Pabst v. Lewiston Daily Sun

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedApril 14, 2010
DocketANDcv-08-1146
StatusUnpublished

This text of Pabst v. Lewiston Daily Sun (Pabst v. Lewiston Daily Sun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pabst v. Lewiston Daily Sun, (Me. Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN CIVIL ACTION D~CJ

Plaintiff, ORDER v. RECEIVED & FILED LEWISTON DAILY SUN,

Defendant ANDROSCOGGIN SUPERIOR COURT

Plaintiff William Pabst, Jr., has brought this action against the defendant

Lewiston Daily Sun to recover for an alleged breach of contract.

BACKGROUND Mr. Pabst was an independent contractor who distributed newspapers for

the Lewiston Daily Sun (the Daily Sun). The parties' relationship was governed

by two contracts, executed on April 29, 2004 and March 1, 2006 respectively. Both

contracts contained language identifying them "as the final, complete and

exclusive statement of the parties' agreement and contract," intended to replace

all prior agreements, which could only be modified by a mutually-signed

writing.

Under the contracts, Mr. Pabst leased a list of the Daily Sun's subscribers

located along a certain distribution route. Each day he would purchase

newspapers wholesale from the Daily Sun, then resell them to the public in the

designated area. While Mr. Pabst could collect payments direct! y, subscribers

often mailed their payments to the Daily Sun. The contracts authorized the Daily

Sun to accept these payments on Mr. Pabst's behalf as his agent. No other

1 mention of compensation appears in either contract. However, the parties in fact

had a well-defined system of accounting between themselves whereby each

week the Daily Sun would give Mr. Pabst a check for the net portion of his

subscribers' payments minus the wholesale cost of the papers. Other debits and

credits were also applied, all of which were reflected in a weekly invoice.

At the time the first contract was signed, the Daily Sun's representative

informed Mr. Pabst that a $60 per-week flat-rate adjustment would be deducted

from his weekly disbursements due to the high-profitability of his routes. This

money would be shared with other distributors serving less profitable routes.

The Daily Sun claims that Mr. Pabst was already familiar with this subsidy

because he had formerly been employed by the company as a motor route

manager. In that position Mr. Pabst had been responsible for analyzing the

profitability of various routes and adjusting the allocation subsidies between

them.

While Mr. Pabst apparently expressed his disagreement with the subsidy

system, he performed under the initial contract from April 29, 2004 to February

28, 2006. Each week Mr. Pabst would receive a check and an invoice from the

Daily Sun reflecting the net of subscriber fees from his routes plus gratuities,

minus the wholesale cost of his newspapers and the $60 per-week redistribution

deduction. Other unspecified debits and credits were applied as well. On March

1, 2006 Mr. Pabst and the Daily Sun executed a second contract that was identical

to the first in all aspects material to this litigation. Mr. Pabst continued to

perform until September 30, 2007. On October 24, 2008, Mr. Pabst filed this

complaint alleging that the Daily Sun's withholding of the subsidies constituted

an intentional breach of the parties' agreement.

2 Mr. Pabst argues that the contracts unambiguously prohibited the flat-rate

adjustment, and that the parol evidence rule operates to bar any extrinsic

evidence to the contrary. He also contends that the trial testimony offered by the

Daily Sun is unreliable, that the doctrine of contra proferentem favors his cause,

and that this case is sufficiently analogous to an unpaid-wages dispute to merit

the application of 26 M.R.S.A. § 626's allowance of attorney's fees. The Daily Sun

contends that the parol evidence rule is not applicable because the written

contracts are ambiguous and/ or partially integrated, and that the extrinsic

evidence shows the weekly deductions to have been part of the whole

agreement. The Daily Sun also argues that the affirmative defenses of accord and

satisfaction, release, or payment bar Mr. Pabst's claim, and that it is not liable for

attorney's fees in any event.

DISCUSSION

This dispute is fundamentally one of contract interpretation. The Daily

Sun argues that the redistribution scheme did not violate the parties' contracts.

Mr. Pabst, the plaintiff, contends that it did, though he has failed to point out

what specific portion of the contract he believes was breached.

When interpreting a written contract, courts seek to "effectuate 'the

parties' intentions as reflected in the written instrument, construed with regard

for the subject matter, motive, and purpose of the agreement, as well as the object

to be accomplished.'" Rogers v. JacksoH, 2002 ME 140, <]I 16, 804 A.2d 379,382-83

(Saufley, c.J., dissenting) (quoting V.I.P., Inc. v. First Tree Dev., LLC, 2001 ME 73,

<]I 3, 770 A.2d 95, 96) (internal quotations omitted). The court may consider

extrinsic evidence only in limited circumstances. Id. <]I 16, 804 A.2d at 383. If the

writing is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence "to ascertain the

3 intent of the parties." Id. 9117,804 A.2d at 383. Similarly, "[i]f the parties allege

that the unambiguous written instrument reflects only part of their agreement,"

the court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine "the extent to which the

written document represents an integration of their agreement." Id. 9I 18, 804

A.2d at 383 (citing Handy Bont Serv., Inc. v. Profl Servs., Inc., 1998 ME 134, 9I 11,

711 A.2d 1306, 1309).

Mr. Pabst rests on the contracts and claims they are fully integrated and

unambiguously establish his right to the contested funds. The Daily Sun

contends that the contracts' abbreviated discussion of compensation is facially

ambiguous or demonstrates a lack of integration. Contract language "is

ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation." Id.

9I 17, 804 A.2d at 383 (citing Villas by tlIe Sea Owners Ass'n v. Garrity, 2000 ME 48, 9I 9, 748 A.2d 457, 461). Whether a term is ambiguous is a question of law. Villas by tlIe Sea Owners Ass'n, 2000 ME 48, 9I 9, 748 A.2d at 461.

Here, the term the Daily Sun complains of is almost certainly not

ambiguous. The contracts state:

[Mr. Pabst] shall be responsible for any money that [Mr. Pabst] collects in advance from subscribers. [Mr. Pabst] agrees that the [Daily Sun] may act as [Mr. Pabst's] agent in accepting advance payments from subscription payments received for copies that [Mr. Pabst] has delivered.

This language clearly allocates responsibility for the collection of subscribers'

advance payments to Mr. Pabst, and creates an agency relationship between the

Daily Sun and Mr. Pabst with respect to payments sent directly to the company.

The provision's failure to address other payment contingencies does not render it

ambiguous. However, its failure to address essential details of the parties'

financial relationship does show that the contracts were not fully integrated.

4 Whether an agreement is fully integrated or not is a question of law. Gagne

v. Stevens, 1997 ME 88, err 8, 696 A.2d 411,414. "Where the language of the

agreement is unambiguous with respect to the existence and scope of integration,

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Related

Gagne v. Stevens
1997 ME 88 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Rogers v. Jackson
2002 ME 140 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2002)
Handy Boat Service, Inc. v. Professional Services, Inc.
1998 ME 134 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Waxler v. Waxler
458 A.2d 1219 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1983)
BROWN DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. Hemond
2008 ME 146 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2008)
Villas by the Sea Owners Ass'n v. Garrity
2000 ME 48 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
V.I.P., Inc. v. First Tree Development Ltd. Liability Co.
2001 ME 73 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)

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Pabst v. Lewiston Daily Sun, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pabst-v-lewiston-daily-sun-mesuperct-2010.