P. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided August 10, 2022·No. 19-65·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-0065V UNPUBLISHED

K.P., Chief Special Master Corcoran

Petitioner, v. Originally Filed: May 25, 2022 Refiled in Redacted Form: August 9, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 2022 HUMAN SERVICES, Special Processing Unit (SPU); Respondent. Ruling on Entitlement; Findings of Fact; Severity; Localized Injury to Shoulder; Tetanus-Diphtheria- Acellular Pertussis (Tdap); Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA).

John Robert Howie, Howie Law, PC, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner.

Jennifer Leigh Reynaud, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On January 15, 2019, K.P. filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that as a result of a tetanus-diphtheria-acellular pertussis (“Tdap”) vaccine received on September 12, 2016, she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) as defined on the Vaccine Injury Table (the “Table”).

1When this decision was originally filed the undersigned advised his intent to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner filed a timely motion to redact certain information. This decision is being reissued with Petitioner’s name redacted to her initials Except for those changes and this footnote, no other substantive changes have been made. This decision will be posted on the court’s website with no further opportunity to move for redaction.

2National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). Petition (ECF No. 1) at Preamble. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of Special Masters. After a full review of the evidence, I find it most likely that Petitioner’s injury was limited to her left shoulder; that the injury and its residual effects lasted for more than six months; and that she is otherwise entitled to compensation. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Deem SIRVA Table Elements are Satisfied (ECF No. 32) is granted.

I. Relevant Procedural History

As referenced above, Petitioner initiated her claim, accompanied by the requisite supporting documentation (filed as Exs. 1-14), in January 2019.3 She filed updated records (Exs. 15-17) approximately one year later. The parties engaged in settlement discussions from December 2019 – July 2020, before reaching an impasse. Status Reports (ECF Nos. 18, 21-26). Thereafter, in December 2020, Respondent filed his formal report opposing compensation, contending that (1) Petitioner had not established the statutory “severity” requirement of six or more months of injury-related sequelae,4 and (2) Petitioner’s pain was not limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered. Rule 4(c) Report (ECF No. 29) at 5-6 (citing Vaccine Act Section 11(c)(1)(D)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10)).

On April 22, 2021, Petitioner filed a supplemental affidavit (Ex. 19)5 and a Motion to Deem SIRVA Table Elements are Satisfied (ECF No. 32). On May 13, 2021, Respondent filed his Response (ECF No. 34). Petitioner filed her Reply (ECF No. 35) the same day. The matter is ripe for adjudication.

II. Authority

Pursuant to Vaccine Act Section 13(a)(1)(A), a petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the matters required in the petition by Vaccine Act Section 11(c)(1). A special master must consider, but is not bound by, any diagnosis, conclusion, judgment, test result, report, or summary concerning the nature, causation, and aggravation of petitioner’s injury or illness that is contained in a medical record.

3The claim was originally assigned to then-Chief Special Master Dorsey (now Special Master Dorsey), in her purview overseeing the SPU. In early October 2019, the case was reassigned to me as the current Chief Special Master.

4 Petitioner does not allege, nor would the evidence support, either alternative for establishing the severity requirement: that the alleged injury resulted in death, or “inpatient hospitalization and surgical intervention.” Section 11(c)(1)(D)(ii), (iii).

5 As identified in the docket text, Bates-stamping, and Petitioner’s briefing.

2 Section 13(b)(1). “Medical records, in general, warrant consideration as trustworthy evidence. The records contain information supplied to or by health professionals to facilitate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions. With proper treatment hanging in the balance, accuracy has an extra premium. These records are also generally contemporaneous to the medical events.” Cucuras v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 993 F.2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, where medical records are clear, consistent, and complete, they should be afforded substantial weight. Lowrie v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 03- 1585V, 2005 WL 6117475, at *20 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 12, 2005). However, this rule does not always apply. “Written records which are, themselves, inconsistent, should be accorded less deference than those which are internally consistent.” Murphy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-882V, 1991 WL 74931, *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. April 25, 1991), quoted with approval in decision denying review, 23 Cl. Ct. 726, 733 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 968 F.2d 1226 (Fed.Cir.1992)). And the Federal Circuit recently “reject[ed] as incorrect the presumption that medical records are accurate and complete as to all the patient’s physical conditions.” Kirby v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 997 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

The United States Court of Federal Claims has outlined four possible explanations for inconsistencies between contemporaneously created medical records and later testimony: (1) a person’s failure to recount to the medical professional everything that happened during the relevant time period; (2) the medical professional’s failure to document everything reported to her or him; (3) a person’s faulty recollection of the events when presenting testimony; or (4) a person’s purposeful recounting of symptoms that did not exist. La Londe v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 110 Fed. Cl. 184, 203-04 (2013), aff’d, 746 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The Court has also said that medical records may be outweighed by testimony that is given later in time that is “consistent, clear, cogent, and compelling.” Camery v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 42 Fed. Cl. 381, 391 (1998) (citing Blutstein v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-2808, 1998 WL 408611, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 1998). The credibility of the individual offering such fact testimony must also be determined. Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bradley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

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