of evidence for appellate review when it presented a different theory to the court presiding over the case).
¶ 25 What husband asserted was, rather, (1) the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine does not apply to a person who has admitted wrongdoing; and, (2) even if it does apply, the trial court should have created an exception for such circumstances.
¶ 26 Turning to the first of these contentions — the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine does not apply to a person who has admitted wrongdoing — husband submits that public policy weighs against granting the appraiser immunity because the appraiser admitted, in the diversion agreement with the Board of Real Estate Appraisers, he had violated several appraisal laws when he appraised the marital home. We are not persuaded.
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¶ 27 As we noted above, the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine exists so court appointees are “free to act upon their own convictions without apprehension of personal consequences.” Merrick, 43 P.3d at 714 (emphasis added). Granting something less than immunity to court appointees could make them “reluctant to accept appointments or, if accepted, could inhibit full disclosure of pertinent information and taint recommendations.” Awai, 872 P.2d at 1336. So, even though the appraiser later admitted he had violated appraisal statutes when appraising the marital home, public policy supports, rather than undermines, according him quasi-judicial immunity in this case.
¶ 28 This does not mean husband did not have the ability to challenge the appraiser’s appraisal at the time of the domestic relations hearing beyond providing his own testimony. He had the safeguards of the adversary system available to him. See Awai, 872 P.2d at 1335 (“safeguards” include “the presence of an impartial judge . . . and the adversarial nature of the judicial process, with its opportunities for objection, cross-examination, rebuttal, and presentation of the other side’s case-in-chief”). When asked by the domestic relations court, he could have nominated an expert with
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the requested credentials. And he could have offered his own expert to testify at the hearing about the value of the marital home.
¶ 29 And it does not mean the appraiser faced no sanctions for the mistakes he made in the appraisal. As we noted above, he stipulated to a diversion agreement with the Board of Real Estate Appraisers. See Forman v. S.C. Dep’t of Lab., 796 S.E.2d 138, 142- 43 (S.C. Ct. App. 2016)(listing cases holding that quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to professional disciplinary proceedings).
¶ 30 Last, husband urges us to create a “limited exception” to the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine for the situation presented in this case, and he cites several cases from other jurisdictions in support of his request. See, e.g., LLMD of Mich., Inc. v. Jackson-Cross Co., 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999); Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1992); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984); James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982). None of these cases supports creating such an exception in Colorado.
¶ 31 LLMD, Murphy, and James concern the witness immunity doctrine, not the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine. LLMD, 740 A.2d at 188; Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 674; James, 637 S.W.2d at 916-17. These two doctrines pivot on different standards.
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¶ 32 Under the witness immunity doctrine, “participants in judicial proceedings have an absolute privilege for communications related to the proceedings.” LLMD, 740 A.2d at 188. As we explained above, however, quasi-judicial immunity applies to an individual who performs a function intertwined with the judicial process. Awai, 872 P.2d at 1336. These doctrines may sometimes overlap, but they are not the same.
¶ 33 Plus, the holdings of LLMD and Murphy focused on expert witnesses retained by one of the parties, concluding they were not immune under the witness immunity doctrine from liability for malpractice as an expert witness. LLMD, 740 A.2d at 191; Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 682. Those holdings do not apply to this case in which the appraiser was appointed by the domestic relations court. Murphy itself recognizes a difference between a witness retained by a party in exchange for remuneration, who owes duties to that party, and “an independent fact or opinion witness with information to be presented to the court in an objective manner.” 841 S.W.2d at 680-82.
¶ 34 And, even if the issue in this case were witness immunity, as opposed to quasi-judicial immunity, the Third Circuit distinguished
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LLMD in a manner supporting a conclusion that the appraiser in this case is entitled to immunity. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 128-30 (3d Cir. 2001). Distinguishing between privately retained experts and court-appointed ones, the Hughes court reasoned that, “[b]ecause they work on behalf of the court rather than any one party, court-appointed experts provide unbiased, neutral information and recommendations and aid the court in its decision- making process.” Id. at 130. Without witness immunity, the Hughes court continued, such experts “may be reluctant to assist the court, thereby depriving the court of its sole source of neutral information.” Id.
¶ 35 Levine involves the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine, but it shapes the doctrine differently than how it is structured in Colorado. Under Levine, quasi-judicial immunity is available in New Jersey for “arbitrators,” those “in whose hands ‘the dispute resolution process is entrusted,’” 478 A.2d at 400 (citation omitted), but such immunity is not available for “appraisers,” who are individuals “engaged because of special knowledge, technical skill, or expertise,” id. Applying this permutation of the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court held court-
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appointed accountants were not entitled to immunity because they “did not remotely resemble arbitrators when they performed their assigned function.” Id. at 402.
¶ 36 The trial court in this case recognized Colorado’s standard is different. It recognized cases such as Levine focus on the standard of care the professional violates, and they hold a party should have a remedy against a professional who violates the standard of care.
¶ 37 We conclude Colorado’s law supports the trial court’s analysis. Colorado’s standard of quasi-judicial immunity is rooted in absolute judicial immunity. See Merrick, 43 P.3d at 714. And absolute judicial immunity “applies to actions in a legal proceeding no matter how erroneous, how injurious the consequences, or how malicious the motive.” Id.; see also Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009)(“[C]ourt-appointed experts . . . are absolutely immune from liability for damages when they act at the court’s direction. They are arms of the court . . . and deserve protection from harassment by disappointed litigants, just as judges do.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 38 We further conclude the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the appraiser was entitled to quasi-judicial
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immunity for his appraisal of the marital home and for his testimony concerning the appraisal. As a result, the trial court did not err when it granted the appraiser’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.
III. Attorney Fees
¶ 39 Relying on section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2025, and Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare System, 262 P.3d 991, 1000 (Colo. App. 2011), the appraiser asks for his appellate attorney fees if we affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss husband’s claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
¶ 40 C.A.R. 39.1 authorizes parties to request appellate attorney fees, but it mandates they “explain the legal and factual basis” for such an award. The Rule goes on to state, “Mere citation to this rule or to a statute, without more, does not satisfy the legal basis requirement.”
¶ 41 While the appraiser pointed out in his attorney fee request section 13-17-201 generally authorizes an award of attorney fees when we affirm a court’s decision to dismiss a case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), he says no more than that. The citation to Crow adds
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nothing; it simply refers to section 13-17-201 as a basis for an award of attorney fees.
¶ 42 In his reply brief, husband submits the appraiser did not comply with C.A.R. 39.1 because (1) the appraiser “simply cites to one statute and one case without any explanation of the legal or factual basis for his request”; and (2) section 13-17-201(1) applies to tort claims, husband raised a contract claim, and the trial court did not determine the “essence of this action was tortious rather than contractual.”
¶ 43 We agree with the two points husband makes, so we deny the appraiser’s request for appellate attorney fees.
¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LUM concur.