PA Record Outlet, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In Re PA Record Outlet, Inc.)

92 B.R. 139, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 300, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1688, 1988 WL 109683
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 20, 1988
Docket19-70114
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 92 B.R. 139 (PA Record Outlet, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In Re PA Record Outlet, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
PA Record Outlet, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In Re PA Record Outlet, Inc.), 92 B.R. 139, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 300, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1688, 1988 WL 109683 (Pa. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERNARD MARKOVITZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is Debtor’s Complaint for Recovery of Preferential Transfer against Defendant, Mellon Bank, N.A. (“Mellon”). The parties have stipulated to the essential facts, and have reduced the remaining issues to the following:

(1) Is the use of a UCC-3 Official Amendment Form sufficient to reflect a name change by a debtor, pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 9402(g), thereby obfuscating any “seriously misleading” error, and maintaining a perfected security interest?
(2) If yes, does the identification of collateral in said UCC-3, by referral to the original financing statement, meet the requirements of perfection?

A hearing was held at which time testimony was taken, and the parties have submitted post-trial briefs. Based upon same, and this Court’s further research, we find that the filing of the UCC-3 amendment form was a proper way to continue Mellon’s perfection, and that the collateral was sufficiently identified. Therefore Mellon did not receive a preference pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547.

FACTS

PA Record Outlet, Inc. (“Debtor”) filed a Chapter ll bankruptcy petition on January 24, 1986. This debtor was previously known as Sounds Distributing Service, Inc. (“Sounds”), and changed its corporate name to Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc. on or about December 22, 1983. 1

*140 On September 22, 1978 Mellon provided Sounds with a $75,000.00 line of credit in return for which Mellon received a security-interest in inter alia, Sound’s inventory. UCC-1 financing statements were executed by Sounds and were filed with the appropriate state and local authorities. Continuation statements were similarly filed on August 16, 1983.

On February 9, 1984, after Sounds changed its name to Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc., a new Note and Security Agreement were executed with Mellon, in the sum of $300,000.00. New UCC-1 financing statements were not executed; rather, Mellon filed UCC-3 Amendment forms with the appropriate state and local authorities. The form lists the Debtor as Sounds Distributing Service, Inc., 3701 Bigelow Blvd., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213. The amendment states:

The Debtor has changed its name to:
The Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc.
The Debtor’s new address is:
Great Southern Shopping Center,
Route 50, Bridgeville, PA 15017

The amendments also indicate that they are filed in relation to the original financing statements: 93109932 (state)/17757-1978 (local). When the amendment was received for filing, the state authority indexed it under Sounds Distributing Service, Inc. and Pennsylvania Record Outlet, Inc. The local authority indexed the amendment under Sounds Distributing Service, Inc. only, even though their procedure, if followed correctly, would also require it be indexed under PA Record Outlet, Inc.

During the ninety (90) days prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing Mellon received $116,500.00 from the Debtor, toward the repayment of the Note. Debtor-in-Possession now alleges these payments to be a preference, averring Mellon was not properly perfected.

ANALYSIS

The Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Pennsylvania, 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 1101 et seq., states that the legislation is to be “liberally construed.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a). Additionally, although the Comments to the Code are not part of the legislative enactment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has given them significant weight, as showing the drafters’ intent. See Philadelphia Title Insurance Company v. Fidelity —Philadelphia Trust Company, 419 Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (1965). See also, In re Bristol Associates, Inc., 505 F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir.1973); In re Engle, 73 B.R. 870 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Taylor, 45 B.R. 643 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1985).

Article 9 of the Code encompasses that area of commercial law generally known as “Secured Transactions.”

Pursuant to § 9402(a) and § 9402(g) of the Code:

(a) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral ... (g) ... Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time, (emphasis added).

During the four month period after Sounds changed its name, Mellon filed the aforementioned amendments indicating said change. Mellon used Official UCC-3 Amendment Forms. Debtor has challenged the sufficiency of these amendments as to both notice and content.

UCC financing statements are used to facilitate a “notice” filing system. This Court has determined that the appropriate method for indexing of the instant amendment would have been a dual classification under both the Debtor’s former name and the Debtor’s present name. In fact, such a dual indexing did occur at the state level. *141 The testimony of the local filing officer’s deputy advised the Court that our preference for dual indexing is the appropriate procedure in the local filing office as well. There is no explanation for the failure to properly index in this case, except as an error on the part of the filing officer. The parties have agreed that a misindexing by the filing officer does not operate as an invalidation of the secured party’s perfection. Matter of Bufkin Bros., Inc., 757 F.2d 1573 (5th Cir.1985); Matter of Glasco, Inc., 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1981); Matter of Royal Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.1973). In the case at bar we presume, therefore, that a reasonable searcher would find these amendments, and that they provide the notice required under the Code.

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92 B.R. 139, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 300, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1688, 1988 WL 109683, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pa-record-outlet-inc-v-mellon-bank-na-in-re-pa-record-outlet-inc-pawb-1988.